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These rudimentary [jural] ideas are to the jurist what the primary
crusts of the earth are to the geologist.
-Henry Sumner Maine'
I was trying to reach land, the solid land of fixed and settled
rules .... [However,] the nature of the judicial process... is not
discovery, but creation ....
-Benjamin N. Cardozo2
The truth is, that the law is always approaching,and never reaching,
consistency.
3
-Oliver Wendell Holmes
I.

INTRODUCTION

The evolution of Anglo-American contract law has garnered the
attention of many of the twentieth century's great jurisprudential scholars.
Contract law's evolution has a surprisingly short time frame. Contract's
predecessor, the common law writ system,4 was alive well into the

nineteenth century. Some scholars, such as Professor Gilmore, have
already written a eulogy to the relatively brief existence of the law of
contract.' He has argued that contract's twin, the law of torts, has won

the battle for survival through a juristic Darwinism. Professor Gilmore
1.
2.
3.
4.

HENRY S.MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 3 (Peter Smith 1970) (1861).
BENJAMIw N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921).
OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 32 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) (1881).
One legal scholar summarizes the recent idea of a unified theory of contract:
Our early common law had no general theory of contract in the sense that,
provided they satisfied certain legal tests [or requirements], promises or agreements
generally should be enforceable by the courts. All that it had was a system of writs
designed to protect rights deriving from a few transactions .... This form of action on
the case... ultimately became the normal remedy for breaches of contract ....
DAVID H. PARRY, THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH LAW 3 (1959) (emphasis added).
5. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). Contra E. Allan Farnsworth,
Contracts Is Not Dead, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1034 (1992).
6. See GILMORE, supra note 5, at 87-102. Others have more eloquently stated this life cycle
of contract law. The life cycle is described as one which evolved from tort and whose history has
been one in which it has come full circle. From Professor Fuller's tort-like revelation that reliance
was a ground for enforcement of a contractual obligation, L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interestin ContractDamages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936), to the acceptance of promissory
estoppel to "prevent injustice," Todd M. Smith, Note, Wrongful DischargeReexamined: The Crisis
Matures, Ohio Responds, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1209, 1248 (1991), and, finally, to the growth
of tort causes of action with the renunciation of the doctrine of privity, contract has returned like the
"prodigal son" to where it had come. In his reflection of the historical foundation of contract, Professor Atiyah explains that contract was an outgrowth of the law of tort and unjust enrichment. See P.S.
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correctly emphasizes that the classical theorist's fanaticism with the
demarcation between contract and tort are, in many cases, purely
semantical. The rise of the concepts of promissory estoppel7 and unjust
enrichment 8 has further blurred the dividing line between contract and
tort. Gilmore takes note of "the absurdity of attempting to preserve the
nineteenth century contract-tort dichotomy." 9
Contract law has been characterized as formalistic in content and
application. The formalism of classical contract theory has long been the
focus of most black letter renditions of the rules of contract. Contract
dogma dictates the need for mutual assent, through offer and acceptance,
coupled with an exchange of consideration."0 It requires that the
agreement be between two parties possessing legal capacity and that the
consideration involve a legal subject matter. Each of the these requirements of contract have provided protective umbrellas for layers and

ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 750-51 (1979). Professor Atiyah also
critiques the notion of an evolutionary Darwinism which some law and economics theorists have
argued transcends the law of contracts and leads to the survival of efficient rules:
[A] competitive or evolutionary process has helped efficient rules to survive. The argument ... is that contracting parties will always unerringly go for the efficient
solution... ;if the rules of the law are inefficient, therefore, parties will contract round
them, that is, exclude the inefficient rules from their contract. They will gradually perish
through lack of use; the efficient rules will survive.
P.S. Atiyah, The Theoretical Basis of Contract Lmv--An English Perspective, I INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 183, 195 (1981) (reviewing Posner and Kronman's work on law and economics). The
evolutionary nature of the law may also be attributed to the work of Henry Sumner Maine and his
historical school of law. "[T]he historical school [emphasized] the gradual evolution of legal institutions ....Maine declared that 'the jurist ... has nothing to do with any ideal standard of law or
morals."' PARRY, supra note 4, at 15 (quoting an earlier edition of HENRY S. MAINE, LECTURES ON
THE EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 370 (7th ed. 1966)). Professor Maine showed "that legal ideas
and institutions have a real course of development as much as the genera and species of living
creatures." Frederick Pollock, Introduction, in MAINE, supra note 1, at xiv.
7. The acceptance of promissory estoppel or detrimental reliance as a separate ground for
recovery was "codified" as early as 1932. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
8. Unjust enrichment is often referred to as quasi-contract. One may argue that the fact that
the recovery is not necessarily based upon a bargained for exchange brings it outside the realm of
contract. Others argue that the fact that one is attempting to recover for a benefit bestowed is reason
enough to view it as a contract remedy. See GILMORE, supra note 5, at 89. Whether considered as
quasi-contract or quasi-tort, unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel have expanded the "law of
obligations" and have widened the range of private "transactions" for which judicial relief will be
granted.
9. Id. at 90.
10. See generally Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1933)
(examining the beliefs, policies, and theories from which contract law developed). "The whole of
the modem law of contract, it may be argued,.... respond[s] to the need of greater or finer
discrimination in regard to the intentional characterof acts." Id, at 578 (emphasis added).
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layers of contract doctrine. From the Statute of Frauds to the infancy law
doctrine, the law of contracts is filled with formalistic rules that have
been fragmented into numerous minority views and are of little universal
or uniform application." As these layers of doctrine have been exposed
and criticized, the notion of a unified theory of contract, at least in its
classical garb, has been dealt a serious blow. Professor Langdell's "riot
of pure doctrine,'2 encompassing the notion that an entire field of law
could be created and formalized into a doctrinal general theory, was
doomed.

Professor Gilmore's argument that contract law has been absorbed
by the ever-expanding realm of tort is not without merit. One may argue
that the "death of contract," in its pure or classical form, also means the
"death of tort" by the blending of the two fields into a hybrid "law of
obligations." The expansion of estoppel "may ultimately provide the
doctrinal justification for the fusing of contract and tort in a unified
theory of civil obligation."' 3 A more accurate hypothesis would be to
argue not the death of contract but the death of the notion of a unified
theory of contract. The history of contract is one of numerous expositions
of unified theories, most of which have spawned variant theories and
scholarly criticism: Blackstone 4 begot Mansfield," natural law theorists 6 begot legal positivists, 7 classical theorists" begot legal realists. 9

11. The infancy law doctrine is an example of the deconstruction of a specific contract
doctrine. It has disintegrated into a number of minority doctrines: benefit rule, depreciation rule,
misrepresentation of age rule, necessities doctrine, doing business rule, and emancipation doctrine.
See Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructingthe Myth of the "Infancy Law Doctrine": From Incapacity
to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 481,488-99 (1995); see also Clare Dalton, An Essay in the
Deconstructionof Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1095 (1985) (explaining that the various
doctrines obscure "concrete contractual issues").
12. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 98. Simply stated, Langdell's theory is that "law is doctrine and
nothing but doctrine-pure, absolute, abstract, scientific ... ." Id.
13. Id. at 90.
14. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
15. Mansfield advocated an expansive view of contract premised upon both the notion of moral
obligation and the "establishment of morality as th[e] test" of enforceability of promises. PARRY,
supra note 4, at 9.
16. See generallyJOHN FINNIS, NATuRAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1980)
(discussing the classical and main stream theories of natural law). The natural law theorists have
been associated with the notion that the jurisprudential scholar's task is to determine what the law
"ought to do"; that is, the belief that morality and the law are inseparable. In summarizing the
concept of "practical reasonableness" in natural law, Professor Finnis states:
Now we can see why some philosophers have located the essence of 'morality' in the
reduction of harm, others in the increase of well-being, some in social harmony, some
in universalizability ....some in the all-round flourishing of the individual ....Each
of these has a place in rational choice of commitments .... Each, moreover, contributes
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to the sense, significance, and force of terms such as 'moral', '[morally] ought', and
'right' ....
Id. at 126 (alteration in original). St. Thomas Aquinas, in Summa Theologim, posits his version of
natural law. In short, human law is the product of human reason which allows all humans to derive
the one true eternal law which all humans possess by nature. "Accordingly it is clear that natural law
is nothing other than the sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent creatures." 28 THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGLE 23 (Thomas Gilby O.P. ed., 1966). Additionally, Aquinas notes, "[J]ustice took
its startfrom nature, and then certainthings became custom by reasonoftheir usefulness; thereafter
the things put forward by nature and approved by custom were sanctioned by fear and reverence
for the law." 28 id. at 27 (quoting CICERO, DE INVENTIONE ORATORIA II 53); see also THOMAS
AQUINAS, SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 419-20 (Timothy McDermott trans., 1993).
17. John Austin is considered the father of legal positivism. Austin believed that legal
jurisprudentialists should not be concerned with the ought to of natural theory but should study law
as it is, or what is called the positive law. For Austin, the positive law was the enunciation of
"commands" by a sovereign body to its public charges. "This analytical approach rigorously
distinguished positive law from matters such as morality and justice.... Positive law.., was
defined by Austin as a species of command ... [that] flows from a determinate source .... The
R.B. VERMEESCH & K.E. LINDGREN,
determinate source of these commands is a sovereign ....
BUSINESS LAW OF AUSTRALIA 616 (2d ed. 1973) (emphasis omitted). Two variant schools of
positive law are associated with Hans Kelsen's "pure theory" of positive law and H.L.A. Hart's
"primary-secondary" rules of law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (2d ed. 1961); HANS
KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 1967).
18. The classical theory of contracts has often been associated with laissez-faire economics.
The legal counterpart is the liberal notion of freedom of contract. The basis for enforcement should
thus be the intent or agreement of the parties. It was not for the courts to determine the normative
values of a given transaction. If a transaction possessed the needed formalities, then enforcement of
the contractual obligation would be an action for the court. It was not for the court to determine if
there were factors of procedural unfairness (unequal bargaining positions) or of substantive
unfairness (unconscionable contract terms). "[T]he shibboleths 'freedom of contract' and 'sanctity
of contract' became the foundations on which the whole law of contract was built.... [Judges]
thought that it was just to enforce contractual duties strictly according to the letter." P.S. ATIYAH,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 9 (4th ed. 1989).
19. Professor Lon Fuller is the father of legal realism. "[H]e portrays the formal requirements
of [classical] contract as being in dialectical, productive tension with their functional goals .... "
James Boyle, Legal Realism andthe Social Contract:Fuller'sPublicJurisprudenceof Form, Private
Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 371, 372 (1993). In short, reliance upon
formalities would render contract doctrines unfair in substance and irrational in application. For
example, the fictional finding of consent or intent to imply contractual terms is an obvious rue.
Instead, the notion of process and of developing formal rules that would foster the ends of justice
and fairness was the proper approach to contract. As stated by Professor Fuller: "The intellectual
torture which our courts inflict on legal doctrine will be obviated when we have brought ourselves
to the point where we are willing to accept as sufficient justification for a decision the
'non-technical' considerations which really motivated it." L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82
U. PA. L. REv. 429, 435 (1934).
Karl Llewellyn is also closely associated with the legal realism movement. The legal realist
generally believed that "there was no inherently true deductive system of value" underlying contract
law. Todd D. Rakoff, Contractsof Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174,
1201 n.101 (1983); see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
122 (1960); K.N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REV.
665, 673-74 (1925) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Legal Institutions];Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective,40 YALE LJ. 704, 707 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, What Price
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This Article begins with the premise that there is no generally
accepted unified theory of contract.2" A review of the case law is
undertaken in order to uncover the normative mind-sets 21 used by
judges in deciding contract disputes. The search for underlying norms or
rationales in contract is far from a novel concept. The "new spirit" of
contract theorists 22 and the notion of "fairness of exchange" 23 have
provided justifications for the loosening of the strict application of
traditional contract doctrine and for the expansion of its remedial net.
Notions of substantive fairness and fair dealing have long been an
accepted part of American jurisprudence. 24 However, contract purists

Contract?] ("So much, indeed, has been done that some hope offers of putting together a sketch of
the whole. Chimerical such a sketch must be-compounded of parts strangers to each other, a dreamthing, and mayhap a monster... ."). Other charter members of the "realist movement" include
Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., Benjamin N. Cardozo, John Chipman Gray, and Roscoe Pound. See
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 11, 22-26 (1982).
20. It is true that many of our greatest jurisprudential scholars have attempted to formulate a
general theory of contract. E.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70
COLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1970); Robert S. Summers, PragmaticInstrumentalismin Twentieth Century
American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law
and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1981). It is also true that a number have rejected the notion
of a unified theory. "Indeed it is a point of some of these critics (for example, Friedman, Gilmore,
Macneil) that the search for a central or unfying principle of contract is a will-o'-the-wisp, an
illusion typical of the ill-defined but much excoriated vice of conceptualism." CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 3 (1981) (emphasis added).
Professor Gilmore succinctly states the argument of the "ephemeral" problem with which all unified
theories must deal: "The materials which, as lawyers, we deal with are, as we are all too unhappily
aware, forever changing--they dissolve and recombine and metamorphose into their own opposites,
all, it seems, without a moment's notice." GILMORE, supra note 5, at 3-4. As to the current state of
affairs, Professor Gilmore states that it was through a process of "doctrinal disintegration" that "[tihe
systems have come unstuck and we see, presently, no way of glueing [sic] them back together
again." Id. at 101, 102.
21. An early example of such a normative mind-set was espoused by Lord Mansfield, who
believed all promises, with or without "commercial consideration," should be binding. Thus,
gratuitous, charitable, and familial promises are to be equally binding as a contract to purchase
goods. See GILMORE, supra note 5, at 18 & 110 n.32 (citing Hawkes v. Saunders, 98 Eng. Rep.
1091, 1091 (1782) ("[T]he ties of conscience upon an upright mind are a sufficient consideration.")).
22. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980) (predicting a move
away from the notion that there is "one best way" to conduct contractual relations); Richard E.
Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193 (1982) (discussing Judge Teitelbaum's
opinion in Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), as
the progenitor of the "new spirit").
23. See generally P.S. Atiyah, Contractand FairExchange, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1985)
(theorizing that, although contract law has traditionally not been concerned with the adequacy of

consideration, courts have indeed concerned themselves with substantive fairness of exchange
through other means).
24. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 1-203, 2-103(1)(b), 2-209 cmt. 2 (1995); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
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have clung to the belief that these developments were not a direct affront
to the mystical notion of a unified theory. Unified theories have justified
the enforcement of contracts based upon such precepts as the classical

"meeting of the minds" of the parties,
contract "as

promise," 26

5

the "morality" of contract,

'
and the "bargain principle."27

One way to examine a subject is to study it at its fringes. In order
to understand the beginning of the universe, scientists have studied its
expansion by looking out to far off galaxies. It is the technique of
examining the remnants of the "big bang" in order to reverse in theory
and reconstruct the moment of creation. 28 Alternatively, in the words of
Judge Posner, it is at the fringes of the law that new "discoveries" are
incorporated into the law so as to "cause the least perturbation in the
system., 29 So, in order to understand the essence of contract we need
to look to the frontier of contract law, that area of the law where
contractual certainty is at its weakest.3" The law of satisfaction,"1
substantial performance,32 and of quasi-contractual instruments or
"comfort letters" 33 are among the areas that are examined in order to

25. See I SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 22 (3d ed. 1957)
(1920). A variant of this subjective meeting of the minds is its objective counterpart, the "consent
theory" of contract. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract,86 COLUM. L. REV.
269 (1986).
26. See FRIED, supra note 20, at 14-17. But see Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with
Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1022, 1025 (1992) ("But a moral theory of promising,
standing alone, would have courts enforcing purely moral commitments, which is tantamount to
legislating virtue.").
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1979); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REV. 741, 742 (1982) ("By bargain, I mean an
exchange in which each party views the performance that he undertakes as the price of the
performance undertaken by the other.').
28. One commentator has noted:
By peering into the deep recesses of space, the astronomers are, in effect, looking back
in time to periods in the history of the cosmos when the galaxies were in their infancy.
Since the light from a galaxy 12 billion light years away took 12 billion years to reach
the earth, they are seeing the galaxy as it appeared [12 billion years ago].
Kim A. McDonald, Life Historyof the Cosmos, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 14, 1994, at
A10.
29. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 81 (1990). "We try ... to
accommodate the new discovery by adjusting the periphery of our epistemic system rather than by
changing the core." Id.
30. Judge Posner defines "thinking like a lawyer" as "an awareness of approximately how
plastic law is at the frontiers ....
Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
31. See infra part III.
32. See infra part III.B.
33. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo & Rene Sacasas, Creditand Value Comfort Instruments:
Crossing the Line from Assurance to Legally Significant Reliance and Toward a Theory of
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better understand the "spirit of contract." First, however, a brief look at
some of the widely recognized "unified" theories of contract law is in

order.
II.

A HISTORY OF CONTRACT THEORY THROUGH A
"UNIFIED" PERSPECTIVE

A. Classical Contract Theory and Its Progeny
Legal history in general, and, more specifically, Anglo-American
jurisprudence, 4 is filled with numerous general theories of law. In the
eighteenth century, we were given the Blackstonian 35 construct that, by
some almost divine intervention, the common law of England, like the
Ten Commandments, had descended upon us from above; that through
the use of the Eighteenth Century's defining innovation, the scientific
method, one could discover the one true law already embodied in the
common law. For Blackstone, this gold mine of reason had miraculously
developed unknowingly and only had to be mined.36 New law was not

Enforceability,47 BAYLOR L. REv. 357 (1995) (explaining that, although comfort instruments were
presumed to lack the required intent for enforceability, the growth of lawsuits in which comfort
instruments have become the operative instruments of contention has caused the elimination of the
per se rule of their unenforceability); see also infra part III.H.
34. "Jurisprudence" is defined as the "philosophy of law, or the science which treats of the
principles of positive law [laws adopted by a proper authority for the government] and legal
relations." It comes from the Latinjurisprudentiaor "legal science." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
854-55 (6th ed. 1990); see also THOMAs E. HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE (12th ed. 1916). Jeremy
Bentham gives the accepted "dual" definition ofjurisprudence as the study of what law "is" or what
it "ought" to be: "[J]urisprudence can have but one or the other of two objects: 1. To ascertain what
the law is [or] 2. To ascertain what it ought to be." JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. XVII, § 2 (spec. ed. 1986) (1780) (footnote omitted).
For an insightful study of the definitional problem of jurisprudence, see R.H.S. Tur, What Is
Jurisprudence?,28 PHIL. Q. 149 (1978).
35. William Blackstone lived from 1723 to 1780 and was appointed to a professorship at
Oxford in 1753. See Charles M. Haar, Preface to 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND at xxi, xxi (1962). The Commentaries comprise his contribution to the
"quantification" of a general theory of law. See 4 id. at xxvii. Haar wrote:
That the Commentaries are a milestone in legal history is without question. They
are a starting point for understanding the common law. They present a storehouse for
study in intellectual history, a unified and comprehensive statement of the eighteenth
century's ideas and assumptions as applied to the ordering of society through law.
4 id. See generallyDANIEL J. BOORSItN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW (Peter Smith 1973)
(1941) (analyzing Blackstone's work in the Commentaries on the Laws of England against the
backdrop of eighteenth century thought).
36. "The old Blackstonian theory of pre-existing rules of law which judges found, but did not
make ... ." CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 131.
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needed, for all the questions had already been answered. It was a
conservative ijtihad" premised on the belief that the legal system and
its substantive law did not have to reflect the commercial and technological upheaval represented in the industrial revolution.3 8 Through scientific intellect, one only had to discover the unifying truths that
underscored all areas of the law. Blackstone's reactionary call allowed
the jurist the luxury of not needing to transform the law to meet the
needs of rapidly changing economic and social conditions. The law was
the bedrock that provided the stability needed to prevent civilized society
from crumbling into anarchy. His judicial mandate was clear: "Let us
preserve, unchanged, the estate which we have been lucky enough to
inherit."3 9
This can be considered the first unified theory of our common law.
"Our early common law had no general theory of contract in the sense
that, provided they satisfied certain legal tests, promises or agreements
generally should be enforceable by the courts. All that it had was a
system of writs designed to protect rights deriving from a few transactions. . . ."0 The writ system was doomed to fail, for law must react
to the changing conditions of society or the anarchy it is intended to
prevent would surely reign. The history of contract jurisprudence is one
of various attempts at creating a unified theory to justify the legal
enforceability of private obligations. The "promise theory" of contract
has held sway for the greater part of this century. Its banner has been
championed in successive generations by Samuel Williston, as reporter

37. In Islamic law, the iftihad, or notion of independent reasoning, was terminated in the tenth
century because "early scholars had interpreted the divine law (the Shari'a) sufficiently." RICHARD
SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND ITS ENWRONMENT 47 (2d ed. 1993); see also

Nabil Saleh, The Law Governing Contracts in Arabia, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 761, 763 (1989)
("Sunni jurists of the early tenth century ... and onwards proclaimed that the door of Utihad (the
exercise of human reason in order to find a rule of Shari'a law) was closed.").
38. One commentator noted:
At the end of the Napoleonic Wars Britain was clearly the world's leading manufacturing
nation ....[I]t emerged as the world's leading commercial nation... accounting for
between one-fourth and one-third of total international commerce ....Britain retained
its dominance as both an industrial and trading nation for most of the nineteenth century.
RONDO CAMERON, A CONCISE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WORLD 222 (1989) (footnote omitted).
39.

GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERiCAN LAW 5 (1977).

40. PARRY,supra note 4, at 3. "[In] the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ... the writ of
assumpsit had opened the door wider to provide a general remedy for the breach of an agreement
and before the doctrine of consideration had been fully defined as a workable criterion for
determining what agreements should be legally enforceable...." Id.at 8.
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of the Restatement of Contracts,4 and E. Allan Farnsworth, as reporter
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.42 The Restatement (Second)
of Contractsdefines a contract as "a promise... for the breach of which
the law gives a remedy ...
The importance of promise as the basis
of contract is that it requires judicial intervention into the world of future
performances. A promise is a commitment to a future performance. Such
a recognition was a complete departure from what had come before in
the English writ system. Professor Farnsworth poses the following query:
From the standpoint of contract law, the decision to recognize
purely executory exchanges of promises opened a Pandora's box of
problems. What could the law do to ensure that the exchange of
promises was followed by the exchange of performances expected by
the parties?... Were any limits to be placed on the expectations for
which recovery would be allowed?'
One of the attempts to limit the scope of the enforceability of
promises is the "will theory." For a promise to be binding there must be
a subjective "meeting of the minds," or wills, between the contracting
parties.45 The party being bound had to subjectively intend to enter into
a binding contractual obligation.46 This notion that one could disaffirm
a contract if she could prove that there had been no subjective intent to
make a promise was a fundamental tenet of contract law throughout the
nineteenth century.47 More recently, Professor Fried espoused that "so

41. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS at v (1932). For an understanding of Professor Williston's
position on the notion of promise in contract, see generally I WILLISTON, supra note 25.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS at v (1979). See generally E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1990) (compiling both a textbook for students and handbook for
practitioners).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979).
44. FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 1.3, at 10.
45. For a review of the rise and fall of the will theory of contract, see MORTON J. HORwITz,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning"
in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967); Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent in the
Formationof Contracts, 14 U. ILL. L. REv. 525 (1919).
46. "Intention is regarded as the keystone of contract law." JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-4(b), at 8 (3rd ed. 1987); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, The
Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM L. REV. 576, 577 (1969);
Roscoe Pound, The Role of the Will in Lav, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1954) (noting that an English
Chancellor explained that he "looked at the substance, not the form, and that the intention of those
who engaged in a transaction was the substance").
47. "T]wo of the finest flowers of nineteenth century subjectivism-an attitude which
modulates smoothly into a theory of the untrammeled autonomy of the individual will and thence
into the idea of unrestricted freedom of contract which was surely one of the master concepts of
nineteenth century thought." GILMORE, supra note 5, at 40 (emphasis added).
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long as we see contractual obligation as based on promise, on obligations
that the parties have themselves assumed, the focus of the inquiry is on
4 The importance of promise as the gauge of
the will of the parties."
contractual liability is fundamental. By focusing upon the "will of the
parties," the arbiter is precluded from inquiry into extraneous matters
such as injury to the other party. Professor Fried argues that to the extent
that contract is viewed as promise, then the "Death of Contract"
theorists49 will fail in their doctrinal
attempt to "assimilate contractual
50
torts."
of
law
the
to
obligation
Consensus ad idem, or the subjective meeting of the minds, still
rings true in legal folklore.5 However, the inherent inability to determine subjective intent gave way to the use of a community standard, or
objective standard, for determining intent. Even as far back as the time
of Henry Sumner Maine's writings, the subjective-objective dialectic
began to acknowledge the distinction between the ideal and that of
practical application. "Lastly, the Consensual Contracts emerge, in which
the mental attitude of the contractors is solely regarded, and external
circumstances have no title to notice except as evidence of the inward
undertaking."5 2 Justice Holmes viewed legal development as the
inevitable movement towards objectivity and formalism. "The law moved
from 'subjective' to 'objective,'
from 'internal' to 'external,' from
' 53
'formal.'
to
'informal'
The Anglo-American preference for objective standards that could
be easily and fairly applied soon came to the fore.54 "[T]he 'objective

48. FRIED, supra note 20, at 4 (emphasis added).
49. E.g., GILMORE, supra note 5.
50. FRIED, supra note 20, at 4.
51. The finding of intent or "mutual assent" has been the core requirement for contract
formation in Anglo-American jurisprudence. In his discussion of the "discrete norm," Professor

Macneil notes that "two of the common contract norms [are the] implementation of planning and
effectuation of consent." MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 59-60.
52. MAINE, supra note 1, at 328 (emphasis added).
53. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 41; see also HOLMES, supra note 3, at 230 ("It is said that

consideration must not be confounded with motive.... A consideration may be given and accepted,
in fact, solely for the purpose of making a promise binding.").

54. The movement from the subjective to the objective has been a relatively universal
phenomena. For example, with respect to Australia, it has been noted: "In the nineteenth century it
was common to regard a contract as resulting from a true meeting of minds. There had to be a
genuine consensus ad idem .... The modem tendency is to determine the existence of agreement
on a more objective basis .... " VERMEESCH & LINDOREN, supra note 17, at 133. The use of
external manifestation and standards theoretically made the judges' "discovery" of intent an easier
task. "If... we can restrict ourselves to the 'externals' . . . then the factual inquiry will be much
simplified .... " GILMORE, supra note 5, at 42.
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theory of contract' became the great metaphysical solvent-the critical
test for distinguishing between the false and the true."55 The subjective
meeting of the minds was transplanted by the implication of intent
through the use of the reasonable person principle. This objective
approach has a lineage almost as long as its subjective counterpoise. 6
"The objective approach of the law to nearly all questions of agreement,
assent, or intention in the law of contract was established beyond dispute
by the end of the classical period. . . ."" The objective notion of law
far precedes the classical period of Anglo-American contract law. Kant
notes that imperatives or commands are "formulas expressing the relation
of objective laws of volition in general to the subjective imperfection of
the will of [the] rational being."5 8 He espouses that "nothing remains
which can determine the will objectively except the law, and nothing
subjectively except pure respect for this practical law."59 Thus, the
normative "ought to," as filtered by the subjective will, is, for Kant, the
simple duty of all rational beings to obey the law despite "inclinations"
that would indicate otherwise.6"
Judge Learned Hand enunciated the objective approach to contract
as well as anyone in the 1911 case of Hotchkiss v. National City
61
Bank:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal ...intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the
mere force of law to certain acts of the parties ....If, however, it
were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the
words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law
imposes upon them, he would still be held ....
...[W]hatever was the understanding in fact.., is of not the

55. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 42-43.
56. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 29, at 25 ("On the side of law as an objective entity... we
have the distinguished lineage of Antigone, Socrates, Coke, Blackstone, Langdell ....On the side
of law as politics ...we have the equally distinguished lineage of ...Hobbes, Bentham, Holmes,
and H.L.A. Hart. . ").

57. ATIYAH, supra note 18, at 11. The classical period is defined by Professor Atiyah as the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See id. at 8.
58. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31 (Lewis W. Beck
trans., 6th prtg. 1959).
59. Id. at 17.
60. See id. Kant makes clear that the will's determination of its duty to obey the law, and not
the effects of the law, is the ultimate good. "[T]he pre-eminent good can consist only in the
conception of the law in itself .,. so far as this conception and not the hoped-for effect is the
determining ground of the will." Id.
61. 200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913).
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slightest consequence, unless it took form in some acts or words,
which, being reasonably interpreted, would have such meaning to
ordinary
men.... The rights and obligations depend upon the law
62
alone.

The objective approach to intent and contracts in general has been
"codified" in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts' bargain principle.63
Section 17 states that "the formation of a contract requires a bargain in
which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange." 64 The
operative word is "manifestation." Actual assent is not required; an
outward or objective manifestation is all that is required. Apparent assent
is sufficient even if lack of actual assent can be proved. "[-It is clear that
a mental reservation of a party to a bargain does not impair the
obligation he purportsto undertake. 65
A major doctrinal development was the acceptance of an exchange
of promises as fulfillment of the "mutuality of consideration" requirement
dictated under the "bargain theory" of contract. A promise based upon
merely "moral consideration" was to be viewed as being outside the
sweep of "promise[s] ... for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy."' The notion of mutuality of consideration narrowed the sweep
of legally enforceable contractual obligations. The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts "codifies" the requirement of a bargain for exchange: "In
modem times the enforcement of bargains ... is extended to the wholly
executory exchange in which promise is exchanged for promise .... The
promise is enforced by virtue of the fact of bargain, without more." 67
Professor Egan explains the reasons for the popularity of the "bargain

62. Id. at 293-94 (emphasis added).

63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1979).
64. Id. § 17(1) (emphasis added); see also id. § 18 (concerning manifestation of mutual assent);
id. § 19 (explaining how conduct may be regarded as manifestation of assent); id. § 53(3)
(commenting on manifestation of intention not to accept); id. § 57 (explaining that, where
notification is required, "[an] offeror is not bound by an acceptance in equivocal terms unless he
reasonably understandsit as an acceptance" (emphasis added)); id. § 65 cmt. a (making note of the
use of a reasonable medium of acceptance); id. § 71 cmt. b ("[T]he law is concerned with the
external manifestation rather than the undisclosed mental state.").
65. Id. § 17 cmt. c (emphasis added).
66. Id. § 1.
67. Id. § 75 cmt. a. The sanctity of the bargain concept is tempered by § 90 which allows for
the enforcement of "half' of the bargain because of detrimental reliance by another party. Thus, "[a]
promise which... induce[s an] action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise." Id § 90(1). The insertion of this section on "promissory estoppel"
evolved during the drafting of the FirstRestatement. Section 90 was a victory for Professor Corbin,
a staunch believer in reliance theory, over his rival, Professor Williston. For an interesting account
of this "duel of scholars" see GILMORE, supra note 5, at 57-65.
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principle":
The strict bargain principle of contract law developed in response
to the rise of the free market. The bargain principle's real appeal was

its ease of administration. Theorists and courts found that rigid rules
applied in an objective manner required a lot less inquiry and thought
than attempting to inject equity and fairness into a consensual transaction. 8
The concept of mutual assent or the bargain principle of traditional
contract law focused primarily on "contractual certainty" regarding
contract terms. This notion of certainty is reflected in the notion that an
offer and acceptance should be a "mirror image" of one another. Thus,
if the terms are not identical, then there could be no finding of contractual intent.69 The ongoing use of the certainty rationale was demonstrated
in the 1992 English case of Waford v. Miles.7" "'If the law does not
recogni[z]e a contract to enter into a contract (when there is a fundamen-

tal term yet to be agreed) it seems to me it cannot recogni[z]e a contract
to negotiate. The reason is that it is too uncertain to have any binding
force .... "" In fact, the Willistonian notion that "mutual assent" must
be present at the time of contract formation has long faded in importance.72 It is now generally held that such intention to be bound may be
implied. It is for the courts to determine based upon the "totality of the
circumstances." 73 This more expansive view of contractual intent has

68. Thomas P. Egan, Equitable Doctrines Operating Against the Express Provisions of a
Written Contract (Or When Black and White Equals Gray), 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 261, 311 (1993).
69. The importance of certainty in the rules of contract has long been a rationale given for the
formalistic application of those rules. It is this "certainty of rules" with which the legal realist took
issue. "Uncertainty is a source of cost and disutility
....[A] defining characteristic of legal
realism.. . is depreciation of the benefits of rules in reducing uncertainty." POSNEP, supranote 29,
at 45.
70. 1 All E.R. 453 (1992).
71. Id. at 459 (alteration in original) (quoting Courtney & Fairbom Ltd. v. Tolaini Bros.
(Hotel) Ltd., I All E.R. 716, 720 (1974)).
72. Traditional contract theory is closely associated with the influential writings of Professor
Samuel Williston. Traditional contract theory focuses solely upon whether there was a reaching of
"mutual assent" at the time of "contract formation." Subsequent events are rendered meaningless
under this analysis. See I WILLISTON, supranote 25, § 22.
73. The implication of intent is a widely accepted prerogative of the courts because the parties
"with hindsight ...will tend to the interpretation that best suits their interests." Howell Lewis,
Letters of Comfort, 139 NEW LJ. 339, 339 (1989) (discussing the use of contractually ambiguous
comfort letters in commercial and financial transactions). Courts will then "objectively" imply or not
imply contractual intent based upon the "totality of the circumstances." One commentator noted,
"Courts look to the intent and surrounding circumstances of the parties when forming a
contract .... Egan, supra note 68, at 311 (concerning when a court should not apply the parol
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been a major development in twentieth century contract law.

Each theory has met with an even greater number of critiques. This
frenzy of intellectual analysis is even more remarkable given the

"newness" of this area of law. In fact, the American embodiment of
contract law began out of necessity in the late eighteenth century with
the "discovery" of manifest destiny.74 Its corresponding jurisprudence
is mostly a product of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However,
our jurisprudence can be further "legitimatized" by tracing its ancestry
to its English roots. Thus, our jurisprudence is one of many step-fathers:7
76
Thomas Hobbes," John Locke, David Hume," Jeremy Bentham, 1
79
John Austin, and John Stuart Mill" to name a few.
B.

Fuller's Reliance: Opening of Pandora'sBox

Fuller and Perdue's reliance work is considered a watershed in
the enforceability of contractual obligations. The executory exchange of

evidence rule).
74. "Americans moving west brought with them both a respect for the law and a rudimentary
knowledge of the law." KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 170 (1991).
75. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (London, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1976) (1651). Hobbes
(1588-1679) espoused a political theory advocating a strong, secular government as a means of
controlling natural human shortcomings such as selfishness and greed.
76. For John Locke's (1632-1704) best known works, see JOHN LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1975) (1689); JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge, University Press, 2d
ed. 1967) (3d prtg. 1698).
77. For examples of David Hume's (1711-1776) work, see DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1888) (1739-1740); HUME'S
MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Henry D. Aiken ed., Hafner Publishing Co. 1970) (including
such works as Essays, Moral and Politicaland selections from A Treatise of Human Nature).
78. See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 34 (proposing a theory of utilitarianism that all action
should be directed toward achieving the greatest good for the greatest number of persons). Jeremy
Bentham's (1748-1832) influence on the common law is well recognized: "The general trend [was]
in the direction of recognising utility rather than morality as the justification for the enforcement of
obligations." PARRY, supra note 4, at 13. Bentham is often associated with the movement toward
the codification of law.
79. For John Austin's (1790-1859) best known work, see JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (2d ed. 1970) (1861). Austin is regarded as the father of
Anglo-American analytical jurisprudence: "Austin's followers, for example, Holland, Salmond, and
Gray, followed suit; and their conclusion is that contracts should be enforced so as to prevent
disappointment of well-founded expectations." PARRY, supra note 4, at 14 (footnote omitted).
80. For examples of John Stuart Mill's (1806-1873) work in this area, see JOHN S. MILL, On
Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, AND ESSAY ON BENTHAM 126 (Mary Wamock ed.,
Penguin Books 1974) (1859); JOHN S. MILL, Utilitarianism,in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, AND
ESSAY ON BENTHAM, supra, at 251 (1863) (characterizing Mill as a disciple of Jeremy Bentham and
as the foremost spokesman of liberalism in the nineteenth century).
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promises that formed the basis of the bargain principle had now been
bifurcated. Only a single promise, expressed or implied, was needed in
order to make claim for a remedy. The notion of "mutual assent" or
"agreement" had thus been transformed into a fictional character to be
recast by those still clinging to the certainty and comfort provided by
classical contract. Was a bargained for exchange needed to elicit the
benefit of contract remedy? No! Did the promisee have to agree to a
specified reciprocal consideration to bind the promisor? No! Thus, a
meeting of the minds, subjectively (will theory) or objectively (bargain
theory), was a nice element for a judge to base a decision on, but was a
pure luxury. Instead, the notion of "justifiable reliance" became the basis
to launch the realm of contract remedies into greater reaches of
application.8 ' Promissory estoppel's dramatic coming out in the First
Restatement of Contracts and its triumphant preeminence in the
Restatement (Second) of Contractsilluminated Fuller's achievement and
Professor Corbin's vision.82 A recent commentary illustrates how far
contract has come from the days of classical contract's monolithic
reverence for freedom of contract:
One trend in contract law ...has been to place less emphasis on
the distinction between contract and tort law and more emphasis on
fairness in contractual relations. The reabsorption of classical contract
doctrine into the mainstream of tort is evidence supporting this
assertion: courts have slowly eroded classical contract doctrine in order
to remedy wrongs and prevent injustices from occurring between
private parties. The trend in contract law is to compensate "any
detriment reasonably incurred by a plaintiff in reliance on a
defendant's assurances. ' 3
The Restatement (Second) of Contractsprovides plenty of leeway
for such an expansive use of detrimental reliance or promissory
estoppel.84 It has been used to overcome missing elements, in the
traditional contract's equation, in order to find a contractual obligation;
for example, if two parties fail to clearly express contractual intent, a
81. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979) (noting that this section is
often referred to regarding "promissory estoppel").
82. "Corbin's abiding interest was in what he called the 'operative facts' of cases; he had no
love for, indeed little patience with, doctrine." GILMORE, supra note 5, at 58.
83. Kenneth J. Goldberg, Lender Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U. L. REV. 653, 668-69
(1988) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). "A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action.., and which does induce such action ...is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Id. § 90(1).
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court may imply such intent by finding "reasonable reliance." 5 The use
of equitable doctrines to imply the required intent comes within the realm
of what has been referred to as the "new spirit of contract." 6 This new
spirit places less emphasis upon the fictional "presentiation 87 of the
formal words of promise associated with classical contract theory.
Professor Speidel states the case for the new spirit of contract. "[I]n the
search for agreement the court should ascertain the legitimate business
aims of the [parties] as supplemented by the 'customs and expectations
of the particular business community.' The preference is for standards.., and agreement in fact rather than some limited concept of
promise.""
The underlying premise of this new spirit of contract is supported
by the belief that the courts should expand their analyses beyond the
words of the instrument. This expanded analysis takes into consideration
the "equities" of the overall transaction, including how subsequent events
may call for an "equitable reformation" of the contract.8 9 For example,
all contracts should be equitably reformed to include the obligations of
"good faith" and "conscionability." Professor Macneil stresses the
inability of human beings to reduce into written form pre-contractual
negotiations.9" The result is a distortion of classical contract's
"mutuality of obligation." The fragmentation of promises between what
is subjectively understood and what is presentiated in the form of
contract results in "nonmutuality rang[ing] from subtle to gross
differences in understanding."9 Professor Macneil argues that the courts
need to refer to "tacit assumptions" 92 in determining the enforceability
of promises. "Such assumptions may range from general ones such as

85. See id. § 90 cmt. b.
86. See Speidel, supra note 22, at 193 (discussing the district court's decision, in Aluminum
Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), to reform a contract where
the plaintiff would have lost $60 million based on "the court's sense of fairness").
87. Professor Macneil examines the concept of presentiation in his commentary on the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
Presentiation,60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974) (commentary).
88. Speidel, supra note 22, at 199.
89. Id. at 193.

90. See Macneil, supra note 87, at 590-97.
91. MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 9.
92. Id. at 25. The use of these assumptions is more closely associated with what persons
"ought to do" as opposed to what they "must legally do." See FINNIs, supra note 16, at 297-350.
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trust to the highly specific, such as assumptions about particular and
precise trade usages."9 a
Professor Fuller's discussion in "Contracts Imperfect in Expression
or in Legal Effect"94 called into question the contract norms that had
defined traditional contract law. Unexpected liability premised upon
reliance had become the order of the day. Fuller states that "reliance on
a contract may remove the objection of indefiniteness" in a prospective
contract.95 The rationale to extend contractual liability beyond that
which was allowed by the "formalities" of classical contract theory has
opened the door to ad hoc inquiry. "[T]he need to reimburse detrimental
reliance justifies a court in running a hazard of uncertainty which would
otherwise be avoided. 96 The expansion of contractual liability through
the doctrine of reliance pre-dated Fuller's landmark work. The undercurrent of reliance damages had long influenced the common law in various
guises. Professor Fuller recognized this fact when he noted that "the
reliance interest seems to prefer to travel incognito."'"
The reliance mystique continues to weave its influence in our
judicial decisions. The First Circuit, in Chelsea Industries v. Accuray
Leasing Corp.,9" imposed a legally binding obligation upon the issuer
of a "policy letter" despite its intent not to be bound. The plaintiff in the
case had entered into an equipment lease. Subsequently, it requested from
the leasing company information as to a purchase option at the expiration
of the lease. The leasing company forwarded a letter regarding its
"policy" as to the purchase of leased equipment. The court held that the
letter became a part of the "total" agreement and was a contractually
binding promise. The court's rationale smacked of reliance theory.
"[T]here is a normal assumption that a business transaction is not
meaningless and that words have a purpose." 99 The purpose is to induce
another into "action or forbearance."'"

93. MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 25.
94. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest In ContractDamages: 2, 46
YALE LJ. 373, 386 (1937).
95. Id. at 395.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 390.
98. 699 F.2d 58 (lst Cir. 1983).

99. Id. at 60.
100.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CoNTRAcrs § 90 (1979).
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C.

The Death of Contract and the New Spirit of Contract

The easing of the strict bargain principle of contract law has mainly
been achieved by a commensurate growth of the equitable doctrines.'
These doctrines have been used to overcome the formal requirements of
contract, such as express intent, consideration, infant incapacity, and the
Statute of Frauds. The loosening of the grip of the formal requirements
of contract has been traced to the rise of promissory estoppel. One
commentator states that "[p]romissory estoppel rejects a purely formalist
approach and provides a doctrinal rubric by which reliance liability is
enforced as to commitments that do not satisfy formal contract law
requirements."' 2 Professor Charny asserts that formality still plays a
role in the enforceability of promises. "The degree of formality with
which a promise is articulated may affect its enforceability."'0 3 However, lack of formality is no longer the death knell of contractual enforceability.
The equitable advance of contract law has been embraced by a
number of theoretical schools. The equitable relaxing of formal contract
law has been interpreted by "death of contract" theorists as a movement
towards tort-like remedies and the absorption of contract into the law of
tort." 4 The equitable reformation ("new spirit") of contract law has
been viewed by some as the expansion of contract law, and not as its
death. The expansion of contract through equitable concepts,10 5 such as

101. These doctrines include promissory estoppel, waiver, unconscionability, good faith, and
fair dealing.
102. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REv. 373,
446-47 (1990); see also Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory
Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 509 (1983).
103. Chamy, supra note 102, at 455.
104. Some have bifurcated the absorption of contract law into the law of tort and the law of
restitution or unjust enrichment. This author classifies the doctrine of unjust enrichment as both a
remedy in tort and in contract and, thus, if contract is eliminated, then tort is its proper place. Also,
the notion of tort's absorption of contract as advanced by "death of contract" theorists is not a novel
idea. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 10. Cohen explains:
In emphasizing the element of injury resulting from the breach, the whole question of
contract is integrated in the larger realm of obligations, and this tends to put our issues
in the right perspective and to correct the misleading artificial distinctions between breach
of contract and other civil wrongs or torts.
Id. at 578-79.
105. See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 906 (1978).
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unconscionability, 10 6 good faith, 107 and promissory estoppel' ° can be
viewed as contract's response to the changing nature of today's
exchanges. For example, Professor Macneil attributes the need for an
expanded approach to contracts as a response to the growth of relational
contracts in comparison to traditional transactional contracts. He poses
a response to this phenomenon: "[D]evelop an overall structure of
contract law of greater general applicability than now exists
and ...merge both the details and the structure of transactional contract

law into that overall contract structure."' 9 Others have indicated that
the need for expansion was due to the increased standardization of both
transactional and relational contracts where mutual consent, subjective or
objective, is a fiction. The epitome of the standardization movement is
the use of form contracts. The danger of abuse in the use of fine print,
one-sided, and unread contract forms is well-documented. The development of limiting principles has been a natural response to rein in the
potential for such abuse. Professor Braucher lists the common law
limitations of good faith and strict construction" as two such principles: "Limiting principles include the duty of good faith [and] construc-

106. Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that "[i]f the court... finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable ... the court may refuse to
enforce the contract ....
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1995); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONRACTS § 208 (1979) ("Unconscionable Contract or Term").

107. Section 1-203 states that "[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) ("Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing"). It should be noted
that "good faith" in contract is not a recent innovation. The concept of good faith has a long
tradition in English common law. For example, when one party possesses specialized knowledge,
she has a duty to disclose. "These contracts are called contracts uberrimaefidei('of the utmost good
faith')." PHILIP S. JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 323 (12th ed. 1989).
108. See generally Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract
Doctrine,78 YALE LJ. 343 (1969) (discussing the evolution of promissory estoppel, whose principal
application is no longer limited to gratuitous promises but is now being applied in a business
setting); Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferationof Promissory
Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. RE,. 52 (1981) (discussing how the Restatement (Second) of Contracts'
drafters have responded to the burgeoning application of promissory estoppel and how the reliance
principle influenced the Restatement scheme as a whole).
109. Macneil, supra note 87, at 597.
110. The concept of strict construction against the drafter can be found throughout
Anglo-American jurisprudence in both statutory and non-statutory interpretations. The English refer
to this concept as the contra proferentum rule, which states that, in a case where there is an
"ambiguous provision," the questions surrounding the ambiguous provision are resolved by
"constru[ing] strictly [the provision] against the drafter." Michael G. Patrizio, Fablesof Construction:
The Sophisticated PolicyholderDefense, 79 ILL. B.J. 234, 234 (1991); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 206 (1979) ("Interpretation Against the Draftsman").
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tion against the draftsman. ' . t
The movement toward "limiting principles" in contract law, in an
effort to reach equitable resolutions, has profound ramifications for the
classical theory's fundamental premise of "freedom of contract." Whether
these limiting principles and the resultant remedies are to be labeled as
tort-like or as a "new spirit" of contract will continue to be debated.
What is clear is that this movement further expands the anti-formalism
approach to contracts.'t 2 The "private law" formulated in a contract has
been somewhat replaced by an equitable reformation based upon
community norms and standards. Professor Macneil refers to these
common norms as the "linking" norms of restitution, reliance, and
expectation. "These linking functions... put the restitution, reliance, and
expectation interests 13in a central position in analyzing contractual
'
behavior and rules."
The practical effect of this incursion of equity into contract law is
further incentive for ad hoc inquiry with an increased focus on justice
and fairness." 4 The loser in this scenario is the approach of contract as
doctrine, requiring application somewhat formalistically under the
banners of generality of law, and the resulting benefits of predictability
and certainty. Professor Langdell's "riot of doctrine" has been duly
suppressed." 5 In its place we have an approach more malleable to the6
myriad of fact patterns found in modem commercial transactions."
One commentator states that "[l]ike two other grand principles, articulated in the U.C.C. and adopted by the drafters of the Restatement-'good
faith' and 'unconscionability'--'promissory estoppel' states a principle
of abstractjustice capable of applicationin an infinite variety offactual

111. Robert Braucher, Interpretationand Legal Effect in the Second Restatement of Contracts,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 13, 16 (1981).
112. Lon Fuller recognized this "modem tendency toward 'informality."' Lon L. Fuller,
Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 822 (1941) (emphasis added).
113. MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 55.
114. POSNER, supra note 29, at 44.
115. See GILMORE, supra note 5, at 97-98.
116. Professor Speidel's analysis of the infamous ALCOA case reflects a classic example of a

court's equitable formation of a contract. What makes the court's reasoning more remarkable is the
court's forwardness in applying the "new spirit" of contract by focusing on a number of non-contract
factors: "(1) the legitimate business aims of the parties as supplemented by the 'customs and
expectations of the ... business community;' (2) their purpose of'avoiding the risks of great losses;'
and (3) the need to frame a remedy to preserve the essence of the agreement." Speidel, supra note
22, at 193 (citing Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 89-93 (W.D.
Pa. 1980)).
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situations."t7 The rigid application of rules has increasingly faded
from the jurisprudential landscape." 8 In reality, the formalistic application of contract doctrine began its demise with the extinction of the writ
system and the creation of contract as a general remedy of law. The
rigidness of the rules were soon filled with numerous exceptions." 9 At
times, these exceptions were usually more applicable than the so-called
general rules. The multi-jurisdictional nature of the American court
system has made the notion of a uniform common law an imprecise
facsimile at best. 20 Instead we have become a nation of minority
views. Ad hocery has long been a significant feature of our judicial
landscape.
1. Promissory Estoppel: Part Deux
The highly influential impact of promissory estoppel upon contract
doctrine warrants a further look. The principle, although not the
term,' 2' can be found in section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. It is the embodiment of a combination of Fuller's reliance
doctrine with Corbin's vision. The vision was that the narrowness of
classical contract's consideration requirement was no longer sufficient to
monitor the remedial purpose of contract law. "[M]any judges ... were
not prepared to look with stony-eyed indifference on the plight of a
plaintiff who had, to his detriment, relied on a defendant's assurances
without the protection of a formal contract."'" The law of contract had
to be made more flexible in order to service the increased variety and
complexity of the disputes engendered by modem transactional and
relational exchanges. Section 90 provides for the enforcement of a
117. Knapp, supra note 108, at 78 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
118. Judge Posner notes that the "widely perceived decline ... of legal formalism" may be
traced to "a historical shift in the balance between rules and standards, in favor of the latter."
POSNER, supra note 29, at 45.
119. "Each of these [rules] almost immediately generated an almost infinite number of
exceptions to what was still proclaimed to be the 'general rule."' GILMORE, supra note 5, at 76; see
also POSNER, supranote 29, at 44 ("Rules create pressure for ad hoc exceptions, but standards could

be thought the very institutionalization of the ad hoc exception.").
120. One may argue that statutory preemption has been the exception to the fragmentation of
the law. Two examples are most apparent: the almost universal enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the increased federal preemption in a host of areas including consumer
transactions, financial transactions, and environmental liability. However, the gloss of uniformity
should not blind us to the fact that such uniform law is subject to the interpretive anomalies inherent

in the different court systems.
121.

The first comment notes that "[t]his Section is often referred to in terms of 'promissory

estoppel."' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a (1979).
122.

GILMORE, supra note 5, at 63-64.
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promise that may not have been bargained for or may not have involved
traditional consideration.2 In doing so, section 90 furnishes a tripartite

test for a finding of contractual liability. 24 First, the promisor

"reasonably expect[s] to induce action or forbearance."' 125 Second, the
promise "does induce such action or forbearance.' 26 Third, "injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."' 2 7
Thus, the flexibility of approach envisioned by Corbin is
achieved. 2 But, by what principles are courts to be guided in finding
and preventing injustice? What normative values or principles of contract
or non-contract should be sought to limit the uncertainty that such
flexibility often entails? The comments provide some guidance: "This
Section... states a basic principle which often renders inquiry
unnecessary as to the precise scope of the policy of enforcing bargains. ' What is this basic principle that allows for the expansion of
the contractual umbrella? We will return to this question later in this
Article. 3 ' The quantification of a "basic principle" leads to some
further questions. Is reliance still within the realm of contractual
promise? Or, have we crossed the line into the injury centered universe

of non-contract?
Comment b to section 90 attempts to narrow the limits of the

123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). In the area of charitable
subscriptions and marriage settlements, § 90 allows for enforcement even absent a finding that the
promise induced an action or forbearance. Id. § 90(2). Some courts have interpreted this section to
allow for the treatment of charitable subscriptions "as a sui generis category requiringneither
consideration nor reliance." Id. § 90 cmt. f (emphasis added) (reporter's note); see Salisbury v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1974) (noting that "a charitable subscription
is enforceable without consideration and without detrimental reliance"). But see Jordan v. Mount
Sinai Hosp., Inc., 276 So. 2d 102, 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aff'd, 290 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1974)
("Courts should act with restraint in respect to the public policy arguments endeavoring to sustain
a mere charitable subscription. To ascribe consideration where there is none, or to adopt any other
theory which affords charities a different legal rationale than other entities, is to approve fiction.").
Can the frontier of contract law be expanded any further? Is a promise lacking consideration or
reliance still within the purview of contracts?
124. The Restatement acknowledges the similarity of this principle to those principles found in
negligence, in misrepresentation (doctrine of estoppel) and in restitution. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a (1979). However, the Restatement makes clear that promissory estoppel
is a remedy in contract. "A promise binding under this section is a contract, and full-scale
enforcement by normal remedies is often appropriate." Id. § 90 cmt. d.
125. Id. § 90(1).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 121-27.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a (1979).
130. See discussion infra part III.B-D.
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promissory estoppel rationale's infinite number of possible applications.
The focus seems to be the acknowledgement of certain limiting norms in
order to rein in section 90's potential sweep. These norms are centered
around the vagueness of the third requirement for liability, the prevention
of "injustice." A finding of injustice may depend "on the formality with
which the promise is made, on the extent to which evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and channeling functions of form are met ... and on the
extent to which such other policies as the enforcement of bargains and
the prevention of unjust enrichment are relevant."' 13' Professor Fuller,
in his often cited work Form and Consideration,32 examines the
functions served by contractual formality. They serve an "evidentiary
function," 13 3 a "cautionary function,"' 134 and a "channeling function."
The channeling function allows the businessperson to communicate her
objectives and thoughts by way of legally "defined and recognizable
channels."' 35 It is argued that the greater the formality of a transaction,
the easier will be36the "'judge['s] ... inquiry whether a legal transaction
was intended."",1
Thus, the "confining norms" of contract are intended to be relaxed
but not dismantled. From the beginning, the notion that reliance or
promissory estoppel could co-exist with the bargain principle was made
clear by Fuller. His rationale was simply that the same policies which
support recovery for "bargained for promises" also support "promises
which induce" another to act. Fuller acknowledges that "the complex of
policies which dictates a judicial protection of the expectation interest is

131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1979).
132. Fuller, supra note 112.
133. Id. at 800. Fuller's example is the Roman stipulatio which entailed "an oral spelling out
of the promise ... to impress its terms on participants and possible bystanders." Id.
134. Id. (noting that this function serves as a "deterrent... by acting as a check against
inconsiderate action"). The common law seal served such a purpose as a "symbol in the popular
mind of legalism and weightiness." Id.
135. Id. at 802. Examples of legally recognizable channels are the legal instruments of the day,
such as a mortgage, a guaranty, a deed, a purchase contract, and a promissory note. The functions
of legal formalities have been recognized in the Second Restatement:
Four principal functions have been identified which legal formalities... may serve: the
evidentiary function, to provide evidence of the existence and terms of the contract; the
cautionary function, to guard the promisor against ill-considered action; the deterrent
function, to discourage transactions of doubtful utility; and the channeling... function,
to distinguish a particular type of transaction from other types and from.., exploratory
expressions of intention ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 cmt. c (1979).
136. Fuller, supra note 112, at 801 (emphasis omitted) (quoting IHERING, II GEIST DES
ROMISCHEN REcHTs 494 (8th ed. 1923)).
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strongest in the case of a promise which forms part of a bargain."' 137
Reliance recovery was intended to supplement and not to replace. The
old formalities may be replaced with new ones, but some degree of
formality will continue to have a place in contract. "The desiderata
underlying the use of formalities will retain their relevance as long as
3
men make promises to one another."'
It seems clear that the adoption of reliance as a basis of recovery
was not intended to move contract within the realm of tort. Rather, it is
more a shifting of contractual liability from that of purely "bargained for
exchange" to one of nonmutuality, where inducement, not reciprocity, is
the triggering device. But, the basic cause of action is still based on
"promise" and involves matters of a contractual nature. In regards to the
former point, Professor Fuller explains that section 90 provides, in effect,
that "serious reliance may under some circumstances make 'binding' 139a
promise for which nothing has been given or promised in exchange."'
As to the contractual nature of the reliance in question, one commentator
notes that the "reliance-protecting policy" does "no more than indicate
the current high-water mark of reliance theory being applied in contract
cases."'40 The fact that reliance can be found in other realms' 4' does
not mean it cannot also be applied in contract without affecting the
essential contractual nature of the cause of action. It may be simply an
attempt to adjust contract theory to the changing nature of contract. The
need to augment the bargain principle with reliance and equitable
principles may be attributed to the development of more complex forms
of pre-contractual negotiations 4 2 and of contractual agreements:
The [equitable] doctrines .. place limits on the freedom of contract
because "[c]lassical contract doctrine was developed for cases of
discrete, one-shot transactions, but it [is] a poor fit for complex,
long-term contracts... ." The complexity of most modem agreements
insures that such agreements will rarely be fully completed. Therefore,
anyone attempting to enforce an agreement is likely to encounter one

137.
138.
139.
140.

Fuller & Perdue, supra note 94, at 373.
Fuller, supra note 112, at 822-23.
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 94, at 401 (emphasis added).
Knapp, supra note 108, at 77 (emphasis added).

141. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976). Recovery for misinformation
or misrepresentation can be sought against someone who "through reliance upon it in a transaction
[intended] the information to influence." Id. § 552(2)(b); see also 12 WILLISTON, supra note 25,
§ 1509, at 455-56.
142. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, PrecontractualLiabilityand PreliminaryAgreements: Fair
Dealing and FailedNegotiations, 87 COLIJM. L. REV. 217 (1987).
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..

"

Despite promissory estoppel's doctrinal importance, its place in the
judicial mind-set is still to be determined.'" Its scholarly acceptance
should ensure that it will remain an alternative tool that can be used by
a judge. For example, the court in Nimrod Marketing (Overseas) Ltd. v.

Texas Energy Investment Corp.' used promissory estoppel rationale
to uphold a claim of an independent purchasing agent. The defendant,
while in the process of bargaining for a construction contract, forwarded
a comfort letter appointing the plaintiff as its purchasing agent and
informing it of the prospective construction project. 4 6 Based upon this
"comfort letter," the plaintiff began to make purchases on behalf of the
defendant. A formalized contract was never consummated. The court,
nonetheless, held the defendant liable because it "clearly had knowledge
of the special circumstances producing damages"'47 and because, as the
lower court had also concluded, the plaintiff "had relied on the 'comfort
1 48
letter. "0

D. Efficiency and Economics
A number of "non-traditional" approaches have been presented to
explain how contract law could better work to maximize benefits to
society as a whole. These approaches can be understood through the
time proven philosophical
dichotomy represented by the
deontolgical-teleological schools of thought. Instead of looking to the

143. Egan, supranote 68, at 312 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting KEVIN M.
TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 321 (1990)).
144. See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 108, at 53 (explaining that promissory estoppel "has become
perhaps the most ... expansive development of this century in the law of promissory liability"). A
recent study seems to indicate otherwise. "Courts' extreme reluctance to grant recovery under
promissory estoppel indicates a continued adherence to traditional contract principles of bargained-for
exchange." Phuong N. Pham, Note, The Waning of PromissoryEstoppel, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1263,
1263 (1994). In concluding, the author states:
[C]ourts show extreme reluctance to deviate from traditional contract principles. Contrary
to assertions that promissory estoppel has become a primary, independent theory of
obligation, the doctrine has remained an inferior doctrine of last resort.... Despite the
claims of death-of-contract scholars, the waning of promissory estoppel provides evidence
of the enduring vitality of traditional bargain theory.
Id. at 1290.
145. 769 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047, and cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1104 (1986).
146. See generally DiMatteo & Sacasas, supra note 33, at 422 n.376.
147. Id. at 1080.
148. Id. at 1079.
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morality of keeping one's promises or to the enforcement of contract as
the confirmation of free will, the consequentialist mind-set looks to the
effects of a decision as its guiding light. Contract law is to be viewed as
an "instrument" to forward societal goals. This instrumentalist concept
holds that "contract rules must be evaluated and understood, not as
instances of the general principle of free will, but in terms of their
consequences."' 14 9 In the words of utilitarianism, a decision is just if it
results in a "net benefit" to society.
This type of analysis is advocated under what is often referred to as
an efficiency, or a law and economics, theory of contract. This economic
analysis can be used both analytically and normatively. Analytically, it
may be argued that "utility" calculations are the foundations of common
law rules and doctrines. In short, most rules are historically premised on
the notion of the "greater good."'50 Normatively, economics or utility
calculations should be utilized to render decisions that will result in the
greater good for society. The "greater good" goal of contract law can be
framed in the Kaldor-Hicks model of economics. Courts should strive for
decisions that fulfill the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. The effects of a decision
should result in an "aggregate gain ... larger than the aggregate
1
15

loss."'

Judge Richard Posner proposes a reappraisal of Holmes's "prediction theory" of the law,' along with a need for constant critical
inquiry of the rules and beliefs of law. Precedent should assist, not
truncate, critical inquiry. "Systems of thought that emphasize hierarchy,
tradition, authority, and precedent disvalue the kind of critical inquiry

149. Jack M. Beermann, ContractLaw as a System of Values, 67 B.U. L. REV. 553, 556 (1987)
(reviewing HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (1986)).
150. Efficiency has long been an underlying norm of many of contracts' foundational premises.

For example, the "reasonable person principle" is based on the notion of what a reasonably prudent,
efficient person would have done in a given situation; hopefully, something that would satisfy the

efficiency norm. "[E]veryone [is] held to the standard of that rational, efficient. 'reasonable'
person." Speidel, supra note 22, at 197 (emphasis added). "Both the party and the judge, in
presenting and hearing the case, invoke the reasonableperson as the shared standard of judgement."
Note, Sympathy as a Legal Structure, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1961, 1970 (1992) (emphasis added).
151. Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets
the Real World, 24 GA. L. REv. 583 app. at 624 (1990). For an excellent review of the "economics"
of efficiency theory, see the appendix entitled, "An Efficiency Primer." Id. at 624-27.
152. See POSNER, supra note 29, at 221-28. See generally Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897) (explaining that the law is a body of predictions-prophecies
of what the court will do in certain situations); David H. Moskowitz, The PredictionTheory of Law,
39 TEMP. L.Q. 413 (1966) (addressing interpretations, as well as criticisms, of Oliver Wendell
Holmes's prediction theory of the law).
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that tests belief and advances knowledge .... .""t One attempt at such
an inquiry into the predictive nature of the law is the use of economics
"to improve our understanding of law and assist in its reform."' 154 In
short, it is possible "that legal outcomes can be made determinate by
methods of analysis that owe nothing to legal training or experience."' 55 One way is to analyze the likely consequences of an action
or decision. Jurisprudence that continuously extends historical doctrine
through creative interpretations is inferior to that which attempts, through
consequential analysis, to shape the future. The starting point, and
perceived goals, of this teleological jurisprudence is quite different from
those found in traditional will, bargain, or consent theories of contract. 56 The starting point of the traditional theories is the focus upon
the fictional intent of the promisor or the reliance of the promisee. It is
also the fitting of existing rules and doctrines to the case at bar. For
those concerned with efficiency, the starting point is in the future with
a focus upon likely consequences. The goals of contract law also take on
different slants. For the traditionalist, the goal is to achieve a "demonstrably right"'5 7 decision with a logical application of the "rule-of-law"
as the litmus test of rightness. For the consequentialist, the goal of the
judge is to achieve a "reasonable result' 58 from an efficiency or "net
benefit" perspective. Rules should not be propagated and retained solely
for purposes of certainty and stability. Instead, rules should continuously
159
be reassessed as means or instruments to achieve societal effects.
A number of criticisms of this approach should be considered. First,
efficiency is only one of a number of goals in any system of contract
law."6 Other goals often considered as being within the purview of
contract law include certainty of contract, 161 predictability, 62 morality, "' fairness,'64 and justice."' The efficiency "norm" likely plays

153. POSNER, supra note 29, at 82.

154. Id. at 63.
155. Id. at 37.
156. See id. at 28-31.
157. See id. at 26. "Law ... is concerned not only with getting the result right but also with
stability, to which it will frequently sacrifice substantive justice." Id. at 51.
158. Id. at 26.
159. Id. at 29.
160. "Efficiency notions alone ... cannot completely explain why certain commitments should
be enforced unless it is further shown that economic efficiency is the exclusive goal of a legal
order." Bamet, supra note 25, at 283.
161. See supra notes 69, 72, 144 and accompanying text; see also infra part W.A.1.
162. See infra part IV.A.I.
163. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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a part in judicial decision-making, but it is an unlikely suitor for an
overarching theory of contract. Second, the valuation of the "gains and
losses" resulting from a contract rule or decision are likely to be inexact.
Efficiency, like other "standards-based theories,"' suffers from the
nonworkability of calculations dependent upon normative evaluation.
How does one evaluate the net benefits or costs to fairness, justice,
efficiency, or "wealth maximization"? 67 It is a problem analogous to
the implication of intent at the formation of a contract in classical
contract law. "No human mind can know all the causes effecting results
in any complex sequence of events. Because of limitations on knowledge
of causes and effects, our ability to presentiate is always a limited
one."' 168 Furthermore, the law and economics model's workability is
likely to suffer as one moves from the transactional-type of contract to
relational-types. Professor Macneil has noted that many contractual
concepts may not work as efficiently in these types of contracts.' 69 One
may argue that economic, or efficiency, theory is likely to function better
in analyzing discrete, transactional exchanges as compared to long-term
relational agreements. For example, at the "extreme transactional pole,"
the subject matter is a "[s]imple, monetizable economic [type of]
exchange."' 170 At the "extreme relational pole," the subject matter
includes "complex personal noneconomic satisfactions." 17' The increased duration and complexity of many of today's relational contracts
makes efficiency valuations all the more difficult.

164. See supra notes 101, 105-08; see also infra note 449 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 19, 67; see also infra note 235 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion concerning the notion of "standards-based theories," see Barnett, supra

note 25, at 277-86.
167. For general background information on Posner's development and usage of "wealth
maximization" and efficiency, see ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF CONTRACT LAW (1979); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE

(1981); Richard A. Posner, The Ethicaland PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
168. Macneil, supra note 87, at 590 (footnote omitted).
169. Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts,47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 722-23 (1974).
170. Id. at 738.

171. Id. In the area of the assignability or transferability of contracts, Professor Macneil notes
that "[t]ransfer [is] likely to be uneconomic and difficult to achieve even when it is not impossible."

Id. at 740.
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Various theories have been posed to explain the "gaps and
gores" 7 2 inherent in the will and bargain theories of contract. For
example, Fuller explains the fear behind increased formality in contract
and the unlikely import of the now deceased Uniform Written Obligations Act. Such formalized and standardized approaches to contract result
in "increased embarrassment to the task of judges seeking a way to let
a man off from an oppressive bargain without seeming to repudiate the
prevailing philosophy of free contract."' 73 Fuller was right on both
scores. Despite the success of the Uniform Commercial Code, standardization of contract and uniformity of decision has not been the order of
the day. The idea of "judicial embarrassment" represents the notion that
the judicial mind-set is clouded with numerous concerns other than the
objective application of contract doctrine. These "other concerns" have
been widely theorized upon. The result has been the production of
extensive literature enumerating various judicial concerns and values such
as justice, 74 efficiency,175 fairness, 176 and sympathy. 7 7 Most of
the literature is more recent pontifications of earlier attempts at devising

172. A gore in "old English law [is] a small, narrow slip of ground.... In modem land law,
a small triangular piece of land, such as may be left between [adjacent] surveys which do not close."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 695 (6th ed. 1990).
173. Fuller, supra note 112, at 823.
174. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical
Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IowA L. REV. 769 (1985). Rosenfeld notes:
The justice of a contract between two individuals is due either to the fact that they
reached a genuine agreement or to the actual terms of their agreement. In the former case,
contract can be said to be intrinsically just; in the latter case, it can be said to be just for
extrinsic reasons, that is, its terms have been determined to be fair under some
independent criterion of justice.
Id. at 771-72 (footnote omitted).
175. See generally POSNER, supra note 29 (equating efficiency concepts with wealth
maximization); Note, Efficiency and a Rule of "Free Contract": A Critique of Two Models ofLaw
and Economics, 97 HARV. L. REv. 978 (1984) (highlighting efficiency analysis as one of the most
influential and often written about methods of mainstream legal literature).
176. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1826 (1980) ("[T]he freedom of contract
slogan no longer insulates a transaction from minimum demands of fairness, reasonable behavior,
and consistency with important policies."). See generally Atiyah, supra note 23 (suggesting that
courts often incorporate substantive fairness analysis into consideration in modem contract law);
Edward A. Harris, Note, Fighting PhilosophicalAnarchism with Fairness: The Moral Claims ofLaw
in the Liberal State, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 919, 944-59 (1991).
177. See generally Note, supra note 150 (addressing the importance of sympathy in the legal
process).
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an overarching principle to explain the mystical innerworkings of the

judicial mind."'8 Any background analysis of contract theory would be
amiss without a look at these different constructs.
The theories of contract previously discussed have left their imprints
upon our current judicial mind-sets. Normative values continue to be
drawn from the underlying rationales of the moral sanctity of promise,179 of enforcing the will of the parties,' of allowing the private
parties to valuate the benefits of their bargains,' 8' and for compensating
reliance's injury.'8 2 These rationales are facades behind which lie the
values and norms that provide the real impetus for the implementation

and the creation of law. "The demand for justice behind the law is but
an elaboration of such feelings of what is fair and unfair."'8 3 The
notions of efficiency or economics, fairness, and justice may be tied
together with the notion that the courts do inquire into the effects of their
decisions and that inquiry is likely to impact upon their "reading of the
law." Professor Summers states that "[t]he law is not a mere formal
receptacle. It includes substantive content."' 84 Another commentator
states, "Courts and scholars often ...focusf on the policy of protecting
freedom of contract. In so doing, they ignore competing policies ....These policies include promoting.., justice and fairness in
social relations ....In sanctifying the principle of freedom of contract,

178. See, e.g., Cohen, supranote 10 (reviewing the "basis of contract" and enumerating upon
the "economic basis for contractualism'). "[A] regime in which contracts are freely made and
generally enforced gives greater scope to individual initiative and thus promotes the greatest wealth
of a nation." Id. at 562-63. Thus, the doctrine of natural selection can be applied to the law "as a
virtue in the Nietzschean [sense]: Let the weak perish that the strong may survive." Id. at 563.
179. See infra part IV.A.3.
180. See infra part IV.A.4.
181. See infra part I.A.4.
182. See infra part IV.C. The notion that fundamental human values remain at the core of most
of our contract theories was aptly espoused by Cohen. "[T]o base the obligation of the promise on
the injury of the one who has relied on it, is to appeal to something reallyfundamental." Cohen,
supra note 10, at 578 (emphasis added) (reliance theory). "Popular sentiment generally favors the
enforcement of those promises which involve some quid pro quo. ...The parties to the contract
must themselves determine what is fair." Id. at 580, 581 (bargain theory). "According to the classical
view, the law of contract gives expression to and protects the will of the parties, for the will is
something inherently worthy of respect." Id. at 575 (emphasis added) (will theory). "[P]romises are
sacred per se, that there is something inherently despicable about not keeping a promise, and that
a properly organized society should not tolerate this." Id. at 571 (second emphasis added) (promise
theory).
183. Cohen, supra note 10, at 581. "When courts ... proceed to interpret the terms of the
contract they are generally not merely seeking to discover the actual past meanings ...but more
generally they decide the 'equities,' the rights and obligations of the parties...
Id. at 577,
184. Summers, supra note 20, at 875.
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courts and scholars oversimplify the norms of contract law."' 5 It is to
the "law's normative nature"'8 6 that we now turn.
To this point, the primacy of the discourse has been the sanctity of

contract. In its most "pure" form (bilateral, executory), we may define it
as the "sanctity of the exchange." The sanctity of the exchange is
reflected in the fact that our business system, along with its legal support
structure, highly values the keeping of one's promises in an exchange.
It is now time to turn to a corollary issue. Is the full judicial enforcement
of the promises in an exchange affected or modified by an underlying
notion of the "fairness of the exchange"? Equally important, should the
notion of fairness or justice have a role in the judicial mindset and the
enforcement of contractual promises? The answer for some is a grudging
acceptance that fairness considerations are an inevitable part of the

judicial mindset. Doctrinal formalism has been no match for human
nature's inclination towards fairness and justice.'87 Despite the rational-

izations embodied in "freedom of contract,"' 8 the courts have rescued
many parties from their own devices. A review of the case law illustrates
that courts have viewed fact situations involving a "bad bargain"'8 9

185. Joseph W. Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 42 (1989).
186. Summers, supra note 20, at 947.
187. In the words of St. Thomas Aquinas: "[T]here is in man an appetite for the good of his
nature as rational, and this is proper to him, for instance, that he should know truths... about living
in society." 28 AQuINAS, supra note 16, at 83 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also
VER-MEESCH & LINDGREN, supra note 17, at 615-16 (noting Aquinas's reflections regarding the
"inclinations" of man to be rational).
188. The "freedom of contract"-"faimess inquiry" debate can be framed in terms of the
difference between "rules" and "standards":
[A] standard-oriented view might say we should examine contracts ad hoc and enforce
only those judged to involve a fair exchange. The rules position might criticize the
standards position as involving too much arbitrary discretion on the question of fairness.
To avoid the quagmire of the fairness inquiry, we should simply follow the rule: enforce
all contracts freely entered. Enforcement of the rule, however, requires asking which
contracts have been freely entered.... [I]mplementation of the rule, therefore, involves
a circular return to a standard-like fairness inquiry ....
Mark Hager, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to CriticalLegal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM.
U. L. REv. 1051, 1061-62 (1988) (book review). For an interesting discussion of the analogy of
contract rights to property rights, see Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought.
Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 939 (1985). Kennedy asserts, "The legal
theorists became more and more conscious... that contract rights were analogous to property rights,
and simultaneously were more concerned that the judges avoid importing their own notions of
fairness into private transactions." Id. at 954 (emphasis added).
189. The unfairness of the bargain is viewed here as a valuation of the bargain or exchange at
the time of the court's decision. In short, can undue hardship be avoided by a decision not to fully
enforce the contract or promise given by the promisee? This is opposed to the general view that the
reasonableness of the terms of a contract or the bargain itself is to be judged at the "time of
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differently than those involving relative "equality of consideration."''
However, often the underlying "economics" or "fairness" of the bargain
is shrouded by the courts in the garb of common law doctrine. The
purpose of this analysis is to see if the rationales of fairness can be
distilled from the fact patterns and expressed rationales of the cases.
The courts have long attempted to mitigate the demands of applying
"rules of law" with concerns for fairness. In Carnival CruiseLines, Inc.
v. Shute,'9 t the Supreme Court recognized the need for a "fundamental

fairness" inquiry when reviewing clauses in a standard form contract. "It
bears emphasis that forum-selection clauses contained in form passage
contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamentalfairness."'92

contract!' See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979) ("If a contract or term
thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the
contract ... !'(emphasis added)). The Restatement does make an exception where the weighing of
the bargain is not "presentiated" at the time of contract formation. In the case of specific
performance, if the bargain contracted for would subsequently result in an "unreasonable hardship,"
then specific performance or an injunction "will be refused.' Id. § 364(l)(b).
190. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts does not require "equality or near-equality" of
consideration. In fact, it states that sometimes the mere existence of consideration is sufficient to
make a promise legally binding. Id. § 17 cmt. d. In a free market economy, it is left to the parties
to evaluate the sufficiency of the consideration being given and received. For the purpose of finding
a contract, the courts are primarily concerned with the "element of exchange." Id. But, despite the
general judicial discourse against the notion of a "fairness of bargain" element, one can find evidence
that courts do view cases of inequality of consideration in the exchange in a different light.
Furthermore, one may imply a "fairness of consideration" element from different provisions of the
Restatement. The notion of "sufficiency of consideration," although expressly deleted from the
Second Restatement, is clearly there in spirit. See, e.g., id.; id. § 71 cmt. a. Nominal consideration,
or a recital of consideration, is deemed insufficient. "[A] mere pretense of bargain does not suffice,
as where there is a false recital of consideration or where the purported consideration is merely
nominal." Id. § 71 cmt. b. See generally Note, Restatement of Contracts (Second)-A Rejection of
Nominal Consideration?, 1 VAL. U. L. REV. 102 (1966). The Restatement recognizes that, in most
bargains involving goods, "the values exchanged are often roughly or exactly equivalent by standards
independent of the particular bargain." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. a (1979).
However, it later rationalizes that it is not for the courts to review the value of the consideration
exchanged because "in many situations there is no reliable external standard of value ....Valuation
[therefore] is left to private action .... Id. § 79 cmt. c. One may argue that, today, most exchanges
of goods and services are relatively fungible. Also, it can be argued that in the age of expert
witnesses, professional appraisers, increased standardization, and the proliferation of professional and
nonprofessional standards and associations, the existence of "no reliable external standards" is a rare
exception. Thus, the courts do have the tools to calculate or estimate the relative equality of
consideration if they were so inclined.
191. 499 U.S. 585 (1991); see also Dempsey v. Norwegian Cruise Line, 972 F.2d 998,999 (9th
Cir. 1992) (adopting the Court's approach, in examining the provision in question, "to determine if
it was unreasonable or fundamentally unfair"); Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 954 F.2d 763,
768 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that a clause would be invalid if it was "unreasonable and unjust"),
192. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added); see also ILGWU v. NLRB
(Bemhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (collective bargaining agreements); Lewis
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One hundred years earlier, the Supreme Court had laid down the
groundwork for today's more overt fairness inquiry:
The question of the want of equality and fairness, and of the hardship
of the contract, should, as a general rule, be judged of in relation to the
time of the contract, and not by subsequent events. [However, w]e do
not intend to say that the court will never pay any attention to
hardships produced by a change of circumstances ... .193
In fact, prior to the nineteenth century, "a legally enforceable contract
had to be fair."'94 The modification of the bargain principle, and its
underlying rationale of freedom of contract, by the notion of fairness can
be seen as a partial return to contracts' primal beginnings. One can argue
that the fairness inquiry bolsters judicial impartiality. "There is,
moreover, a fairness question: why should the interests of the party who
gains from enforcement [of a contract] be advanced at the expense of the
reluctant party?' 9 5 A fairness inquiry into the terms of a contract, and
judicial enforcement of those terms, may be intimated from the
Restatement (Second) of Contacts. Section 364, "Effect of Unfairness,"
lays down the ground rules for a court's denial of equitable relief in the
enforcement of an "unfair" contract." "Specific performance or an
injunction will be refused if such relief would be unfair .
,,.97 Three
grounds of unfairness are enumerated: (1) if a contract is "induced
by... unfair practices";.9 . (2) if granting such relief "would cause

v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960). In Lewis, Justice Frankfurter stated: "There is no
reason for jettisoning principlesoffairness andjustice that are as relevant to the law's attitude in
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements as they are to contracts dealing with other
affairs .... " Id. at 475-76 (emphasis added) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In Railroad Co. v.
Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357 (1873), the Court held: "Contracts of common carriers, like those of persons
occupying a fiduciary character, giving them a position in which they can take undue advantage of
the persons with whom they contract, must rest upon theirfairnessand reasonableness." Id. at 380
(emphasis added).
193. Franklin Tel. Co. v. Harrison, 145 U.S. 459,473 (1892) (quoting Lee v. Kirby, 104 Mass.
420, 428 (1870)).
194. HALL ET AL., supra note 74, at 171.
195. Mark M. Hager, The Emperor's Clothes Are Not Efficient: Posner's Jurisprudenceof
Class, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 7, 31 (1991).
196. It is important to note that "unfairness" in § 364 is something "less" than the notion of
"unconscionability" found in § 208. Whereas "[u]nfaimess in the exchange does not of itself make
an agreement unenforceable," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364 cmt. b (1979), a
finding of unconscionability "may be [a] sufficient ground, without more, for denying specific
performance." Id. § 208 cmt. c.
197. Id. § 364(l).
198. Id. § 364(1)(a).
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unreasonable hardship";199 or (3) if the "exchange is grossly inadequate

or the terms of the contract are otherwise unfair."'

A number of

arguments may be posed that such a fairness inquiry should be, and at

times is, performed when determining remedies available at law. First,
the historical division of law and equity has been abrogated in almost
every other sense.20 ' If the unfairness of an exchange can be a ground
for denying equitable relief, then it should be a ground for the denial or
reduction of damages. Second, the notion that "unfairness in the
exchange" is almost always the result of mistake or fraud is an illusion.
Parties enter into one-sided and subsequently unfair contracts for
numerous reasons. The reasons include lack of sophistication, 21 2 the use
of standard or form agreements prepared by one of the parties,20 3
unequal bargaining positions,2 and imprudent judgment. The courts
have come to the rescue under a number of guises, including the
implication of contract terms,20 5 the denial of specific performance, and

199. Id. § 364(I)(b).
200. Id. § 364(l)(c) (emphasis added).
201. There has been a "contraction of the area in which [the] traditional distinction is made
between the availability of equitable and legal relief." Id. § 364 cmt. a.
202. For a comparative analysis, see Ronald L. Hersbergen, Contractsof Adhesion Under the
Louisiana Civil Code, 43 LA. L. REv. 1 (1982). "The Civil Code ... has been applied in Louisiana
under a dual standard ... whereby the formation and enforceability of a contract may depend... on
the level of sophistication of the buyer .... " Id. at 16 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
203. See generallyRakoff, supranote 19 (noting that form contracts with boilerplate language
should be considered presumptively unenforceable).
204. CompareRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmts. a, d (1979) (noting that the
determination whether a contract is unconscionable due to unequal bargaining positions looks to a
showing of "gross inequality of bargaining power" coupled with terms which "unreasonably" favor
the stronger party) with id. § 211 cmt. c (explaining that in standardized form agreements,
individuals normally do not inspect the terms and, "[a]part from [governmental] regulation, standard
terms imposed by one party are enforced").
205. The "gap filling" provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code allow a court to imply a
number of specific terms using reasonableness as its guide. See U.C.C. § 2-305 (1995) ("Open Price
Term"); id. § 2-308 ("Absence of Specified Place for Delivery"); id. § 2-309 ("Absence of Specific
Time Provisions'). More importantly, for the notion of fairness of exchange, see id. § 1-203
("Obligation of Good Faith"); id. § 2-302 ("Unconscionable Contract or Clause").
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the expansion of the notions of unconscionability,2 ° good faith,2 °7
and fair dealing.20 8
If the doctrines of unconscionability and good faith are further
expanded,2 then it may be argued that the demarcation between the

two and "simple unfairness" will be meaningless. Thus, the fairness
inquiry will be the order of the day, resulting with the exorcism of
contract's indifference to the "adequacy of consideration." 21 The courts
will have more freedom to "reform" bad bargains and to equalize the
"overall imbalance" 21' between the contracting parties. The equitable
adage found in section 364 on the "effect of unfairness" would be set

loose upon the general enforceability of contracts. The ruling of
Campbell Soup Co. v. Went&12 would no longer be confined to the law
of equity. A contract enforceable in form may, nonetheless, be denied
full legal enforcement if "the sum total of its provisions drives too hard
a bargain for a court of conscience to assist."2 13 One may further argue
that the enforcement of "unfair" contracts runs contrary to public policy
and should, accordingly, be disregarded. "Historically, the public policies
against enforcement of terms were developed by judges ... on the basis
of their own perception of the need to protect some aspect of the public
welfare., 214 An example of such a policy is the judicial preference to
narrowly construe covenants not-to-compete and to modify or void terms
which they view as "unfair." 215 One may argue that this judicial

206. See generally Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967) (examining both procedural unconscionability and
substantive unconscionability).
207. See generally Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts,73 IowA L.
REv. 299, 301-06 (1988) (discussing the distinction between "good faith in performance" and "good
faith in enforcement"); Robert S. Summers, The GeneralDuty of Good Faith-ItsRecognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982). For a discussion of the differences between
good faith and the doctrines of mistake, impracticability, and frustration, see Andersen, supra, at 318
n.75; Steven J.Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor
Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984); E. Allan Famsworth, Good Faith Performance and
Commercial ReasonablenessUnder the Uniform CommercialCode, 30 U. CHI.L. REV. 666 (1963).
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
209. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Clark, Note, Ensuring Good Faith in Dismissals, 63 TEx. L. REV.
285 (1984) (employment law).
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1979).

211. Id.§ 208 cmt. c.
212. 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
213. Id. at 84.
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. a (1979).
215. See, e.g., Loblaw, Inc. v. Warren Plaza, Inc., 127 N.E.2d 754,760 (Ohio 1955) (construing
strictly the vague term "demised premises" against the limitations upon land use and, thus, against
the lessor (drafter)).
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doctrine of "public policy" could be used by courts to limit the
enforcement of unfair contract terms. Comment a of section 179 of the
Restatement (Second) acknowledges that this judicial principle is "an
open-ended one that does not purport to exhaust the categories of
recognized public policies. 216
Professor Atiyah states the generally held premise that "the
traditional dogma of contract law [is] that the adequacy of the consider-

ation is immaterial to the validity of a contract.... There is simply no
room for any inquiry into the fairness of the exchange." 217 He then
recites numerous examples of how the law has dealt with fact-specific
cases of substantive unfairness: illusory contracts, option contracts,
requirement and output contracts,"' and the "defences of fraud,
misrepresentation, and duress and undue influence; ... mistake and even
frustration," 2 19 along with the law of penalties and, finally, "the huge
growth of statutory interventions in contract law, much of which is quite
avowedly designed to ensure substantive fairness in exchange." '
These are the ways in which the courts have overtly dealt with certain
situations of substantive unfairness. More generally, the courts have
utilized the devices of implication, construction, and interpretation to deal
with the issue of fairness in the exchange. 22 ' There has been a long
running "covert operation" involving the weaving of intricate webs of
exceptions and fictions2 to avoid the harsh results incumbent upon a
body of law steeped in formalism and dogma.2 3
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. a (1979); see also id. § 78 ("Voidable
and Unenforceable Promises"); id. § 207 ("Interpretation Favoring the Public"); id § 365 ("Effect
of Public Policy").
217. Atiyah, supra note 23, at 1.
218. See id. at 7, 8.
219. Id. at 2.
220. Id. at 3. Some examples of U.C.C. implied provisions include: implied warranties of

merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, U.C.C. § 2-315 (1995), implied duties of good
faith and unconscionability, id. §§ 1-203, 2-403,2-302, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Law, id. § 2-316,
new home warranty laws, and state usury laws.
221. Atiyah, supra note 23, at 9.
222. "The intellectual torture which our courts inflict on legal doctrine will be obviated when
we have brought ourselves to the point where we are willing to accept as sufficient justification for
a decision the 'non-technical' considerations which really motivated it." Fuller, supra note 19, at
435, quoted in Boyle, supra note 19, at 381 n.47. "[A]rgument by analogy and the closely related
technique of the legal fiction are often used to disguise change as continuity .... " POSNER, supra
note 29, at 92-93.
223. As of 1985, Professor Atiyah's observation was that no such acknowledgement had been
made by the courts. "Unfortunately, the extreme reluctance of courts to acknowledge openly that
they are trying to ensure that a contract operates as a fair exchange means that the conceptual
apparatus of the law is highly complex and often obscures what is actually going on" Atiyah, supra
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A number of arguments have been posed against the use of a
fairness inquiry as a factor in the interpretation and enforceability of a
contract. First, the inference by the Restatement (Second) is that fairness
standards are difficult to determine or quantify. 4 Most fairness
inquiries are only likely to be successful in resolving whether there was
procedural fairness in the negotiation and formation of a contract.
Second, substantive fairness's appeal to our sense of justice, in weighing
the terms of a contract, is ephemeral. In the end, the justice achievable
in a given case must be sacrificed at the altar of generality. "[T]he
extreme indeterminacy. .. inherent in a principle of substantive fairness
prevent[s] it from providing the overarching account of contractual
obligation that contract theory requires." The inability to quantify an
objective principle for fairness will return this construct to the sarcophagi
of the '"just price' theorists of the Middle Ages." 6 Third, an efficiency argument can be formulated against the use of a fairness inquiry in
general contract cases. Judicial intervention that "thwart[s] individual
preferences" ' 7 is inefficient and antithetical to the free will basis of
our jurisprudence."
The preceding criticism of fairness inquiry will not interrupt the task
at hand. The criticism takes root in the "ought" of contract theory.229
For purposes of this analysis, the question is much more parochial. Do
courts covertly undertake substantive fairness inquiries? Professor
Horwitz described the historical battle between the "substantive fairness
theory" of contract and the "will theory" of contract:

note 23, at 9.

224. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. c (1979) (noting that parties,
themselves, are in a better position to determine valuation).
225. Barnett, supra note 25, at 285.
226. Id. at 283 (citing RICHARD T. ELY, OUTLINES OF ECONOMICs 827 (5th ed. 1930)); see also
Bernard W. Dempsey, Just Price in a Functional Economy, 25 AM. ECON. REV. 471 (1935);
Raymond de Roover, The Concept of the JustPrice: Theory andEconomic Policy, 18 J. ECON. HIST.
418 (1958).

227. Barnett, supra note 25, at 286.
228. One commentator noted:

Only in the nineteenth century did judges and jurists finally reject the longstanding belief
that the justification of contractual obligation is derived from the inherentjustice or
fairnessofan exchange. In its place, they asserted for the first time that the source of the
obligation of contract is the convergence of the wills of the contracting parties.

Morton J.Horwitz, The HistoricalFoundations ofModern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 917,
917 (1974) (emphasis added).
229. Professor Barnett states that "(wie look to contract theory... to tell us which interpersonal
commitments the law ought to enforce." Barnett, supra note 25, at 269 (emphasis added).
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The rise of a modem law of contract... was an outgrowth of an
essentially procommercial attack on the theory of objective value which
lay at the foundation of the eighteenth century's equitable idea of
contract.
...The

role of contract law was not to assure the equity of

agreements but simply to enforce only those willed transactions that
parties to a contract believed to be to their mutual advantage.230
The debate was framed so as to posit the importance of practicality in a
market economy against the metaphysics of justice and equality. In the
end, the former prevailed. The rationale for the demise of substantive
fairness was provided in Gulian Verplanck's 1825 work, An Essay on the
Doctrine of Contracts.23' Additionally, Professor Horwitz explains, "[I]f

value is solely determined by the clash of subjective desire, there can be
no objective measure of the fairness of a bargain. Since only 'facts' are
objective, fairness can never be measured in terms of substantive
equality."2 32 He concludes that two things came out of this "revolution"
in contract theory.23 3 First, there was a creation of "a great intellectual
divide between a system of formal rules ... the 'rule of law' and those
ancient precepts of morality and equity, which ... were ... render[ed]

suspect as subversive of 'the rule of law."' 234 Second, and more
important to the present inquiry, the "nineteenth century courts and
doctrinal writers did not succeed in entirely destroying the ancient
' Thus, the norms
connection between contracts and natural justice."235
of substantive fairness have always been a part of our contract jurisprudence.
In the area of form or standardized contracts, the fiction of intent
has been fully exposed. The notion of fairness as a standard for
enforceability and interpretation has been widely accepted. This
acceptance may be the door that swings open to the use of the fairness
norm in more and more types of contract cases. The fiction of intent to
imply fair contract terms has found a place in a great deal of contract

230. Horwitz, supra note 228, at 947.
231. GuLIAN C. VERPLANCK, AN ESSAY ON THE DociRNE oF CONTRACTS (Amo Press 1972)

(1825).
232. Horwitz, supra note 228, at 949.
233. See generally HoRwrrz, supra note 45, at 160-211 (relating the historical change towards
the equitable conception of contract).
234. Horwitz, supra note 228, at 956.
235. Id. at 955 (emphasis added).
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disputes.236 The aura of certainty, convenience, and ease in administra-

tion of formal rules will continue to have many suitors. The Ninth
Circuit, in McDonald' Corp. v. Barnes. 7 restated the case against the
fairness inquiry. "'Courts have no right to remake contracts to comport
with some unspecified notion of fairness nor to refuse enforcement on
that ground."' 238 The rationale of indeterminacy is in full force in this
case.2" 9 In Bolen v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours,24 ° the court found it
"troubling" that some "instances ... [of] application of contract law [are]
a transparent invitation to the fact finder to decide not what the 'contract'
was, but what 'fairness' requires.""24 The Fourth Circuit emphatically
noted that "Virginia law plainly says that fairness is for the parties to the
contract to evaluate, not the courts. Our task is rather one of enforcement. 242 The Seventh Circuit concurred, holding that "'the terms of
the contract control, and it is not' ' 243
our function to rewrite them according

to our own notions of fairness.

Nonetheless, research yields a bountiful harvest of cases where the
courts have rewritten contracts without apology. They generally rewrite
covenants not-to-compete, restrictions on the alienation of real property,

236. It has been noted:
The implication of additional terms is usually justified on the grounds that it is necessary
in order to give business effect to the intentions of the parties; the parties obviously
intended such an obligation, and the agreement makes commercial nonsense without
it.... In some instances, the courts seem to have gone beyond this, and implied terms
largely because this was necessary to achieve substantialjustice between the parties.
S.B. MARSH & J. SOtLJSBY, OuTLINES OF ENGLISH LAW 177-78 (3d ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
Examples of areas of the law where judicial implication has been pronounced include: carriage of
goods (seaworthiness), sale of goods (merchantability), employment law (safe workplace), and
landlord-tenant law (fitness for habitability).
237. No. 92-36552, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 23513 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 1993) (limited use
opinion) (decision reported without published opinion as table case at 5 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1993)).
238. Id. at *13 (quoting Villegas v. Transamercia Fin. Servs., Inc., 708 P.2d 781, 784 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1985)).
239. The following is the best definition of the determinacy-indeterminacy dialectic:
"Indeterminate authority may be illustrated by reference to ideas of 'honor,' or 'morality,' or 'fashion.' . , . [Y]et none can be fully defined.... [Determinate] authority finds its source in some
human organization." BERNARD F. CATALDO ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND THE LEGAL
PROCESS 7 (3d ed. 1980).
240, No. 92-1233, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 1970 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1993) (limited use opinion)
(decision reported without published opinion as a table case at 985 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1993)).
241, Id. at *8-9.
242, Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Michaelson Properties, Inc., 974 F.2d 545, 551 (4th
Cir. 1992).
243. Dresser Indus. v. Pyrrhus AG, 936 F.2d 921, 933 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Scheduling
Corp. of America v. Massello, 503 N.E.2d 806, 811 (111. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 511 N.E.2d 437
(11. 1987)).
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form contracts, satisfaction clauses, and exculpatory clauses. 2" More
recently, some courts have used the notion of "good faith" to disguise its
rewriting of contracts as something other than a full-fledged fairness
inquiry.245 "Good faith ...emphasizes ...consistency with the
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of
conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate
community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. '24 6 Some
commentators have described this inherent duality in most cases as the
phenomena of "sympathy" 247 or "empathy" 248 at play. There is a
"tension between the judge's engagement with the case... before him
and his responsibility to the judiciary as a whole as a struggle between
'empathy' or emotional bonding... and 'legality' or rational rules. 249
The empathy or sympathy role may incline a judge to void a contract
because of substantive unfairness, while the concern for the stability of
contract rules may cause a judge to frame the decision in trickery and to
the distinguishment of precedent. The flexibility of stare decisis enables
a skilled judge to serve both the fairness and "promise-enforcing external
god[s]"2 '0 of contract:
[A]djudication routinizes both analogy and modification, each of which
enables sympathy's search for common ground....
•.. [Sympathy's moderation can be achieved through] the vast
ability of judges to distinguish cases or uncover similarities between
them by shifting their perspectives on the meaning of fact patterns....
[A]nalogy is, after all, imperfect....
...Doctrinal flexibility (or indeterminacy) rests on an ability to
narrow a previous holding and distinguish a new fact pattern without
244. See generally Anita Cava & Don Wiesner, Rationalizinga Decade of Judicial Responses
to Exculpatory Clauses, 28 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 611 (1988).
245. See, e.g., Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 199 (1921); Hubbard

Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 873, 876-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,493 U.S. 978
(1989) ("The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing essentially serves to supply limits on
the parties' conduct when their contract defers decision on a particular term, omits terms or provides
ambiguous terms."); cf.Texas Nat'l Bank v. Sandia Mortgage Corp., 872 F.2d 692, 698 (5th Cir.
1989) (limiting implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to an "implied promise that a party
will not do anything to prevent or delay the other party from performing the contract").
246. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979), quoted in Hubbard
Chevrolet Co., 873 F.2d at 876.
247. See Note, supranote 150, at 1970-71.
248. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MiCt. L. REv. 1574 (1987).
249. Note, supranote 150, at 1968 (emphasis added).
250. MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 17.
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attacking the facial validity of that previous holding.25'
The place of a fairness inquiry in modem contract law is taken up
again by Professor Eisenberg in his analysis of the bargain principle.
He notes that the bargain principle's "conceptual simplicity,"25 3 as a
device to short-circuit the "complexity" of a fairness inquiry, has been
an illusion. "Concepts of fairness were smuggled into contract
law ...."' An unlimited bargain principle can be justified within
certain parameters. First, the economic marketplace is one of simplicity
and of relatively perfect competition. Second, the per se application of
the bargain principle will lead to systemic fairness and efficiency at the
expense of injustice in a given case. "[F]ailure to enforce bargain
promises to their full extent [will] subvert efficiency by diminishing the
willingness of private actors to enter into and plan upon the basis of
credit transactions."255 Third, "[t]he contract price is normally the most
efficient price, in the economist's sense of that term., 25 6 In reality, we
live in a highly complex marketplace, inequality of bargaining positions
calls into question the existence of "perfect competition," and there are
enough externalities (e.g., government intrusion) to lessen the price
efficiency parameter.257 Professor Eisenberg concludes that "[p]lacing
limits on the bargain principle involves costs of administration. Failure
to place such limits, however, involves still greater costs to the system
of justice." '
F

FairnessMicro-Managementand Systemic Fairness

A fairness inquiry involves the application of fairness concerns to
a particular case. It involves the query of whether a formal contract rule
should be avoided in order to obtain a just or fair result between the
parties involved. In contrast, systemic fairness can be utilized to support
a variety of rationales for contract enforceability. These two senses of

251. Note, supra note 150, at 1969, 1973, 1975-76 (emphasis added).
252. Eisenberg, supra note 27.

253. Id. at 800.
254. Id. at 801.

255. Id. at 746.
256. Id.
257. "[E]conomi relationships are more complex than the two traders in the [perfect]
competition model." Beermann, supra note 149, at 560.
258. Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 801.
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fairness may be quite divergent. 59 The application of formal rules,
without concern for the fairness factors of a specific case, has been
justified based upon the notion of systemic fairness. The predictive nature
of contract law will be served by enforcing the "free will" rules of
contract. The participants in the free market will have "fair warning" of
the rules of the exchange. In order to ensure a fair and predictable
playing field for future business transactions, the impracticality of
case-by-case fairness micro-management must give way to full enforcement.
A number of formulations can be useful to help understand the
macro-micro duality of fairness rationales. First, the duality can be
articulated by the Rawlsian notion that "all obligations arise from the
principle of fairness." 2 o By voluntarily entering into the arena of
contractual obligations, one is consenting to the rules of law that provide
the framework for exchange. To borrow a term, there are two sets of
possible obligations: (1) the personal obligation to the other contracting
party; and (2) "institutional obligations. 2 6' The "institutional obligation" in this case would be the institution of contract law or of the free
market system. The benefits and efficiency produced by the system or
institution is premised upon the participant's adherence to its rules even
in the face of personal unfairness in a specific case. "The institutional
obligation ... is one that a person voluntarily incurs as a result
26
of... participation in a particular social scheme.""
An alternative formulation is one based strictly upon utilitarian
grounds. Contract doctrine and rules, founded upon legitimate values and
public policy, will generally regulate the marketplace in an efficient and
fair manner. However, like all human endeavors, contract rules will not
be perfect in formulation or enforcement. Unfairness in a given case is
the expense for the overall benefits being forwarded by the general
application of law. These benefits include predictability, certainty of law,

259. Judge Posner refers to these two concepts of fairness as the "tradeoff between formal and
substantive justice." POSNER, supra note 29, at 38. This dialectic is often framed as the difference
between "form and substance-form referring to what is internal to law, substance to the world
outside of law, as in the contrast between formal and substantive justice." Id. at 40.
260. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 342 (1971), cited in Harris, supra note 176, at 946
& n.122.
261. Alan Gewirth, Obligation:Political Legal, Moral, in NOMOS XII: POLITICAL AND LEGAL
OBLIGATION 55, 57 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1970), cited in Harris, supra note

176, at 927 n.36; see also H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, in HUMAN RIGHTS 61, 70
(A.I. Melden ed., 1970).
262. Harris, supra note 176, at 944 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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and rules of fair play. The costs of performing a substantive fairness
inquiry at the expense of general rule application is contractual unpredictability, chaotic rule enforcement, judicial micro-management of private
affairs, and the resultant systemic inefficiency. In the end, the "greater
good" of free market transactions are fostered by freedom of contract.
Professor Summers' work on common-law justification provides
another formulation for general rules application at the expense of ad hoe
fairness inquiries.2 63 He lucidly analyzes the "substantive reasons"
given in support of judicial decision-making: "When judges appeal to
moral, economic, political, institutional, or other social considerations--[they] give 'substantive reasons' .... "' Substantive reasons
can be divided into "goal reasons" and "rightness reasons."'2 65 Systemic
fairness is within the realm of "goals" justification. The goal-rightness
dichotomy is somewhat amenable to a formulation for explaining the
systemic-substantive fairness duality. Goal reasons are premised upon the
future orientation of judicial decision-making. "[T]he decision [a goal
reason] supports can be predicted to have effects that serve a good social
goal." 266 In contrast, "rightness reasons" may be used to support a
decision of substantive fairness based upon the history of the case at
issue. "[A] rightness reason draws its force from the way in which the
decision accords with a sociomoral norm of rightness as applied to a
2 67
party's actions or to a state of affairs resulting from those actions."
Thus, a goal reason for a rule application is to affect future behavior. The
well-being of the present parties may need to be sacrificed because of
"the predicted decisional effects. 2 6' For example, the negative effects
on contractual certainty may warrant a more formalistic enforcement of
a contract rule. In contrast, a rightness reason "does not purport to
predict the future effects .... Rather, the essential relation of accordance
between decision and norm either exists or does not exist at the time of
decision.2 69 The sociomoral norm of "conscionability" would permit
the correction of a one-sided bargain which resulted from a party taking

263. Robert S. Summers, Two Tpes of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of
Common-Law Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 707 (1978).
264. Id. at 710.
265. Id. at 714.
266. Id. at 717. Summers enumerates a number of goal reasons: general safety, community
welfare, and public health. Id.

267. Id. at 718. Rightness reasons include: conscionability, justified reliance, restitution for
unjust enrichment, and fittingness or proportionality of remedy. Id. at 718-19.
268. Id. at 775 (emphasis added).
269. Id. (emphasis added).
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advantage of a weaker, unsophisticated counterpart.7 0
Fairness analysis does and should have a place in common law
decision-making. It comes into play both at the macro or systemic level
and at the micro or case level: "The obligation of fairness simultaneously
prohibits one from taking advantage of another [micro level], while
prescribing that one must comply with... the rules governing the
enterprise [macro level]."27 1 Evidence of the rise of fairness at the
micro level can be found in the case law. Many of the rules and
formalities of classical contract law have been narrowed by the
development of numerous exceptions. These exceptions were created to
temper the harshness associated with rigid rule application. The fairness
or reasonableness norm has been on the rise as noted by the "new spirit"
of contract theorists.272 This new spirit will be analyzed by reviewing
the law of satisfaction. The question to be asked is how have courts dealt
with the notion of satisfaction when it affronts notions of fairness? Along
with attempting to answer this question, a couple of side issues will be
addressed. First, whether the courts make use of "fictions," such as
contractual intent, in the quest for fairness in a regime characterized by
formalism, generality, and freedom of contract. Second, whether courts
have become more open to the task of a "fairness in the exchange"
inquiry.
III.

THE LAW OF SATISFACTION: A SEARCH FOR "JURAL

RUDIMENTS" AND HUMAN VALUES
Case law is the lifeblood of the common law. Any analysis must
ultimately judge itself against the litmus test of application of the rules
and doctrine, the work product of precedent, to real cases. It is at the
grassroots, the interfacing of law and fact, where the law is applied or,
for those of Cardozian ilk, where law is "created."2 73 "[W]ithin the

270. See id.
at 718-19.
271. Harris, supra note 176, at 946. Even though the author of this quote used it in a different
context, its language has been adopted to illustrate my point. "[L]egal obligations of fairness provide
the citizen with moral reasons to obey the law qua law upon which she ought to act." Id. at 964.
272. See supra notes 101, 105-11 and accompanying text; see also infra part IV.B.
273. CA Dozo, supra note 2, at 142-45. Cardozo notes that, in most legal systems, the judge
acts both as an applier of existing rules, id. at 114 (characterizing the judge's responsibility as "the
duty of adherence to the pervading spirit of the law"), and as a creator or legislator of new law. The
issue is the use of judges "as legislators" in a given legal system. Ihering states:
How far if at all the needful changes can or ought to be carried out by judicial decisions
or the development of legal theory, and how far the intervention of the legislator will be
called for, is a matter that will vary from one legal territory to another according to the
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limits [precedent and custom] thus set, within the range over which
choice moves, the final principle of selection for judges, asfor legislators, is one of fitness to an end." 274 Cardozo points out that it is the
task of a judge to look to existing rules of law and doctrine for guidance,
but that the hoped for guidance is often not clearly forthcoming. "We do
not pick our rules of law full-blossomed from the trees. Every judge
consulting his own experience must be conscious of times when a free
exercise of will... determined the form and tendency
of a rule which
' 27 5
at that moment took its origin in one creative act.
Contract, in its formalistic application, must shun its eyes from the
spectra of injustice. For the twin pillars of classical contract doctrine,
predictability and certainty,276 to reign supreme, precedent and its
doctrinal progeny are not to be chipped away in the name of ad hoc
justice or fairness.277 In the words of Justice Cardozo: "[The judge] is
not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty
or of goodness." 278 In Kantian terms, justice in an individual case must
be sacrificed for the integrity of our system of justice. "Man feels in
himself a powerful counterpoise against all commands of duty which
reason presents to him as so deserving of respect; this counterpoise is his
needs and inclinations .... ."'9 In a given case, the inclination to
ensure fairness or to prevent an injustice may lead a court to create an
exception to the application of a general rule of law. Kant argues that the
court should resist such temptation but recognizes such claims to be
"impetuous and yet so plausible.""28 From this illusion of doing justice
in a given case, Kant, in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,
argues:

accepted traditions as the binding force of precedents, the character of the enacted law,

and the wider or narrower ofjudicial interpretation.
IHERING, supra note 136, at 115 n.23. For example, the role of judge as legislator would be
extremely limited in a civil law system where the code is the "only" law, reference to judicial

precedent is at best implicit, and the range of judicial interpretation is narrowly defined. See
generally JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed. 1985). Merryman states, "[T]he
familiar common law doctrine of staredecisis... is obviously inconsistent with the separation of
powers as formulated in civil law countries, and is therefore rejected by the civil law tradition.
Judicial decisions are not law." Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
274. CARDOzO, supra note 2, at 103 (emphasis added).
275. Id. at 103-04 (emphasis added).
276. See discussion infra part IV.A.1-2.
277. See supra part II.F (examining the duality of systemic fairness versus ad hoc fairness or
justice).
278. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 141.
279. KANT, supra note 58, at 21.
280. Id.
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[A] natural dialectic arises, i.e., a propensity to argue against the stem
laws of duty and their validity, or at least to place their purity and

strictness in doubt and, where possible, to make them more accordant
with our wishes and inclinations. This is equivalent to corrupting them
in their very foundations and destroying their dignity-a thing which
even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good.2sI

More specifically, teleological unfairness in a case can be justified by an
282
expanded utilitarian analysis. Kant's notion of the universalization
of all moral acts holds that the inclination to examine the effects of a
decision must be ignored. A rational being is one which acts and decides

based upon a "conception of law."283 Conformity to a rule of law is an
ultimate good in itself. The perceived negative effects of applying a rule

in a given situation are irrelevant to one's notion of rightness. For Kant,
effects resulting from an action are only theoretical while application of
a rationally reasoned law is an unconditional "categorical imperative." 2 4 The rationalism for legal formalism can find much grounding
in this moral philosophy. To countenance ad hoc inquiry into the
theoretical effects of a decision is to doom the legal enterprise "into
sheer inconceivabilities and self-contradictions, or at least into a chaos
of uncertainty, obscurity, and instability. ' 285 The impact of Kantian
thinking on American jurisprudence has been noted:

281. Id.
282. Kant's notion of the universalization of all moral rules is stated in his categorical
imperative: "Act according to maxims which can at the same time have themselves as universal laws
of nature as their object." Id. at 55-56.
283. For Kant, respect for law in and of itself can be an ultimate good. "The only object of
respect is the law, and indeed only the law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognize as
necessary in itself." Id. at 18 n.2.
284. Kant posits the question: "How is a categorical imperative possible?" Id. at 72. In
responding, he explains the dichotomy between the "rational world" and the world of emotion, or
"the world of sense." Id. It is this difference that argues for the generality of law and one's duty to
obey the law in spite of personal hardship. Hardship is a consequence which has no place in Kantian
ethics:
I recognize myself qua intelligence as subject to the law of the world of understanding
and to the autonomy of the will.... I recognize myself as subject to the law of reason
which contains in the idea of freedom the law of the intelligible world, while at the same
time I must acknowledge that I am a being which belongs to the world of sense.
Therefore I must regard the laws of the intelligible world as imperatives for me, and
actions in accord with this principle as duties.
Thus categoricalimperatives are possible because the idea of freedom makes me
a member of an intelligible world.
Id. at 72-73 (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 20.
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[American jurisprudence] has held fast to Kant's categorical imperative ....

It has refused to sacrifice the larger and more inclusive good

to the narrower and smaller. A contract is made. Performance is
burdensome and perhaps oppressive. If we were to consider only the
individual instance, we might be ready to release the promisor. We look
beyond the particular to the universal, and shape our judgment in
obedience to the fundamental interest of society that contracts shall be
fulfilled.286

A naive or amateur capitalist must not be rescued from the harm of
a bad bargain. Changed circumstances should not cause a rescission or
modification of a contract.2" 7 Satisfaction as a condition for a reciprocal
performance may be negotiated as an express term of an agreement. A
court should not give legal force to correspondence lacking the necessary
formalities and "operative phrases ' 28 1 of contract despite evidence of
reliance. Under what rationales have these assertions been justified?
Consent theory and freedom of contract hold that the courts should not
interfere with the ability to negotiate and agree to contractual terms.289
Capitalism's "survival of the fittest" attitude awards those based upon
their relative acumen and judgment. If market conditions change so as to
render a contract unprofitable, so be it. The predictive skills of the other
party should be aptly rewarded. If an event transpires to the detriment of
one of the parties, so be it. The risk allocation agreed to by the parties
should be preserved. If the satisfaction of the promisee is not achieved,
so be it. The promisor should be made to accept the consequences of
entering into such a contract. Reliance upon such noncontractual
instruments as "comfort letters"2 9 should be subject only to nonlegal
" ' Parties should not be allowed to cloak disagreement by
sanction.29

286. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 139-40.
287. The expansion of the "doctrines of frustration, impracticability, and impossibility" seem
to indicate otherwise. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261-271 (1979)
(discussing the various sections on frustration, impracticability, and impossibility); John P. Dawson,
JudicialRevision of FrustratedContracts:The UnitedStates, 64 B.U. L. REv. I (1984) (comparing
the trend in the United States of increased judicial intervention in contract situations where there has
been an unforeseen change with the position taken in German courts).
288. See DiMatteo & Sacasas, supra note 33, at 381-86 (discussing the notion of "operative
phrases" of contract).
289. See infra notes 489-504 and accompanying text.
290. See infra notes part 1l.H.
291. Chamy categorizes some of the nonlegal sanctions as: the "loss of reputation among
market participants," resulting in the loss of valuable business opportunities, the "loss of
opportunities for important or pleasurable associations with others," the "loss of self-esteem," and
"feelings of guilty." Chamy, supra note 102, at 392-93.
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"formalizing" representations in ambiguous, noncommittal instruments.
Kant poses a question, the answer to which is at the core of any
theoretical or metaphysical foundation of the law of contract: "May 29I,2
when in distress, make a promise with the intention not to keep it?
A corollary question can be exposed to the same analysis: May a court
disregard a promise if its enforcement would result in an "unfair" or
inordinate amount of harm (costs) to the promisor? Kant notes a number
of traps that weigh against allowing one out of his or her duty to keep
a promise. First, "consequences cannot be so easily foreseen." 293 The
apparent benefit of the release may have unforeseen consequences. For
example, the release from one's promise may inhibit one's ability to
enter into future exchanges of promises. Ironically, Kant uses this
teleological argument as an initial basis for the absolute duty to keep
one's promises. A more fundamental Kantian argument is that releasing
one from a promise cannot be universalized. "I could will the lie [in a
particular situation, i.e., an exception] but not a universal law to lie....
[M]y maxim would necessarily destroy itself ...."'94 Thus, legal
formalism has a readily made moral foundation provided by Kantian
ethics' unconditional obligation to duty.
A major development has been the expansion of law into unchartered waters where formalistic rule application has given way to the ad
hoe inquiry long found in the realm of equity. This so-called "new spirit"
of contract can be seen in a number of developments including: (1) the
conversion of satisfaction contracts from subjective to objective
standards; (2) the implication of terms into contracts under the rue that
if the parties had been alerted to certain possibilities they would have
expressly negotiated the terms being implied; and (3) the continued
advance of reliance as a potential ground for the enforcement of
quasi-legal instruments.2 95 These areas are the new battlefield where the
fight has been waged between those advocating case by case fairness
inquiry and those holding firm that the generality of law requires that no
such inquiry be performed. Upon reflection of the circular nature of this
fight, one commentator eloquently stated:
[One] view might say we should examine contracts ad hoc and enforce
only those judged to involve a fair exchange. The rules position might

292. KANT, supra note 58, at 18.

293. Id. at 19.
294. Id.
295. See infra notes 508, 512-13 and accompanying text.
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criticize the standards position as involving too much arbitrary
discretion on the question of fairness. To avoid the quagmire of the
fairness inquiry, we should simply follow the rule: enforce all contracts
freely entered. Enforcement of the rule, however, requires asking which
contracts have been freely entered.... [I]mplementation of the rule,
therefore, involves a circular return to a standard-like fairness inquiry.

.

.. 296

A review of these areas of law will hopefully shed light upon this
debate. How formalistically have courts applied the rules of contract
presently stated? How have these rules been transformed to meet
changing conditions or to reflect changing juristic inclinations? What
legal principles, values, and notions of fairness can be distilled from the
cases? Can legal generality and ad hoe fairness inquiries both find a
place within judicial decision making?
A.

Express Satisfaction Clauses: What You Said
Is Not What You Meant?

Satisfaction is a contract norm which applies to all contractual
arrangements, either expressly or implicitly. Contracts, in their express
consensual form, involve the exchange of performances or consideration.
This may involve the performance of services, the manufacture or
delivery of goods, or the payment of money. It is assumed both by the
parties and the courts that the reciprocal considerations are to be
performed in a satisfactory manner. The question is to whom's satisfaction should the performance be judged? Can the promisee reject a good
faith and reasonable performance based upon her own subjective
standards? Alternatively, can one negotiate a subjective satisfaction term
into a contract and be certain of judicial enforcement in case of a
dispute? The answer is probably not.
Satisfaction clauses have traditionally been bifurcated along lines of
subject matter.297 A satisfaction clause in commercial contracts will
296. Hager, supra note 188, at 1061-62.
297. See, e.g., 3A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACrS § 646 (1960); see also Hutton
v. Monograms Plus, Inc., 604 N.E.2d 200, 203-04 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). A similar bifurcation is
often made in the law of assignments. The general rule is that, unless expressly provided otherwise,
a contract is fully assignable. Exceptions have been formulated for types of performances that are
"purely personal." If a contract is one for personal or unique services, then it is not assignable
without consent of the obligee. Furthermore, death or disability of the obligor discharges the
contract. See, e.g., Mackay v. Clark Rig Bldg. Co., 42 P.2d 341,348 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935). See
generally Larry A. DiMatteo, Depersonalizationof PersonalService Contracts: The Search for a
Modern Approach to Assignability, 27 AKRON L. REV. 407 (1994) (explaining that the nature or
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generally be judged based upon an objective standard. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts states that, when satisfaction is a condition, "an
interpretation is preferred under which the condition occurs if such a
reasonableperson in the position of the obligor would be satisfied."29
The second category of contracts is one involving factors of "'fancy,
taste, or judgment. ' '299 The satisfaction with a written screenplay or a
portrait painting are paradigmatic examples of the second category of
satisfaction clauses. However, the line of demarcation between the two
categories of satisfaction clauses is not always clear. It has been held that
subjective satisfaction clauses are acceptable as to the determination of
the "reliability and trustworthiness" of the purchaser of realty," ° to the
determination of the credit worthiness of a purchaser as the "sole judge"
of the seller,3"' to the evaluation of real estate leases," 2 and to the
termination of a physician's employment contract. 3 The court in
Beasley v. St. Mary's Hospital held that a subjective satisfaction clause

allows for even "unreasonable" terminations of the contract. "Where, as
here, a contract incorporates a subjective satisfaction standard, the
objective reasonableness of the obligee's performance is not dispositive."3" The only ground to challenge the exercise of the satisfaction
clause is whether the party exercising its rights under the clause was in
fact "not dissatisfied"
or did not exercise the clause "on account of its
30 5
dissatisfaction."
Given this judicial bifurcation of satisfaction clauses, can the parties
subject matter of contract must be personal to determine the consent of the parties).
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 (1979) (emphasis added).
299. Action Eng'g v. Martin Marietta Aluminum, 670 F.2d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting
Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625, 627 (Cal. 1958) (en bane)); see also Misano di Navigazione, SpA
v. United States, 968 F.2d 273, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1992); FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 8.4, at 585;
cf Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 415, 417 (7th Cir. 1983).
300. Quinn v. Daly, 133 N.E. 290, 292 (II1.1921).
301. Stribling v. Ailion, 157 S.E.2d 427, 428 (Ga. 1967).
302. Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625, 627 (Cal. 1958) (en bane).
303. Beasley v. St. Mary's Hosp., 558 N.E.2d 677 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d
835 (Ill. 1990). The importance of this case is the idea that personal service contracts are generally
categorized as contracts "involving matters of fancy, taste, sensibility and judgment." Id. at 682.
Given that a large portion of our gross national product constitutes personal services, the subjective
satisfaction category takes on great importance. See Ray v. Georgetown Life Ins. Co., 419 N.E.2d
721 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (discussing termination of employment under personal service contracts);
see also Tiffany v. Pacific Sewer Pipe Co., 182 P. 428,430 (Cal. 1919) (noting that factors involved
in determining whether performance is satisfactory are too numerous to permit the application of a
reasonable person standard and, thus, the standard is the party's subjective satisfaction); Brenner v.
Redlick Furniture Co., 298 P. 62 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
304. Beasley, 558 N.E.2d at 682 (emphasis added).
305. Id.
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agree to broach the line between the "purely subjective" and those
"capable of objective evaluation?" 3" Within the realm of freedom of
contract, the answer seems clear. In Forman v. Benson, the court
answered the question in the affirmative: "[I]t [is] clear that the parties
may agree to a reservation in one party of the absolute and unqualified
freedom of choice on a matter not involving fancy, taste, or whim. 30 7
The case for such unfettered discretion is made stronger when the
subjective standard is a negotiated term and was the inducement for the
one party to enter into the contract. The Forman court noted that, even
when such factors exist, the subjective standard does not provide for an
unlimited right of rejection. The court stated, "The personal judgment
standard ...does not allow the defendant to exercise unbridled
discretion in rejecting" performance.30 8 The subjectiveness of subjective
satisfaction clauses continues to be fertile ground for debate.
1. Satisfaction Clauses: Is Subjective Satisfaction Defined
Objectively?
Despite the liberal or classical concept of freedom of contract, courts
have been reluctant to uphold subjective satisfaction clauses. In the 1992
Second Circuit case of Misano di Navigazione, SpA v. United States, 9
the court stated its preference for objective satisfaction: "When a contract
conditions performance upon the satisfaction of one party and is
ambiguous as to the applicable standard of satisfaction, courts generally
require performance to the satisfaction of a reasonable man ....
The rationales which may be forwarded include the belief that the parties
did not intend the subjective satisfaction provision to mean what it, in
plain language, expresses. The promisor is presumed to have believed
that performance rendered "subject to the satisfaction" of the promisee
would only be enforced by a court after a determination of the reasonableness of the rejection. In fact, numerous courts have filtered subjective
306, Forman v. Benson, 446 N.E.2d 535, 538 (II1.App. Ct. 1983). One commentator poses the
same question in analyzing technical and performance specifications in contracts: "Does the law

enforce the seller's candid and explicit promise that the entire risk of satisfying the buyer's
objective's regarding the use of the contracted for product rest with the seller?" Don Wiesner,
Specifications: Technical or Performance?Legal Characterizations,97 COMM. L.J. 32, 46 (1992).
In response, he states: "At first one [may] point to the freedom of contract doctrine and say yes. But
this would be incorrect." Id.
307. Forman,446 N.E.2d at 539; see also Wood Mach. Co. v. Smith, 15 N.W. 906, 908-09
(Mich. 1883).
308. Forman,446 N.E.2d at 540.
309. 968 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1992).
310. Id. at 274.
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satisfaction clauses through the infamous reasonable person standard.
Generally, if a performance is one for commercial or consumer goods or
services, then satisfaction will be determined by customary or community
standards of reasonableness. The reasoning seems to be two-fold. A
subjective standard is susceptible to capriciousness and arbitrariness. A
change in circumstances may render the transaction less profitable to the
beneficiary of the satisfaction clause. The clause can then be used as a
technical loophole for the avoidance of a bad bargain ex post facto.
Second, the court is "able" to apply an objective standard. In the words
of the Misano di Navigazione court, the preference is to apply a
reasonable person standard "particularly when a definite objective test of
satisfaction is available. 3 n Only when performance involves some
form of artistry or uniqueness will subjectiveness be allowed its day
in court.
A traditional law school hypothetical illustrates the point. John and
Mary Homebuyer hire ABC Construction Company to construct a custom
single-family home. The contract provides an express satisfaction
provision: Final payment subject to the final approval and personal
satisfaction of the Homebuyers. In the event of a dispute, Homebuyer's
decision is final. The work is performed in accordance with both industry
standards and the state building code, as is evidenced by the issuance of
a certificate of occupancy by the local government building inspector.
Nonetheless, the work is rejected by Homebuyers as being unsatisfactory.
Will the court enforce the express language of the building contract?
Unlike Misano di Navigazione, this hypothetical contains no
ambiguity regarding intent. The subjective satisfaction of the
Homebuyers is the standard prescribed by the contract. A number of
courts have recognized the power of the parties to agree to a subjective
standard.3 12 They have, nonetheless, developed a number of devices to

311. Id.
312. See, e.g., Forman, 446 N.E.2d at 539. A seminal case on the implication of "reasonableness" in a building contract satisfaction clause is Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr.,

Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983). The Seventh Circuit argued, in detail, for a "presumption of
reasonableness." The court noted, "[T]he presumption that the performing party would not have
wanted to put himself at the mercy of the paying party's whim is overcome when the nature of the
performance contracted for is such that there are no objective standards to guide the court." Id. at
415. The court briefly pays homage to "freedom of contract" and the ability of the parties to agree
to such "whim." The court stated:
Lest this conclusion be thought to strike at the foundations of freedom of
contract, we repeat that if it appeared from the language or circumstances of the contract
that the parties really intended [that one has] the right to reject [the other party's] work
for failure to satisfy [one's] private aesthetic taste .... the rejection would have been
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apply an objective safeguard to the application of subjective satisfaction
clauses." 3 In a case involving the application of a satisfaction clause
in a contract for the underground installation of television cable, the
court upheld the subjectiveness of the satisfaction clause: "Under the law
of 'satisfaction' contracts, the party for whom performance is rendered
may reject if his dissatisfaction is genuine. There is no objective
standard. The relevant inquiry is not whether he ought to have been
satisfied, but whether he was satisfied.""3 4 This seems clear enough.
The operative phrase, however, is that "his dissatisfaction is
genuine."3 5 The performance may be subjectively rejected,
but the
3 16
faith."
bad
or
caprice
by
prompted
[be]
"not
rejection must
The question becomes what standard is to be used to determine if
the dissatisfaction was, in fact, one of good faith? This issue was
addressed in Larwin-Southern California,Inc. v. JGB Investment Co.3 7
The case involved a typical developer land purchase contract. The
contract provided for a number of contingencies that allowed the
developer-purchaser to avoid the contract upon the completion of an
engineering and feasibility study. The contract provided that these
contingencies were to be deemed removed only upon the satisfaction of
the purchaser. The contract provided, "Buyer's approvals provided for in
this [contract] may be given or withheld in its sole judgment and
discretion .... "3 ' Despite its plain meaning, the court held that the

proper even if unreasonable.
Id. at 417.
313. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 769 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
concurring) ("[Alnyone can see who reads the large number of cases in this field, [the] numerous

intricate methods of getting around the objective theory.").
314. Nohcra Communications v. AM Communications, 909 F.2d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added).

315. Id.
316. Id.
317. 162 Cal. Rptr. 52 (Ct. App. 1979).

318. Id. at 54 (emphasis added). In noting that clear contractual language is needed before a
court is likely to apply a subjective standard, Professor Famsworth states, "Words such aspersonal

or entire satisfaction and sole judgment help to show that honest [subjective] satisfaction was
intended." FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 8.4, at 583 n.35; see, e.g., Ard Dr. Pepper Bottling Co.
v. Dr. Pepper Co., 202 F.2d 372, 376, 377 (5th Cir. 1953) (citing a lack of evidence of "actual ill

will"); Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49, 50-51 (1878); Fursmidt v. Hotel Abbey Holding Corp., 200
N.Y.S.2d 256, 259-60 (App. Div. 1960). However, courts will generally apply a reasonable
satisfaction standard if the express language leaves any room for doubt. See, e.g., Bruner v. Hegyi,

183 P. 369, 370 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919) (noting that, where the contract calls for the "fruits of
the labor of the contractor," the court will not allow into evidence a prior oral agreement to clarify
language of contract); Hawkins v. Graham, 21 N.E. 312,313 (Mass. 1889) ("In doubtful cases courts
have been inclined to construe agreements... to do the thing in such a way as reasonably ought
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subjective satisfaction standard provided for319in the contract is to be
tempered by "an implied duty of good faith."
Is this "good faith" to be subjectively or objectively determined?
One may argue that a subjective standard would be more consistent with
the subjective nature of the satisfaction clause. The question to be asked
is did the party in question reject performance out of sincerity and
honesty? Whether a reasonable person would have accepted performance
is irrelevant. This seems to be the position taken by the court in Mattei
v. Hopper.3 ° The case involved a purchase of real estate that was
subject to the purchaser obtaining satisfactory leases. Justice Spence
determined that the "multiplicity of factors which must be considered in
evaluating a lease shows" that the standard to be applied is one of
subjective satisfaction akin to clauses "involving fancy, taste, or
judgment."32' 1 The line between "honest judgment" or "good faith" and
"bad faith" is whether the dissatisfied party had become "dissatisfied
with the performance" as opposed to becoming dissatisfied with the
contract. 3 2 A party should not, however, be able to avoid a bad
bargain under the ruse of dissatisfaction with a satisfactory performance.
Under this approach, the subjective state of mind of the party exercising
his "right of dissatisfaction" would be the operative factor.
A more prevalent approach seems to accept the subjective right of
dissatisfaction, but to apply an objective standard of good faith in
determining if the right has been exercised arbitrarily. "[T]he expression
of dissatisfaction must be genuine and not arbitrary, and that an objective
criterion,--goodfaith-controls the exercise of the right to determine
satisfaction." 323 The use of an objective standard to determine good

to satisfy the" party); Doll v. Noble, 22 N.E. 406, 406-07 (N.Y. 1889); Duplex Safety Boiler Co.
v. Garden, 4 N.E. 749, 750 (N.Y. 1886); Haymore v. Levinson, 328 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1958).
319. Larwin-Southern Cal., Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. at 59. The notion of "good faith" dissatisfaction
has long been used to defeat claims of illusory consideration. If one party's obligation to perform
is totally discretionary upon its satisfaction with the other party's performance, then the contract is

void because of a lack of mutuality of obligation. The implication of good faith into such satisfaction
clauses saves the contract from being a "per se nullity" Id.at 58; see also Pittston Warehouse Corp.
v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 715 F. Supp. 1221, 1227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Aster v. BP Oil Corp.,
412 F. Supp. 179, 189, 191 (M.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 549 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1977); Mattei v. Hopper,
330 P.2d 625, 627-29 (Cal. 1958) (en bane). See generally IA CORBIN, supra note 297, § 152
(discussing several instances where there is no "mutuality of obligation" yet there is a valid contract).
320. 330 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1958) (en bane).
321. Id. at 627.

322. Id. at 628.
323. Larwin-Southern Cal., Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. at 59 (emphasis added).
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faith is a reflection of the general judicial preference for such standards324 and the evidentiary difficulty in assessing the state of mind of
the party in question." The cloaking of a subjective satisfaction clause
with objective good faith seems to be a circular device for masking the
courts' disdain for subjective standards. Ultimately, the difference
between the application of an objective standard for satisfaction or a
subjective one coupled with objective good faith is at most a difference
in degree, and not a difference in kind. 26
2. An Aside: Case Analysis of Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
and Larvin-Southern California,Inc. v. JGB Investment Co.
In reviewing cases, one comes across a number of decisions that
328
327
reveal more clearly than usual evidence of the norms, principles,
rules, standards, 3 29 and "externalities" 330 at work in judicial
decision-making. One such case is the 1946 Second Circuit case of
Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 33 ' This is an especially attractive case
because the majority opinion was written by Learned Hand, with a
lengthy concurrence by Jerome Frank. The case questions the validity of
a release signed by an injured railroad worker who had been represented
by an attorney.332 On the advice of his attorney, the worker signed a
324. Judge Frank states the rationale for the so-called "objectivists": "[A]dvocacy of the
'objective' standard in contracts appears to have represented a desire for legal symmetry, legal
uniformity, a desire seemingly prompted by aesthetic impulses." Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
153 F.2d 757, 761 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1946) (concurring opinion) (expanding upon the view of the

"objectivists").
325. This rationale is somewhat disingenuous given the fact that much of contract law is
premised upon the determination of the state of mind of the parties to a contract as reflected in
contractual intent at the formation of a contract.
326. "[A] wag once inquired whether the difference between a difference of kind and a
difference of degree is itself a difference of kind or a difference of degree. The answer. . . is that

it is a difference of degree. A difference of kind is merely a violent difference of degree." Glanville
Williams, Language and the Lan--1, 61 L.Q. REv. 179, 192 (1945).
327. For further examination of the "norms" of contract law, see infra part IV.
328. "Principles" shall be defined as the fundamental objectives that inform the rules of contract
law.
329. For a discussion of the distinction between rules and standards, see supranotes 114-20 and
accompanying text.
330. "Externalities" are facts in a given case that are noncontractual in nature, but nonetheless
bear upon the contractual issues of the case. "Fairness" factors may at times be viewed as
externalities. Also, a given theory of contract law may construe different factors as externalities. For
example, for efficiency theorist, factors of fairness and justice are viewed as external to the
fundamental notion of efficiency.
331. 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946).
332. The right that was released was one statutorily granted under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994). The validity of the release, however, was determined to
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release without reading its terms. He believed that the release was only
for his wages, and not a release for his personal injuries. In fact, the
instrument that he signed was a general release for all potential claims.
The court held that the fraudulent misrepresentation of the attorney was
beyond the scope of his authority. Therefore, the release was held to be
invalid.
Judge Hand takes a purely doctrinal approach to the case. He
acknowledges the general rule that one is liable for what one has signed:
"The theory upon which a document binds one who signs it, but who
does not read it, is that either he accepts it whatever may be its contents,
or that he has been careless in choosing his informant. 333 The bargain
theory's patron saint, Samuel Williston, is cited as authority.3 Nonetheless, Judge Hand finds an exception within the law of agency
regarding the authority of an attorney, explaining that "an attorney has
' The precedential
no implied authority to compromise a claim."335
norm
of the common-law plays an important part in the rationale of the
decision. The case is one-hundred seventy years removed from the
Declaration of Independence, but Hand still refers to the "law in
England. 336 Judge Frank takes a more circumspect approach in his
concurrence. He draws from a multiplicity of norms in reaching his
decision by examining the historical debate between the "actual intent"
or "will" theorists and the "objective" theorists. He criticizes both
approaches for different reasons. The use of the "fiction" of contractual
intent by the subjectivist is exposed: "[T]he 'actual intent' theory induced
much fictional discourse which imputed to the parties intentions they
plainly did not have." 337 As for the objectivists, Judge Frank concludes
that they "also went too far." 338 They went too far because
"[t]hey tried ... to treat virtually all the varieties of contractual
arrangements in the same way."339 The objectivists believed that the

be within the purview of the common law. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 759.
333. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 760; see also Moity v. New Iberia Bank, 612 So. 2d 140, 143 (La.
Ct. App. 1992) ("The signatures of the parties ... are not mere ornaments .... ").
334. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 760.
335. Id. It would seem the facts of this case would dictate a different decision under Professor
Fried's "promise principle." A signed release, while being represented by an attorney, wan-ants the
moral obligation to be bound by such a clear use of the convention of promise. MACNEIL, supranote
22, at 16-17. The worker's recourse would be in tort (misrepresentation or malpractice) against his
attorney.
336. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 759.
337. Id. at 761.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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use of the "reasonable man" was superior to that of the subjective
"meeting of the minds. 340 Subjectivity, according to the objectivists,
"would destroy that legal certainty and stability which a modem
commercial society demands. 34'
However, both theories possessed their own "fictional characters":
subjectivists based all their decisions on the fiction of contractual intent
whereas the objectivists modeled the reasonable man after the "economic
man" of the free enterprise system. As Judge Frank notes, "The
'economic man' is of course an abstraction, a 'fiction."'342 Judge Frank
makes use of a variety of theories, principles, and norms previously
discussed. The following is a chart of the Frank opinion and its use of
contract theory, with references to relevant sources, norms, and schools
3 43
of thought.

PHRASE

THEORY/PRINCIPLE/NORM
'

"economic man"

"the 'objective' standard
as a necessary adjunct of
a 'free enterrise' econmic system"
"a desire for legal symmetry, legal uniformity""

SOURCE

law and economics

Posner 5

law and economics

'Taley,.. .a theological utilitarian, a
contemporary of
7
Adam Smith ' 'M

certainty/predictability
norm

F.S. Cohen

340. There are recent examples of the conflict between objective and subjective intent. See, e.g.,
Artex, Inc. v. Omaha Edible Oils, Inc., 436 N.W.2d 146, 150 (Neb. 1989) ("Parties are bound by

the terms of the contract even though their intent may have been different from that expressed in the
agreement.").
341. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 761 n.2.
342. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130,
133-34 (2d Cir. 1945)).
343. The references in italics are not those of Judge Frank. Some are extrapolated from potential
sources from which Judge Frank could have drawn support. Other references to sources subsequent
to the Frank opinion is the author's attempt to "pigeonhole" the phrases into the different categories
of theory examined in part I.
344. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 761 n.2.
345. See POSNER, supra note 29, at 382.
346. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 761 n.2.
347. Id. (quoting Edwin W. Patterson, EquitableRelieffor UnilateralMistake, 28 COLUM. L.
REv. 859, 878 n.56 (1928)).
348. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 761 & n.5; see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 845 (1935) (discussing jurisprudence as a study of
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PHRASE
"non-negligent unilateral
9
mistakes"

THEORY/PRINCIPLE/NORM
"meeting of the minds"

"leads to needless complexities that will confront
us in future cases"35

teleological theory

"a good opportunity offers itself to uncomplicate
an excessively complica352
ted set of legal rules

legal formalism

"I believe that [there] is
an important
social policy
' 3
involved 1

social contract

"their passion for excessive simplicity
and unifor35
mity, 5

legal formalism

SOURCE
Hand/Williston

contract interpretation 351by implication

Williston/
Restatement

social contract
3

theorists "3

objectivists

human behavior).
349. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 760. Judge Frank is referring to the opinion of Learned Hand, which
adopts a category taken from Williston. Judge Frank questions the soundness of this approach.
350. Id. at 760.
351. There are matters of social importance, or public policy, that should be implied in contract.
This was noted in the 1834 case of Britton v. Turner. 6 N.H. 481. The case involved a contract for
labor. It provided that payment would be made upon the completion of one year of labor. After
completing nine months of work, the laborer left his employment and sued for nine months of
compensation. The court acknowledged that the controlling rule of law was that "the party who
voluntarily fails to fulfill the contract by performing the whole labor contracted for, is not entitled
to recover anything for the labor actually performed." d at 486. Nonetheless, the court ordered "pro
rata compensation" through implication of community standards:
[We have abundant reason to believe, that the general understanding of the community
is, that the hired laborer shall be entitled to compensation for the service actually
performed, though he do [sic) not continue the entire term contracted for, and such
contracts must be presumed to be made with reference to that understanding ....
Id. at 493.
352. Id. at 481.
353. See supra notes 174, 176, 188.
354. Britton, 6 N.H. at 481.
355. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 762.
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PHRASE
"[i]t is the uncertainty
about the 'facts' that creates most of the unpredictability of decisions '' "

THEORY/PRINCIPLE/NORM

SOURCE
356

certainty norm

Corbin

"'fundamental principle
of the security of
358business transactions'

legal formalism

Williston

"'values which the conscientious judge faces"' 3

justice/fairness
norms

Anti-Williston359

realism/pragmatic
instrumentalism

Fuller/Summers

"Williston [sought] to avoid the appearance of exceptions," 6 as opposed
to recognizing that "'the
complete meaning of any

362

concept... is 3of63hope-

less complexity"'

"most judges are too
common-sensible to allow
... the appearance of
an abstract consistency,
to bring about obviously
unjust results."' 65

fairness norm

fair exchange
dzeori364
iSis.

356. "The truth is that legal relations are nothing other than groups offacts that enable us to
predict with some degree of accuracy the future action of the judicial ... officials ...." 3A
CORBIN, supra 297, § 624, at 4 (emphasis added).
357. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 762 n.6.
358. Id. at 762 (citing I WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 23, at 52).
359. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 762 n.15. "Williston, to whom all subjectivity was anathema ...
Id. (citing Williston, supra note 45, at 525, 532, 534).
360. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 763 n.21 (quoting Cohen, supra note 348, at 840 (noting that
Williston was not "interested in the ethical aspects of contractual liability, [and if he was] he would
undoubtedly offer a significant account of human values and social costs involved in different types
of agreements and in the means of their enforcement" Id. at 841)).
361. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 764 n.22.
362. See Summers, supra note 20, at 875 (discussing how the substantive content of the law
is "necessarily determined by values").
363. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 764 n.22 (quoting P.W. BRIDGMAN, THE INTELLIGENT INDIVIDUAL
AND SocIETY 54 (1938)).
364. See supra notes 73, 116, 182, 192, 236 and accompanying text.
365. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 764. The pragmatic instrumentalist slant to this statement is further
advanced by Judge Frank's analogy to physics: "'[U]ntil the specific difficulty has been resolved [the
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PHRASE
"courts not infrequently have departed from the
objective theory when
necessary to avoid what
they have considered an
unfair decision .. .
Courts have partaken in
"a fair interpretation...
of the instrument... presumably out of tenderness for the injured plaintiffs . . . .

THEORY/PRINCIPLE/NORM

fairness

[Vol. 24:349

SOURCE

micro-management

"contrary to Williston and company"

equitable doctrines

Cardozo

367

,68

"'modem trend... is to
develop a special doctrine
... for that class of cases, liberally relieving the
party who
signed the re,, 370
lease.)

doctrinal

Les'"MerchaJ

experimenter] will not let the lure of consistency interfere with any experiment which appears
promising."' Id. at 764 n.23 (quoting Horace S. Fries, Science and the Foundationsof Freedom, 41
J. PHIL. 113, 117 (1944)).
366. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 764-65.
367. Justice Cardozo gives an analogous example in explaining that substantial performance was
developed to protect the breaching party from unmitigated harm. Judge Cardozo stated, "We have
often applied it for the protection of builders who in trifling details and without evil purpose have
departed from their contracts." CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 44. For treatment of substantial
performance as an "equitable doctrine," see Morgan v. Gamble, 79 A. 410 (Pa. 1911).
368. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 766 (emphasis omitted).
369. See Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules,
100 HARv.L. REV.465 (1987). Professor Llewellyn advocated the categorization of sales' law into
merchant and non-merchant groupings in order to "distinguish the burdens imposed on merchants
from those imposed on consumers." Id. at 493. Alternatively, Wiseman stated, "[HIe advocated that
the law conform to a normative vision of merchant reality... ." Id.As a general matter, Wiseman
noted, "Llewellyn was seeking to replace verbally simple unitary rules of sales law, removed from
the actual facts of commercial transactions, with purposive reasoning ..... Id. at 492.
370. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 767 (alteration in original) (quoting 9 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2416, at 56 (Little, Brown and Co. 1981)).
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PHRASE
"[i]n the admiralty cases,
such relief has long. been
accorded seaman." 72

THEORYIPRINCIPLE/NoRM

reasoning by analogy

SOURCE
Cardozo 371

"the judiciary regards
the ordinary employee as
one who needs... the

special protection of the
courts.

"inequality of bargaining"/
unconscionability

contracts
of adhes3
ion 7

freedom to contract
(not free bargaining)

18thCentury law375

doctrinal informalism

Britton v. Turneran

.. .

"economic inequality...
means the absence
376 of
'free bargaining'
Legal rules "frequently
do play an important role,
even if often not a controlling role . ...,378
"courts should strive to
bring [legal] rules...
into line with intelligent
3
social policy." 80

social
instrumentalism

Social contract
theorists?379

371. "The directive force of a principle may be exerted along the line of logical progression;
this I will call the rule of analogy ....I have put first among the principles of selection to guide
our choice of paths, the rule of analogy ... CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 30-31.
372. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 767.
373. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1979) ("Weakness
in the bargaining process"); Leff, supra note 206 (referring to the "unconscionability clause,"
§ 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code); Rakoff, supra note 19 (arguing that form terms present
in adhesion contracts should be considered "presumptively unenforceable").
374. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 768 & n.41 (making favorable reference to Patterson, supra note 347,
at 877 & n.53 (noting the judicial use of unconscionable as an "emotive epithet" (citing Brown v.
Lamphear, 35 Vt. 252 (1862)))).
375. "The doctrine that 'necessitous men are not free men,' . . . evolved by the English courts
of chancery in the eighteenth century for the protection of harassed debtors." United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 310 (1942) (Murphy, J., concurring) (quoting Vernon v.
Bethell, 28 Eng. Rep. 838, 839 (1762)).
376. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 768.
377. The trend away from the strict application of rules and toward doctrinal flexibility
(quantum meruit) was noted in Britton v. Turner. 6 N.H. 481 (1834). "ITlhat in modem times courts
have... relaxed from the strict rules formerly adopted ....That such rule in its operation may be
very unequal, not to say unjust, is apparent." Id. at 483-84, 486.
378. See Rickeus, 153 F.2d at 769 n.46.
379. Id.
380. Id.
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PHRASE
"legal rules, no matter
how valuable the policy
they embody, are often at
the mercy of the fact-determinations... [that] often involve ineradicable
subjective factors ....

THEORY/PRINCIPLE/NORM

subjectivity
of judgment

SOURCE

Cardozo 38'

Judge Frank's lengthy analysis illustrates the complexity of the
judicial mindset. He uses a number of rationales in support of an
essentially simple argument. Instead of using the fiction of "mistake," the
court should acknowledge that releases are to be viewed as a special
category of contracts. This "special category" mandates a closer judicial
scrutiny for "contract voiding" elements of inequality of bargaining and
unconscionability. The opinion shows a style of judicial decision-making
not wedded to any monotheistic theoretical god. Instead, Judge Frank
draws upon a multiplicity of theories, principles, and norms in reaching
his decision.
The trial court in Larwin-SouthernCalifornia,Inc. dismissed a claim
for specific performance because of the existence of a subjective
satisfaction clause. The case involved a contract for the purchase of
residential acreage and was made contingent upon the purchaser
performing a feasibility and engineering study to its satisfaction. The
clause provided that the purchaser's "approvals ... may be given or
withheld in its sole judgment and discretion. 38 3 The trial court held
that the clause rendered the contract void for lacking mutuality of
obligation. Upon appeal, the appellate court determined that such a
subjective clause did not void the contract. It reasoned that the approval
right, while subjective, was not unfettered and that the law implies a duty
of good faith. The good faith requirement limited the purchaser's
discretion and thus satisfied contract's mandate as prescribed in the

381. Cardozo takes aim at legal formalism in Outlet Embroidery Co.: "If literalness is sheer
absurdity, we are to seek some other meaning whereby reason will be instilled and absurdity
avoided." Outlet Embroidery Co. v. Derwent Mills, 254 N.Y. 179, 183 (1930).
382. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 769 n.46; see also In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652-53 (2d
Cir. 1943).
383. Larwin-Southem Cal., Inc. v. JGB Investment Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 52 (Ct. App. 1979).
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doctrine of mutuality of obligation.3"
The court summarizes breach of contract cases as the determination
of the "proper characterization and interpretation of the parties' intent in
executing the agreement."3' 5 In doing so, the court is paying homage
to classical contract's "presentiation" of contractual intent at the moment
of formation. The implication of contractual intent on a given issue by
an analysis of the "totality of circumstances" or by "tacit understand'
ings"386
is recognized. "[E]xtrinsic circumstances might be available ... which would indicate the parties' intent."3" 7 Thus, despite the
plain and clear meaning of the contract, the court held that the exercise
of disapproval was to be judged "within the parameters of the duty of
good faith."3 8
The teleological perspective in judicial decision-making is also
brought to bear. "[W]e would be acting improvidently if we failed to
consider [whether the contract contains mutuality of obligation and
whether its material terms are sufficiently certain to be enforced] for
purposes of future judicial guidance." 389 The modem trend toward
enforceability and the notion of fairness plays a role in the court's
"forward-looking" or result-oriented rationale. The formalism of classical
contract law is discarded in favor of the "norm of enforcement": "The
modem trend of the law is to favor the enforcement of contracts [and] to
lean against their unenforceability because of uncertainty. . . .""' [flf
it is possible [for a court] to reach a fair and just result, ' ' 39' then the
uncertainty norm of classical contract should not hold sway. In place of
the contract voiding rationales of uncertainty, liberal rules of construction
and gap-filling devices should be utilized to salvage contracts that show

384. "That duty [of good faith] constitutes legally sufficient consideration to establish mutuality

of obligation." Id. at 59.
385. Id. at 56; see also supra notes 22, 91, 176.

386. See Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625, 627 (Cal. 1958) (en bane) (explaining that in order
to determine whether there is "satisfaction" of a lease clause, a "multiplicity of factors" must be

examined).
387. Larwin-Southern CaL, Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. at 57. Custom and usage are noted as possible
"extrinsic facts." The court explained that "custom and usage within the trade... may properly be
used in clarifying what, on the face of a contract, appears to be an ambiguity." Id.
388. Id. at 59.

389. Id. at 57.
390. Burrow v. Timmsen, 35 Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); see also Masterson v.
Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 563-64 (Cal. 1968) (en bane).
391. Larwin-Southern Cal., Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. at 60 (quoting I CORBIN, supra note 297, § 95,

at 400),
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a reasonable modicum of contractual intent.
B.

2

Satisfaction: The Doctrine of SubstantialPerformance

The rejection of performance as unsatisfactory has other limiting
3 93
doctrines, one of which is the doctrine of substantial performance.
Substantial performance is a not so distant cousin of the reasonable
person: "As a matter of law, a reasonable person could not expect more
than fulfillment of the contract."3 " If the rejection is unreasonable, then
the court will grant some relief to the performer. The doctrine of
substantial performance is "remedial corrective" in nature. An unreasonable rejection is a rejection nonetheless. An unreasonable rejection does
not exonerate the party who did not fully perform or who has given
defective performance. Rather, the rejection will not allow the rejecting
party to avoid counter-performance. The doctrine empowers the court to
tailor a remedy that is appropriate to the "degree" of the breach.39 5 A
minor defect in performance may result in a damage award or a
modification of the return performance commensurate with the cost of
correcting the defect or the diminution of value attributable to the
defect. 39 A minor defect does not permit the rejecting party to avoid
counter-performance, since this would result in an injustice, nor does this

392. Professor Corbin noted the limitations of contractual intent in construction, stating that "[i]t
can not be determined by finding, in some occult manner, the supposed 'intention of the parties."'
3A CORBIN, supra note 297, § 622, at 2 (emphasis added).
393. CompareDella Ratta, Inc. v. American Better Community Developers, Inc., 380 A.2d 627,
637-38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (explaining that it is not a condition of the contract that must be
performed but, rather, the contract itself) with Franklin E. Penny Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 668,
677 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (refusing to apply the doctrine of substantial performance where work on the
contract had been so delayed that any satisfactory use of the product was unachievable). For the
inability of substantial performance doctrines to excuse an express condition precedent, see
FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 8.3 (explaining the rule of strict compliance); see also Brown-Marx
Assocs. v. Emigrant Say. Bank, 703 F.2d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 1983); James Brook, Conditions of
Personal Satisfaction in the Law of Contracts, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 103 (1981).
394. Cranetex, Inc. v. Precision Crane & Rigging, Inc., 760 S.W.2d 298, 302 ('ex. Ct. App.
1988); see also Del Monte Corp. v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (explaining
that it would be inequitable to require "complete adherence to the letter of the contract" where it was
"impossible" to adhere to the specifications).
395. One may also analyze the concept of substantial performance within the context of
major-minor breach. For a general discussion on the importance of the material, or major, breach and
minor breach dichotomy, see Farnsworth, supra note 20; Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal
Together After Material Breach-Common Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 553 (1976).
396. "Although every breach gives rise to a claim for damages, not every claim for damages
is one for damages based on all of the injured party's remaining rights to performance under the
contract." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236 cmt. b (1979).
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allow the rejecting party to avoid a bad bargain through rescission of the

contract.
For purposes of contract avoidance, satisfactory performance is not

equivalent to full or complete performance. "Substantial performance... means that the essential elements of the contract have been
'
The
performed, and it is the legal equivalent of full compliance."397
Cranetex court applied the doctrine of substantial performance in ruling
that the rejection of the performance under a "satisfaction provision"398

in the contract was improper.99A finding of substantial performance was
conclusive as to satisfaction.'
The substantial performance doctrine and the notion of
material-nonmaterial breach are examples of doctrinal flexibility. These

doctrines, by their nature, are less formal in their definitional content and
less rigid in their operational use. The notion of materiality provides for

the necessary flexibility to allow for application to all forms of contracts.
Materiality "is necessarily imprecise and flexible" ' which allows for
a wide scope of application.4"' As with the doctrines of reliance4 2
and promissory estoppel, 40 3 the courts are free to apply the substantial
performance and materiality doctrines "in the light of the facts of each
case." ' The adequacy of the performance and the reasonableness of
the dissatisfaction lends itself to a "totality of the circumstances" '°

397. Cranetex, 760 S.W.2d at 302; see also Pollock v. Pennsylvania Iron Works Co., 34 N.Y.S.
129, 130 (C.P. 1895), aff'd, 51 N.E. 979 (N.Y. 1898) (noting that a third party, such as an architect
on a construction project, is deemed to have satisfactorily performed his end of the contract if the
work is in substantial compliance with the contract).
398. The agreement for the repair of a construction crane provided that it was "to the
satisfaction" of the defendant. Cranetex, 760 S.W.2d at 301.
399. "[R]epairs substantiallycompleted is tantamount to a finding that the repairs would meet
the objective standard of a reasonableperson; therefore fulfilling the satisfaction requirementin the
contract." Id. at 302 (emphasis added).
400. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 cmt. a (1979).
401. Id. For example, substantial performance "applies to service contracts." Elbe v. Adkins,
812 F. Supp. 107, 111 (S.D. Ohio 1991); see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supranote 46, § 11-18(b)
(comparing the doctrines of materiality and substantial performance).
402. See supra notes 81-100 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 121-48.
404. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 cmt. a (1979). Section 241 provides a list
of"circumstances" that are deemed to be "significant" in determining the materiality of a contractual
breach or failure. See id. § 241. Comment d of § 237, regarding substantial performance, makes
specific reference to the circumstances listed in § 241. Id. § 237 cmt. d.
405. Professor Farnsworth lists a number of factors or circumstances to be analyzed in
determining if there has been substantial performance: the amount of the benefit which the
dissatisfied party reasonably expected has been received, the extent that the dissatisfied party can
be compensated in damages, the extent of the harm that will be caused to the breaching party in the
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analysis akin to that found in the determination of "reasonably foreseeable reliance. 40 6 Justice Cardozo acknowledged the uniqueness of the
circumstances of each case when he noted that "the line ...to be drawn
between the important and the trivial cannot be settled by a for-

mula.

407

The lack of rigidity in the rules and of "conclusive" factors allows
the courts to undertake fairness micro-management without masking it

in traditional contract garb. The rigidity of the "strict compliance
rule,"4 ' in the area of express conditions, and the "perfect tender
rule,"4 9 in the sale of goods, is discarded along with the harshness that
such rules inflict in particular cases. "[A] test as flexible as substantial
performance sacrifices predictabilityto achieve justice [or fairness]."4 1
This is an example of the on-going dialectic, in general contract law,
between the use of the "rule of law" to advance the norms of certainty
and predictability and the "ex contractu" norms of fairness and justice
that favor ad hoe exceptions or the use of standards in place of rules. The
development of the substantial performance doctrine is a specific
doctrinal acceptance of fairness micro-management. One may argue that
substantial performance is an example of a functional "anti-generality"
principle. It is antithetical to the stem generality bias that pervades
general contract law. It is a prototypical example where the harshness of
rules have created the organic material in which courts have fashioned
countervailing or limiting principles to mitigate the effect of law's

event of "forfeiture," and the willfulness of the breach. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 8.12;
see also U.C.C. §§ 2-608, -612 (1995) (notion of "substantiality"); cf. id. § 2-601 (setting forth
options to buyer in event seller's actions do not conform to contract, otherwise known as "perfect
tender rule" in the sale of goods).
406. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
407. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921). Some courts have looked at the
percentage of completion as one gauge to determine substantial performance. In finding substantial
performance, a 1989 Ohio appellate court took into consideration the trial court's determination that
the cost of work needed for completion "constituted less than five percent of the entire contract
price, which established ninety-five percent completion." Cleveland Neighborhood Health Servs., Inc.
v. St. Clair Builders, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Oh. Ct. App. 1989); see also County Asphalt
Paving Co. v. 1861 Group, 851 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (finding the type of asphalt
used in excavation and paving contracts deviated enough from contract specifications so as not to
be considered a substantial performance).
408. See FARNSWORTH,supranote 42, § 8.3, at 571 (Citing 5 WILLISTON, supranote 25, § 669).
409. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1995). Karl Llewellyn proposed that a substantial performance rule should
replace the perfect tender rule in sales law. One commentator noted, "Llewellyn's proposal of a
substantial performance rule in merchant sales is a clear example of his concern for fairness and
good faith in merchant transactions." Wiseman, supra note 369, at 510 (emphasis added).
410. FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 8.12, at 617 (emphasis added).
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generality in a particular case. Injustice and unfairness of result can only
be rationalized under the rubric of generality, predictability, and certainty
for so long. The end-result has normally been a doctrinal upheaval that
condones a greater degree ofjudicial discretion on behalf of fairness and
justice. The substantial performance doctrine is a case in point.4 '
C. Satisfaction:Assignment of Lease
Freedom of contract has given way to fairness and reasonableness

norms in the area of assignment of leases.412 May a landlord and tenant
expressly agree that the landlord shall have absolute discretion in

consenting to an assignment by the tenant? The Restatement (Second)
of Property states that such consent "cannot be withheld unreason-

ably., 41 3 As with most satisfaction clauses, freedom of contract in the
area of lease assignments has been overridden by a fairness norm. The
courts have determined that an implied term of reasonableness is superior
to an express lease term granting the landlord an absolute right of
consent or dissatisfaction. Leases are presumed to be assignable unless
the landlord can give a good faith or commercially reasonable reason for
withholding consent. This rule has been applied in cases in which the
lease specifically precludes assignment. 4
Historically, a lease was considered personal in nature. The landlord
411. Professor Farnsworth explains that the substantial performance doctrine evolved "to
mitigate the harsh effects of the rules traditionally applied to express conditions." Id. § 8.12, at 616;
see also Boone v. Eyre, 126 Eng. Rep. 160 (C.P. 1777). In commenting on the doctrine of
substantial performance, Justice Cardozo stated, "I have no doubt that the inspiration of the rule is
a mere sentiment of justice. That sentiment asserting itself, we have proceeded to surround it with
the halo of conformity to precedent." CARDOzO, supra note 2, at 44-45.
412. See RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.10 (4th ed. 1991); ROGER A.
CUNNINGHAM ET. AL, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.71 (2d ed. 1993); Campbell v. Westdahl, 715 P.2d
288, 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Jack Frost Sales, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 433 N.E.2d 941,
949 (11. App. Ct. 1982). Contra Reynolds v. McCullough, 739 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987) ("In the usual case, the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and
in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the
plainest case of necessary repugnance.").
413. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 15.2(2) (1976)
(emphasis added),
414. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see also
Murray S. Levin, Withholding Consent to Assignment: The Changing Rights of the Commercial
Landlord, 30 DEPAuL L. REv. 109, 121 (1980) ("'[E]ven where the lease provides an approval
clause, a landlord may not unreasonably and capriciously withhold his consent."' (quoting HomaGoff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035, 1038 (Ala. 1977))). A number of states have
codified the implied term of commercial reasonableness in the area of lease assignment. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.060 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5512(b) (1974); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 516-63 (1985); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney 1982).
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had the right to determine the party to whom her premises were to be
leased. Over time, the courts have recognized the changing nature of
lease contracts. The court in Fernandez v. Vazquez4 5 noted a number
of reasons for the evolution of the principle that "consent not to be
unreasonably withheld."'"6 The court recognized the increased prominence of the "general contract principles of good faith and commercial
reasonableness ' '41 as devices to prevent injustice in landlord-tenant
relations. Secondly, a balancing or factors test is available to courts "in
applying the standards of good faith and commercial
reasonableness. 418 The ability to state objectively the reasons for
withholding consent, as in dissatisfaction of performance, grants to the
courts doctrinal authority to undertake fairness micro-management.
Fairness concerns are usually viewed as anathema to doctrine and
formalism. In the areas of satisfaction and assignments, both the "rule of
law" and fairness have been embodied within mainstream doctrine.
The decision in Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.4 9 was premised
upon the changing nature of the law. Implicit in this change is the notion
that a doctrine, which was once aligned with notions of fairness, may
have to be modified or extinguished given the changing milieu of legal
relations. The adoption of reasonableness is a reflection of the changing
nature of lease assignment law from that of real property law to that of
contract law. There is "an increasing recognition of the contractual nature
of leases and the implications in terms of contractual duties that flow
therefrom."4 0' In disregarding the majority view, the court states that
the "'vitality [of the common law] can flourish only so long as the courts
remain alert to their obligation and opportunity to change the common
2 The conversion of lease
law when reason and equity demand it.""'4

415. 397 So. 2d. 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
416. See il.
at 1173-74; accordNewman v. Hinky Dinky Omaha-Lincoln, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 50,
54 (Neb. 1988) (noting that the factors which a court may weigh in determining reasonableness of
consent include financial responsibility, suitability, legality, need for alteration, and nature of the
occupancy).
417. Fernandez, 397 So. 2d at 1174.
418. Id. (proposing a list of five factors to be considered: financial responsibility, suitability,
legality, need for alteration, and nature of the occupancy); see also DiMatteo, supra note 297, at
441-42.
419. 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985) (en bane).
420. Id. at 847; see also Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Cal. 1974) (en banc)
("California courts have increasingly recognized the largely contractual nature of contemporary lease
agreements and have frequently analyzed such leases' terms pursuant to contractual principles.").
421. Kendall, 709 P.2d at 847 (alteration in original) (quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 676 (Cal. 1974) (en banc)).
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assignments from the domain of freedom to contract to that of a fairness
inquiry is an example of the incursion of the fairness norm into
formalism's rule of law.
D. Satisfaction:Assignment of PersonalService Contracts
The general common law rule holds that personal service conare not assignable. A party has a right to determine with whom
she wants to contract. A corollary principle is that, given this freedom of
contract, one has the right to reject a performance by an assignee of the
contract. Professor Grismore succinctly stated the early common law rule:

tracts422

Since a contract is essentially a personal relationship voluntarily entered
into by the parties to it, it follows as a logical deduction that one of the
parties should not be allowed to destroy that relationship by introducing
a third423person into it in his place without the consent of the other
party.
A duty created by a personal service contract is per se nondelegable. The
Seventh Circuit, in Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co.,424 states
that "[tihere is no inquiry into whether the delegate is as skilled or
worthy of trust and confidence as the original obligor." 425 In short,
satisfaction of performance is irrelevant in a personal service contract as
it pertains to the issue of assignability.426 The obligee can withhold
consent to the assignment and reject any performance by the assignee no
matter how satisfactorily it is performed.
The removal of the per se rule of nonassignability would satisfy
both freedom of contract and fairness norms. One may argue that a
corollary principle to freedom of contract is free assignability. If a
contract fails to preclude assignment, then a party should be able to sell
her rights and delegate her duties. The obligee can be protected in a
number of ways. First, the assignment does not and should not remove

422. A "personal [service] contract" is a "contract... which so far involves the element of
personal knowledge or skill or personal confidence that it can be performed only by the person with
whom made." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (6th ed. 1990).
423. Grover C. Grismore, Effect of a Restrictionon Assignment in a Contract,31 MiCH. L. REV.
299, 299 (1933).
424. 801 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1986).
425. Id. at 1008.
426. The word "assignment" for my purposes shall be defined to include both the assignment
of rights and the delegation of duties. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supranote 46, § 18-1 (explaining
that lawyers often use "assignment" and "delegate" interchangeably). See generally U.C.C.
§ 2-210(4) (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 328 (1979).
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the obligor-assignor from primary liability. Second, the expectations of
the obligee shall provide the basis for determining whether the substituted performance is satisfactory. For example, does the assignment
adversely affect the interests of the nonassigning party? If not, then an
assignment without consent should be allowed. A number of courts have
taken this view and, in doing so, have begun to narrow the scope of the
per se rule.427 One court held that a television anchorman's employment contract was assignable because it did not "vary materially the duty
of the obligor, increase materially the burden of risk imposed by the
contract, or impair materially the obligor's chance of obtaining return
performance. 428
The fairness norm is also advanced because the per se rule precludes
judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of the obligee's rejection of the
substituted performance or the substituted performer. The primary
rationale for the per se rule has been the protection of the expectations
of the obligee. Elimination of the per se rule will allow the courts to also
take into account the interests of the obligor and the innocent third party
assignee. The considerations that were discussed in the previous section
on the assignment of leases429 can also be applied to the assignment of
personal service contracts. Consent to the contract assignment or to the
acceptance of the third party performance "may not be arbitrarily or
unreasonably refused.""43 The rendering of a satisfactory performance
should be the measuring stick for the reasonableness of withholding
consent to the assignment.
A presumption in favor of assignability can be supported by a
number of rationales. First, it would bring this area into conformity with
the general rule of assignability and the public policy in favor of "free
alienability."431 The history of the movement of the demarcation
between personal and nonpersonal contracts has been "one of piecemeal
reform. ' 432 The removal of this exception to assignability would

427. See, e.g., Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972); Decatur N.
Assocs. v. Builders Glass, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 795 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Alexander & Alexander, Inc.
v. Koelz, 722 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
428. Evening News Ass'n v. Peterson, 477 F. Supp. 77, 80 (D.D.C. 1979).
429. See supra notes 412-21 and accompanying text.
430. Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d 1171, 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
431. See generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 46, §§ 18-2 to -3 (explaining that "[t]he
free alienability of [certain] assets is essential to commerce").
432. Robert Braucher, Freedomof Contractandthe SecondRestatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598, 608

(1969).
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provide greater "uniformity and certainty in commercial transactions."43 Secondly, the size and the nature of modem commercial

transactions are far removed from the early common law days where
most contracts formalized purely one to one relationships.434 It is often
difficult to find the "personal" in personal service contracts when
services have taken on the standardized and interchangeable nature that

characterizes transactions in goods. 435 There has been an increase in
fungibility in commercial transactions,

436

along with an increase in the

sophistication of the parties. Third, the parties should be responsible for
negotiating express and detailed nonassignability clauses into their
contracts.437

A fourth rationale in support of freer assignability can be found in
the "new spirit of contract. ' 438 "Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing ....
The use of a
presumption of assignability would be a way of requiring the obligee to

give a "good faith" reason for its dissatisfaction with the substituted
performance. The practical and philosophical differences of long-term
relational contracts further emphasizes the importance of the duty of

433. Pino v. Spanish Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 564 So. 2d 186, 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
434. See, e.g., Peter J. Bishop, The Modern Employment Contract, 12 ADvOCS. Q. 245 (1990)
(explaining that traditional principles of contract law are not sufficient to deal with modem
employment relationships); Egan, supra note 68, at 312 ("The complexity of most modem
agreements insures that such agreements will rarely be fully completed."); see also In re Compass
Van & Storage Corp., 65 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (explaining that ifa bankruptcy trustee
could not assign the contract of a debtor, the submitted reorganization would likely fail); Schultz v.
Ingram, 248 S.E.2d 345 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (declining to either categorize two years as an
unreasonable length of time or designation of southeastern area of the United States as too vague
when interpreting provisions of contract).
435. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of
Contracts Law by StandardForms, 46 U. Pi-r. L. REv. 21 (1984); see also Douglas G. Baird &
Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards,and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA.
L,REX,. 1217 (1982). See generally U.C.C. § 2-207 (1995) (explaining how additional terms will
affect an already existing contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979)
("Standardized Agreements").
436. A sample test for fungibility could be the availability of substitute performance. See, e.g.,
In re Da-Sota Elevator Co., 939 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that a substitute can be found,
with relative ease, for elevator maintenance, a "routine commercial function"); Pingley v. Brunson,
252 S.E.2d 560, 561 (S.C. 1979) (explaining that, even if an organist is talented, it is not the type
of performance which consists of "unique and exceptional skill or ability" and does not warrant a
decree of specific performance).
437. See, e.g., James v. Whirlpool Corp., 806 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (upholding clause
in a distributorship agreement giving the manufacturer an absolute right to withhold its consent to
any transfer of the distribution rights).
438. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text. See generally Speidel, supra note 22.
439. RESTATnENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
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good faith and of free assignability. Professor Hillman argues for the
duty to adjust long-term contracts in two instances. 44 "The first

situation calling for adjustment... [is] when the supplier reasonably
expects the buyer to adjust in case of a serious disruption." 1 This is
premised upon an implicit risk-allocation between parties to a long-term
business relationship based upon a number of variables such as trust,

confidence, and prior dealings. It is a reflection of the "'relational'
realities of many contract settings." 2 The second situation calling for
adjustment involves unexpected occurrences for which the parties failed,
expressly or implicitly, to allocate the risk." 3 "[T]he fairness principle
[dictates] that the parties should agree to share unallocated losses." 4
An assignment by an obligor could be considered an "unanticipated
change"" and place upon the obligee the good faith "duty to adjust." 6 Instead of allowing one party the absolute right to treat the

assignment as a breach, the parties should attempt to negotiate in order
to retain the essence of the contract." 7 In the words of Professor
Macneil, this would prevent the "bad faith... 'abuse' [of] the power to

terminate a contract." 44 Such a duty to adjust by way of negotiation

440. See Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts:An Analysis under
Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE LJ. 1, 4, 15.
441. Id. at 3; see also John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of FrustratedContracts: Germany,
63 B.U. L. REV. 1039 (1983) (describing German "adjustment" procedures in contract disputes which
demonstrate the German system's divergence from Anglo-American tradition); Robert A. Hillman,
An Analysis of the Cessation of ContractualRelations,68 CORNELL L. REV. 617 (1983) (discussing
fairness reasons as the only justifications for cessation of contract). Contra Dawson, supranote 287
(discussing the lack of use of the "adjustment" procedure by American courts and, additionally, its
limited application to partially performed contracts); Clayton P. Gillette, CommercialRationalityand
the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 MiNN. L. REv. 521 (1985). Gillette states:
My belief that moral notions ... do not justify an obligation to adjust also leads me to
conclude that we must respect bargains struck through individual negotiation. The issue
is not whether individuals will suffer harsh results from such a legal rule; on occasion,
they will. The issue is whether we can do better by acting through the law .... I
conclude that we cannot.
Id. at 585.
442. Hillman, supra note 440, at 3; see also Macneil, supra note 169, at 725.
443. Professor Hillman refers to this as the "gap model." Hillman, supra note 440, at 14-17.
444. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
445. "[A] duty to bargain should be imposed when unanticipated changes occur during the
performance of a long-term contract." Macneil, supra note 169, at 722.
446. See supra notes 441-42 and accompanying text.
447. For example, the obligee could negotiate "reasonable assurances" of performance in
exchange for her consent to the assignment. Other examples of the use of the principle of "adequate
assurance" can be found elsewhere in the law. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(b), (0(2) (1994)
(bankruptcy law); U.C.C. §§ 2-210(5), -609 (1995) (sales law).
448. Macneil, supra note 169, at 722.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss2/8

74

DiMatteo: TheNORMS
NormsOF
of CONTRACTS
Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the "Law of Satis

19951

or that failing, by way of a court imposed adjustment, would serve the
sanctity of contract and advance the cause embodied in the "fairness
principle." 49
E.

JudicialMicro-Management:Adjustments to
Covenants Not to Compete

One area where courts have been openly "interfering" with the
express terms of contracts is in the enforcement of covenants not to
compete. Professor Farnsworth declares that "[n]owhere has judicial
paternalism in the service of public policy been more at war with judicial
laissez faire in the name of freedom of contract."'"51 Courts will often
modify or micro-manage the express terms of the covenants as to their
scope, subject matter, duration, and geographical area.452 Professor
Hillman notes that the courts have long adjusted contracts using fairness,
justice, and reasonableness as guideposts. "[C]ourts, using their equity

powers, have a tradition of adjusting contracts. For example, courts have
long whittled away at covenants not to compete, adjusting the duration,
area, and substance of such promises., 5 3 "Equity powers" are the code
words for "rule avoidance" on behalf of the attainment of fairness or
justice in a given case. Equity has been defined as "[j]ustice administered

449. The fairness norm is aided in a number of ways. First, the elimination of the per se rule
would allow the interests of the obligor and the assignee to be entered into the assignment equation.
Second, it is inconsistent with the duty to mitigate found elsewhere in the law of contracts. Consent
to the assignment (coupled with a right to sue for damages) may better satisfy the principle of
mitigation as compared to a termination of contract coupled with a suit for expectation damages.
450. The Second Restatement lists three types of covenants not to compete: (1) covenants
appurtenant to the sale of a business; (2) covenants by an employee or an agent; and (3) covenants
between a partner and a partnership. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTrRACTS § 188(2) (1979). See
generally Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv. 625 (1960)
(noting a recognition by employers that courts are increasingly refusing to enforce employee
agreements not to compete). For an alternative ground suggesting that such clauses be challenged,
see Harvey J. Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposalfor Dealingwith Restrictive
Covenants Under FederalLaw, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1193 (1973).
451. FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 356-57.
452. Professor Farnsworth explains the triad of limitations that courts scrutinize in determining
the reasonableness of covenants not to compete. "The scope of the restraint has three aspects: type
of activity, geographical area, and time. Ifa covenant not to compete proscribes types of activity that
in any of these respects go beyond those necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the promisee,
it is unreasonable." Id. § 5.3, at 361-62 (foomote omitted); see also Burgess v. Permian Court
Reporters, Inc., 864 S.W.2d 725,727 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). The required reasonableness of restraints
upon time, area, and scope of activity have been codified in a number of states. See, e.g., TEX. BUS.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (West 1993).
453. Hillman, supra note 440, at 29; see, e.g., Westec See. Servs., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 538 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971).
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accordingto fairness as contrasted with the strictly formulated rules of
common law ... The term 'equity' denotes the spirit and habit of
fairness,justness, and right dealing .... "
45
In the 1993 case of New River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton, 1
the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted a "three-part test" that must be
satisfied for a covenant to meet the law's reasonableness and fairness
standard. First, is the covenant "no greater than is necessary to protect
the [benefitting party] in some legitimate business interest?" ' Second,
is the covenant "not unduly harsh and oppressive"45 7 on the adverse
party? Third, the court looks to whether "the restraint [is] reasonable
from the standpoint of a sound public policy?"4 58 The court held that
an employer-employee noncompetition agreement, barring the employee
from engaging in a similar occupation within a sixty mile radius of the
employer and for a period of twelve months from the termination of
employment, met all three parts of the reasonableness test.459 In other
cases, the courts have felt free to void or rewrite "unfair" restraints. For
example, the court in Chavers v. Copy Products Co. 4'" held that a
noncompetition agreement, prohibiting a copier repair person from
working in that field for two years, was an "undue hardship. ' 46' The
concern for fairness is implicit in most judicial reformations of covenants
not to compete. "Because post-employment restraints are often the
product of unequal bargaining power and may inflict unanticipated
hardship on the employee, they are scrutinized with more care than are
covenants in the sale of a business."4' 62

454. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
455. 429 S.E.2d 25 (Va. 1993).
456. Id. at 26; see also Clark v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 564, 565-66 (Ala. 1992)
(citing to Alabama law which demands reasonableness, both to restriction relating to the interest and
to the time and place, in order for the covenant to be enforced).
457. New River Media Group, Inc., 429 S.E.2d at 26.
458. Id. Restraints on competition have generally been viewed as against public policy. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186, 187, 188 cmt. c (1979).

459. Some of the factors weighed by the court include the type of occupation (radio disc
jockey), that the sixty mile radius was based upon the broadcast reach of the station, that a good
faith consideration was paid (two thousand dollars), and that the station had 'invested substantial
time and money in promoting [the employee] as an air personality."' New River Media Group, Inc.,
429 S.E.2d at 26.
460. 519 So. 2d 942 (Ala. 1988).
461. Id. at 945.
462. FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 359; see, e.g., Cooper v. Gidden, 515 So. 2d 900,
905 (Miss. 1987) (explaining that a covenant dealing with the sale of a business's goodwill will be
scrutinized to "a lesser degree" than will an employee-employer covenant).
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The "Best Efforts" Doctrine

The "best efforts" doctrine is a doctrine of construction and
implication. 63 It is also one of performance and satisfaction. The
seminal case, via Justice Cardozo, is the 1917 case of Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon.4e4 The case involved an "exclusive agency" agreement whereby an agent obtained the exclusive right to represent and
procure endorsements for a well-known celebrity. After breaching the
agreement, the celebrity defendant argued that the prospective contract

was invalid for want of "mutuality of obligation."4' 65 The contract was
silent regarding the responsibilities and duties to be provided by the
agent. There was no specific language obligating the agent to actually
make any effort to procure endorsements on behalf of Duff-Gordon. The
court salvaged the contract by implying that the promisor was under a
duty to use "reasonable efforts." The rationale employed by the court was
the same as that often used to uphold satisfaction clauses: "We are not
to suppose that one party was to be placed at the mercy of the oth,466
er-.

The best efforts doctrine was designed to be centripetal in nature.
It was intended to overcome claims of illusory consideration and bind
parties to their contracts.467 However, it may possess a centrifugal force

463. A number of terms have been utilized regarding the notion that a party owes a duty of best
efforts in the performance of her contractual duties. Examples of such terms include "good faith
effort," "with dispatch," "continuous operation" and "reasonable efforts." See, e.g., Slidell Inv. Co.
v. City Prods. Corp., 202 So. 2d 323, 325 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 204 So. 2d 572 (La. 1967)
("continuous operation"); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917)
("reasonable efforts"); Arrowhead Growers Sales Co. v. Central Sands Produce, Inc., 180 N.W.2d
567, 568-69 (Wis. 1970) ("with dispatch"). See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep
One's Pronises:The Duty of Best Efforts in ContractLaw, 46 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1 (1984) (discussing
the difficulties associated with keeping one's promises and with satisfying the best efforts doctrine).
464. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
465. See id. at 214. For illustrative discussions concerning "mutuality of obligation," see
IA CORBIN, supra note 297, § 152; FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 3.2.
466. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214. A review of a Cardozo opinion would be remiss without an
appreciation of his special brand of "poetry." In explaining the need to imply contractual terms and
duties, Cardozo recites that "(t]he law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the
precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal." Id.
467. This is analogous to the implication of "good faith" to save contracts with satisfaction
clauses from illusory claims. "Approval or satisfaction clauses ... often give rise to arguments that
the agreement is too vague or illusory.... Mutuality of obligationis an essential element of every
enforceable agreement." Chadd v. Midwest Franchise Corp., 412 N.W.2d 453, 457 (Neb. 1987)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also De Los Santos v. Great W. Sugar Co., 348 N.W.2d
842, 845 (Neb. 1984).
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in the event that the promisee elects to use the best efforts standard as a
tool to terminate the contract. One may argue that the "best efforts"
doctrine is a type of implied satisfaction clause. By implying a best
efforts obligation in order to save the contract from a claim of being
illusory,46 the courts have also set a standard to judge performance.
The promisee has by implication been given a right of termination. If the
performance can be judged as falling below that of best efforts, then the
promisee may reject it as being unsatisfactory.
The notion of best efforts has been extended to other types of
contracts. For example, "best efforts" have been implied into commercial
leases in which the rental payment is based upon a percentage of sales
or revenues. The court in Slidell Investment Co. v. City Products
Corp.469 held that a percentage lease implied a duty of "continuous
operations. '7O The Restatement (Second) of Contracts speaks of the
"spirit of the bargain.""47 Terms and duties are to be interpreted and
implied which empower the contract to fulfill the spirit of the bargain.
To do otherwise is to condone bad faith. "[B]ad faith [includes] evasion
of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, [and]
wilfull rendering of imperfect performance .. ,472 The desire for
satisfactory performance and the ancillary doctrine of best efforts can be
found at the core of this notion of the spirit of the bargain.
Underlying the "spirit of the bargain" and its embodiment in such
doctrines like "best efforts" is the notion of fairness. In the past, courts
have undertaken creative interpretation and "purposive reading'473 to
find the necessary language within the contract. The best efforts doctrine
is an example where the fairness norm is advanced without the charade
of linguistic construction. The break with the formalism of the past is
evident in the Restatement: "[T]he court should supply a term which
comports with community standards of fairness and policy rather than

468. See generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 46, § 4-12(c)(4); 1 CORBIN, supra note
297, § 16; FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 2.13; see also Kays v. Brack, 350 F. Supp. 1243, 1246
(D. Idaho 1972) (holding that a "best effort" constituted a detriment and provided sufficient
consideration).
469. 202 So. 2d 323 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 204 So. 2d 572 (La. 1967).
470. Id. at 325; see also United Dominion Realty Trust, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 413
S.E.2d 866, 868-69 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting an express best efforts clause). Contra Food
Fair Stores, Inc. v. Blumberg, 200 A.2d 166, 174 (Md. 1964) (stating that all contracts have implicit
covenants that parties will act in good faith and deal fairly).
471. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1979).

472. Id.
473. Id. § 204 cmt. d.
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'
analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining process."474
Thus, the
ad hoc fairness inquiry has a strong ally in the Restatement and Uniform
'
Commercial Code's notion of "good faith."475
The fairness norm and
reasonable satisfaction can now find support both in law and in equity.

G. Judicial Satisfaction: Plea Bargainingas Contract
Criminal law gives us a unique example of a three-party determination of satisfaction in contract. The plea bargaining process requires
agreement between the two contract parties, the accused and the
prosecutor, and approval by the court. The acceptance of plea bargains
as within the boundary of contract law has been widely accepted.476
477
The Seventh Circuit, in the 1992 case of Carnine v. United States,
stated that it "regards plea agreements as contracts conferring all of the
attendant rights and obligations governed by ordinary principles of
contract law."4' 78 However, it did recognize that they are "unique
contracts" with additional fairness concerns. 4 The courts are likely to
pursue a heightened fairness inquiry in the case of a breach of a plea
contract. 480 First, it is likely to place a greater responsibility upon the
prosecutor to avoid drafting ambiguous bargains.4 ' Second, in case of
disagreement, the plea contract is to be construed against the government.
"'A plea agreement is not an appropriate context for the Government to
resort to a rigidly literal approach in the construction of language."'4 2
The court in United States v. Ataya483 applied freedom of contract
norms along with some Kantian rationality. The defendant was described

474. Id. (emphasis added).
475. Fairness is not defined as fairness "internal" to the transaction but as judged by the

community's sense of fairness: "Good faith ... excludes a variety of types of conduct.., because
[it] violate[s] community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness." Id. § 205 cmt. a.
476. See, e.g., United States v. Osborne, 931 F.2d 1139, 1162 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 498 U.S. 843 (1990); Cooper v. United States,

594 F.2d 12, 18 (4th Cir. 1979).
477. 974 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1992).

478. Id. at 928.
479. Id.

480. The reason for this heightened scrutiny is constitutional dimension. The court notes that,
with plea agreements, "'special due process concerns for fairness and the adequacy of procedural

safeguards obtain."' Id. (quoting United States v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1329 (7th Cir. 1988)).
481. See, e.g., United States v. Bielak, 660 F. Supp. 818, 826 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (stating that "the
Government is to be held to the literal terms of a plea agreement").
482. United States v. Fields, 766 F.2d 1161, 1167 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v.
Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 854 (7th Cir. 1978)).
483. 864 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1988).
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as a rational and moral agent, free to enter into an exchange of risk.4 4
The court stated that "[a]s a rational agent, the defendant must be
presumed to be capable of freely choosing .... As a moral agent, the
defendant is responsible for these free choices., 485 The court held that
the defendant's failure to fully cooperate was a "substantial breach" of
the government's "reasonable expectations."48 6 It has been asserted that
the foundation for "plea bargaining as contract" is the "norm of expanded

choice. 487 Expanded choice is the normative capstone of freedom of
contract's notions of efficiency and autonomy. "The normative claim that
supports enforcing bargains is that voluntary exchange offers people
more choices than they would otherwise enjoy ....
One goal of
the fairness inquiry is to ensure that the choice was freely and fairly
made.
H.

Comfort Instruments: Advancing the Frontierof Reliance

The importance of fairness is also apparent in the area of noncontractual or "quasi-contractual" liability.4 9 Generally, barring a finding
of unjust enrichment, courts have been reluctant to extend reliance
liability to instruments that do not possess the required formalities of
contract, such as clear contractual intent.490 Some courts have begun to
extend the doctrine of reliance into areas of "noncontract" that were
previously exempted from contractual liability. The courts have found it

484. See id. at 1332-33. One may argue that a plea bargain is a contract that allocates the risk
between the two parties. The defendant is avoiding the risk of a conviction and a harsher sentence.
The prosecutor is avoiding the risk of an acquittal, along with the transaction costs involved in a
trial.
485. Id. at 1332-33.
486. Id. at 1330.
487. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1913 (1992).
488. Id. at 1918.
489. Corbin states that a "quasi contractual obligation is one that is created by the law for
reasons of justice." 1 COffiN, supra note 297, § 19, at 46. The major theme in most quasi-contract
cases is "unjust enrichment." See, e.g., Wood v. Ayres, 39 Mich. 345, 348-49 (1878). See generally
Arthur L. Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YALE L.J. 533 (1912) (discussing the
obligations arising out of contract and the difficulty of placing "legal" classifications upon them).
490. See, e.g., Venture Assocs. v. Zenith Data Sys., 987 F.2d 429,432 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that negotiations and preliminary agreements do not constitute a binding contract); Phoenix Mut. Life
Ins. v. Shady Grove Plaza Ltd., 734 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Md. 1990) (stating that letters of intent
and negotiations do not constitute binding contracts). Some courts have held that a letter of intent
may obligate the parties to negotiate in good faith. See, e.g., Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795
F.2d 291, 300 (3rd Cir. 1986); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp.
491, 499-500 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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difficult to avoid granting relief where there has been fair or reasonable
reliance upon another's representation. This is true even when an element
of contract is clearly missing. One may argue that the entire law of
restitution or quantum meruit is an example of this judicial temptation to
compensate injury. "'Recovery under [quantum meruit] is derived from
the principles of equity and fairness .... ,,,491 Some courts have begun
to expand reliance recovery into areas where a "formal" contract has not
been rendered.
One type of legal hybrid that has grown in popularity is the
'
"comfort instrument."492
A comfort instrument is normally given by a
"third party" to assure a party to a transaction regarding some element
of value or credit. The third party intends to provide an incentive for one
of the principals to enter into the transaction, while not becoming legally
responsible itself. The comfort instrument can be found in numerous
fields of business and finance. They are generally viewed as not creating
any legally enforceable obligations. For example, a parent company who
wants to avoid being a guarantor will often issue a letter to a lending
institution contemplating the extension of credit to a subsidiary of the
parent company. The "comfort letter" attempts to provide assurance
without the resultant guaranty-type of liability. As these instruments have
become more widely used, a growing cadre of cases questioning their
nonenforceability has developed. A number of cases, mostly foreign,
have begun to lay a doctrinal foundation for the assessment of liability
against the letter issuer.493
An interesting paradox can be seen as more and more cases arguing
for enforceability have come to trial. Initially comfort letters were
vaguely written and generally regarded by the business community as
unenforceable. As these instruments continued to grow in use, they

491.

Bushkin Assocs. v. Raytheon Co., 906 F.2d 11, 15 (Ist Cir. 1990) (quoting J.A. Sullivan

Corp. v. Commonwealth, 494 N.E.2d 374, 377 (Mass. 1986)). See generally 5 WILLISTON, supra
note 25, § 805.
492. There is no generally agreed upon definition of the term "comfort instrument." One
commentator sarcastically states that "[c]omfort letters are a species of those ambiguous declarations
which negotiators often use to save a deal threatened by lack of agreement on an important
point.... It is a lawyer's cover-up of a disagreement." A.H. Hermann, Real Comfort in a Comfort
Letter, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1988, at A13. Instruments intended to provide "comfort" include letters
of assurance, letters of intent, accountants' comfort letters or certifications, and attorney opinion
letters.
493. See, e.g., Corson v. Rhuddlan Borough Council, 59 P. & C.R. 185 (C.A. 1989); Compagnie
Generale D'Industrie et de Participations v. Solori Societe Anonyme, Queen's Bench Division
(Commercial Court) (Transcript: Barnett Lenton, 1984), available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library,
ENGCAS File; Bank of N.Z. v. Ginivan, I N.Z.L.R. 178 (C.A. 1990).
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became more detailed in content and more guaranty-like in nature. Will
44
this growing "custom" dictate a new jurisprudence of enforceability? 1
As more detailed representations are added to the content of the
instrument, there will be a greater chance of a court undertaking a
contractual analysis. One commentator states it more pragmatically:
Drafters of comfort letters may "provid[e] detail in the letters which, to
an attorney, offer considerable factual representations and promises on
which to argue detrimental reliance."4 " In the 1991 case of Bank of
New Zealand v. Ginivan, the New Zealand Court of Appeals held that
such a letter "suggest[s] an obligation of a legally binding nature. '
The court focused upon the words "best endeavours" in the letter as
implying an intent that went beyond simple assurance.
A number of courts have looked outside the language of the comfort
instrument to determine if contractual intent and liability may be implied.
I submit that this is in essence a fairness inquiry. Given the "totality of
the circumstances" and of the nature of the relationship, it is inherently
unfair to allow a party to avoid liability for issuing a letter that was
reasonably relied upon by another to its detriment. Contractual formality
and formalism would preclude such an inquiry. The argument for the
extension of legally recognizable reliance may be strongest for long-term
contractual relationships. A party may argue that the comfort instrument
was part of an ongoing, expansive "contract." The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts encourages the expanded use of promissory estoppel to
prevent injustice.497 The Second Restatement "permits reference to the
negotiations of the parties, including statements of intention and even
positive promises.... The transaction may be shown in all its length and
breadth . . . ."" One can no longer assert that such instruments,
devoid of the "operative terms" of contract,499 are wholly unenfor-

494. See Phoenix Mut. Ltfe Ins., 734 F. Supp. at 1187 (stating that "the custom of such [a]
transaction[]" is a factor in determining contractual intent). As financial institutions demand comfort
instruments as a customary requirement, more detailed representations, and stronger assurance
language, a case for contractual significant reliance can more easily be made.
495. Rene Sacasas & Don Wiesner, Comfort Letters: The Legal and Business Implications, 104
BANKING LJ. 313, 335 (1987).
496. Bank ofNZ., 1 N.Z.L.R. at 180.
497. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979); see also Nimrod Mktg.
(Overseas) Ltd. v. Texas Energy Inv. Corp., 769 F.2d 1076, 1080 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1047, and cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 (1986).
498. Braucher, supra note It11,
at 16-17; see also Knapp, supra note 108, at 78-79.
499. "Operative terms or phrases" are terms of art that have specifically and universally
accepted meanings within the law or within a trade or profession. For example, the court in Chemco
Leasing Spa v. Rediffussion held that "take over" of a subsidiary's obligations was such an operative
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ceable. In pursuit of fairness and justice, a court may indeed imply such
terms "in the light of the circumstances."" In England, the Court of
Appeals, in Corson v. Rhuddlan Borough Council,5 ' seemed to accept
this mandate. "'It is accordingly the duty of the court to construe [the]
documents fairly and broadly without being too astute or subtle at
finding defects."' 502
Comfort instrument enforceability is another example of the easing
of the strict bargain principle of contract law and the corresponding
growth of equitable principles in the realm of contract law. 3 Reliance
induced by the issuance of the comfort instrument may result in a finding
of contractual liability even if it was not "bargained for" reliance. This
expanded analysis takes into consideration the "equities" of the overall
transaction. It may also include consideration of how subsequent events
may call for an equitable reformation of the instrument in question. In
reviewing contract norms, Professor Macneil states that "just as a
mountain changes shape and color as one approaches it ever closer and
shuts out other vistas, so too the common norms oriented toward
discreetness take on new characteristics as they more and more dominate
the contract landscape. "'5 It is in this moving landscape that comfort
instruments and the fairness inquiry continue to evolve.
L

Summary

The "spirit of contract" has evolved into a greater awareness of
fairness concerns in individual cases. This ad hoc inquiry was once
shunned in the era of freedom of contract 5 and formalistic rule

phrase sufficient to bind the parent company as a promisor or guarantor. Queen's Bench
(Commercial Court) (Transcript Assoc. 1985), availablein LEXIS, INTLAW Library, ENGCAS File.
Words of promise include "agree" and "undertake." Words of guarantee include "indemnify," "hold
harmless," and "reimburse."
500. Braucher, supra note 11l,
at 16.

501. 59 P. & C.R. 185 (C.A. 1989).
502. Id. at 192 (emphasis added) (quoting Hillas & Co. v. Arcos, 147 L.T.R. 503, 514 (H.L.
1932)).
503. See generally Egan, supra note 68.
504. MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 60.
505. Professor Williston traces the genesis of "freedom of contract" to the late eighteenth
century's philosophy of freedom as symbolized by Jeffersonian democracy. "A gospel of freedom
was preached by both metaphysical and political philosophers in the latter half of the eighteenth
century." Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract,6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921). In the area of

economics, the philosophy of freedom was also deeply embedded. Williston stated, "Adam Smith,
Ricardo, Bentham, and John Stuart Mill successively insisted on freedom of bargaining ...."d.;
see also Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 456 (1909).
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application. Instead, the law has absorbed more and more of the approach
once found in the realm of equityi It has attempted to balance law's
traditional preference for the determinacy of rules with the flexibility
available in a fairness of the exchange inquiry. This fairness inquiry
allows courts to venture outside the four corners of the contract in search
of justice. "Moral" consideration is often considered an anathema to the
finding of a legally enforceable contract. But, "moral" considerations
have played a large role in defining the scope of legal obligations.
Fuller's reliance has been the vehicle whereby bargained for exchange
has been fundamentally altered to hold one morally and legally
accountable for another's reliance.0 7 It seemed inherently unfair for
one to escape liability for the inducement of another because contract's
formalistic checklist of requirements had not been completed. Over time
the "ought to" of contract was transformed to the "is" of contract.
Currently, the frontier of reliance recovery is the uncertain world of
comfort instruments. It may prove to be a microcosmic example of the
further genesis of reliance as a foundation for contractual liability.
At first, comfort instruments were viewed as something outside the
realm of legally recognizable contract. As the use and the content of
these instruments began to flourish, the notion of their nonenforceability
has increasingly been questioned. Once again, reliance's appeal to rectify
the unfairness of unpunished inducement has been brought to bear. There
is a belief that although the comfort instrument in itself is legally
insignificant, it may be evidence of some underlying understanding that
is deserving of protection. An English Court of Appeals has noted that,
even though a lawyer would consider a guarantee worthless, "'a
commercial man would regard the guarantee, perhaps furnished in a
proper form of letter, as having some value
as underlining, as it were, the
5' 0 8
promise that had been undertaken. '
Some guidance for the direction of the "new spirit" of contract may
be provided by current foreign law approaches. For example, the Federal
Republic of Germany is less dependent upon the legal literalism often
found in Anglo-American jurisprudence. The formalism of legal
instruments and the language within them is not as determinative as in
our legal system. An example of this informalism is reflected in the fact

506. See, e.g., Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in ContractEnforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253
(1991); Summers, supra note 105.
507. See Fuller, supra note 112, at 821-22.
508. Heisler v. Anglo-Dal, Ltd., 2 All E.R. 770,772 (C.A. 1954) (quoting Barker v. M'Andrew,
144 E.R. 643 (1865)).
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that a "merchant's guarantee" is valid even if given orally."° This legal
informalism provides parties to a transaction greater flexibility in
structuring their transactions and in the types of instruments they
choose." ' This has direct repercussions for the enforcement and
remedial side of the law. Their approach to enforcement is more
consequentialist in style: "By contrast with... English legal doctrine,
German courts favor the so-called teleological method of interpretation:
rather than restricting themselves to a literal interpretation of the
wording .... they tend to consider the purpose of the [instrument] ... ."" Under this "purpose-oriented" approach, the norm of
reliance is likely to triumph over the formalism of rule application.
One may pose the proposition that even informal letters of comfort,
seemingly not binding on their surface, are more likely to be taken
"seriously" under this purpose-oriented jurisprudence. French law
approaches the issue of the efficacy of such instruments in a direct,
commonsensible way. Would two sophisticated commercial entities create
a meaningless, unenforceable instrument? The French have developed a
presumption that the question should be answered in the negative. This
is consistent with the European mind-set that parents do back their
subsidiaries.5 12 Comfort instruments are thus more likely to be considered as binding "obligations de faire."'5 3 The interests of fairness have
provided the fuel for this expansion of reliance's realm.
This review of the "frontier" of contracts has shown that contractual
certainty is more illusion than reality. The certainty of an express
satisfaction clause has been undermined by the law's objective flow. The
doctrines of substantial performance and best efforts have recalibrated
private contract's measurement of satisfactory performance. Reliance has
provided the mechanism to expand fairness's reach into areas previously
demarcated as noncontract. This review has been but a sampling of the
use of the fairness inquiry throughout the law of contracts. One may find
numerous other examples of the fairness norm at work. The courts have
reviewed express liquidated damage clauses to determine if they are

509. See I LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BusINEss IN EVSTERN EUROPE 216 (Dennis Campbell
ed., 1983) [hereinafter Campbell].
510. "[The parties] are at liberty to agree to variants [of accepted legal instruments] or to
develop entirely new types... 'I id.
511. 1 id. at 206.
512. See Hermann, supra note 492, at A13.
513. Code Civil [C. CV.] art. 1142 (Fr.). This translates to a "commitment to perform."

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

85

Hofstra
Law LAW
Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1995], Art.
HOFSTRA
REVIEW
[Vol. 824:349

"reasonable forecasts" of damages or unfair "penalties. 5 14 Exculpatory
clauses have been voided upon grounds of "public policy"5'15 and

"unconscionability."51 6 Classical contract's notion of "presentiation" has
been transplanted by the courts' "expanded analysis" of unforeseen
developments," 7 "totality of circumstances,"5' 18 "tacit understand' fairness of the exchange,5 20 and notions of unconscionability
ings,"519

and fair dealing.52 1
The question posed at the end of Part I was how have courts dealt
with contractual satisfaction when it affronts notions of fairness? The
answer seems to be that the dictates of fairness have increasingly
prevailed over "bargained for" satisfaction. However, courts have
attempted to disguise their abrogation of express contract on behalf of
fairness concerns. They have avoided the nomenclature of the ad hoc
fairness inquiry by cloaking informalism in the garb of doctrine. The
next part will attempt to distill the underlying norms of contract and
fairness in order to better understand the roles of competing values in the
enforcement decision.

514. See, e.g., Watson v. Ingram, 851 P.2d 761,765 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), aft'd, 881 P.2d 247
(Wash. 1994).
515. "The reason for disfavoring such clauses is based upon the public policy of encouraging
the exercise of reasonable care." Firstbank of Ark. v. Keeling, 850 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Ark. 1993)
(citing Farmers Bank v. Perry, 787 S.W.2d 645, 646 (Ark. 1990)).
516. See Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 386
A.2d 1216 (Md. 1978). The court held, "[C]ontractual limitations on judicial remedies will be
enforced, absent a positive showing of fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching, or other unconscionable conduct .
I..."
Id. at 1231; see also Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecommunications
Satellite Org., 991 F.2d 94, 99 (4th Cir. 1992). See generally Cava & Wiesner, supra note 244.
517. See U.C.C. §§ 2-613 to -615 (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261-272
(1979) (delineating certain circumstances rendering performance impracticable or causing frustration
of purpose of contract); John D. Wladis, Impracticabilityas Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed
Circumstances Upon Contract Obligationsfor the Sale of Goods, 22 GA. L. REV. 503 (1988). In
international contracts, there is a generally accepted "act of God" defense known as "force majeure:'
United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, art. 79, U.N. Doc.
A/C.97/18, Annex 1 (1980), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264, 6276 (1987).
518. See supra notes 73, 82, 116.
519. See supra notes 22, 87, 169.
520. See generally Atiyah, supra note 23.
521. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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IV. THE NORMS OF CONTRACT: OPERATIVE NORMS
UTILIZED IN POLICING OF CONTRACT AND IN THE
ENFORCEMENT DECISION

Classical contract theory established a normative framework to
rationalize its support for the formalism and generality of contract
law.5" It was a theory based upon the sanctity of individual freedom.
The "meeting of the minds" era and the evolution of the "bargain
principle" were contract law's corollariumto our dominant political and
economic theory, the doctrine of laissez faire.5" Professor Williston
recognized this common strain running through the "theorizing in
metaphysics, politics, and economics, ' 24 as well as the law. He stated,
"Indeed it was a corollary of the philosophy of freedom and individualism that the law ought to extend the sphere and enforce the obligation of
contract."5" Thus, the norms sheltered under the philosophy of
freedom of contract began to flourish. The rationales of certainty,
predictability, free will, and systemic fairness became fodder for judicial
reasoning. These are the norms of individualism and formalism. More
recently, the norm of free contract has been expressed in terms of the
efficiency norm. This norm has been most closely associated with the
widespread literature capsulized under the label of "law and econom6
ics."

52

The advancement of the norms of certainty and predictability have
been bound with the norm of authority. The doctrine of stare decisis

522. A "norm" has been defined as an "ought proposition." Norms are not necessarily derived
from a moral analysis. For example, both Kelsen and Austin's systems were amoral in nature.
"Kelsen's theory is amoral because the validity of the legal norm has nothing to do with its content;
it is dependent only upon the way it is created." KELSEN, supra note 17, at 619. For a general review
of the nature of norms, see HANS KELSEN, ESSAYS INLEGAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Peter Heath
trans., 1973); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (S.Komer ed., 1975). Professor Raz
explains that norm is a "term of art." His analysis is confined to what he refers to as "categorical
rules," which he defines as "rules which require that a certain action be performed, as well as rules
granting permissions." Id. at 9.
523. "Corollarium" is latin for gratuity or gift. The word corollary is a derivative. See
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 311 (3d ed. 1991).
524. Williston, supra note 505, at 367.
525. Id. (emphasis added).
526. "The rule of free contract advocated by the Chicago model is closely related to the
formalist norm of freedom of contract. Both hold that contracts should generally be enforced as
written." Note, supra note 175, at 979 n.7; see also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 167,
at 186-87. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962) (noting that
governmental involvement via legislation usually causes more problems then it solves).
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provides the basis for the formal application of rules. The analytical
process is truncated by the deference given to past rulings. The
decision-making process became more of a procedural exercise than one
of ad hoe substantive analysis. The "mechanical jurisprudence" of
applying past precedent--an approach often associated with the legal
positivism of John Austin-became a required exercise on behalf of
certainty and predictability in the law. 27 "[A] proposition of law is true
within a particular... society if it correctly reports the past command 5 28 of a sovereign authority. It is this certainty and predictability
that allows business people to exercise their free will in choosing or
avoiding the "default rules" of contract. 29 Justice Cardozo views
adherence to precedent not so much as direct application, but as building
upon past precedents. It is for the judge to lay his "own course of bricks
on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone
before him."53
A parallel universe of norms developed that were communitarian in
nature. The fiction of contractual intent continued to be a forceful factor.
However, the subjective "meeting of the minds" was transplanted by the
objective reasonable person standard. The norm of reasonableness swept
across the contractual landscape. Actual intent was interpreted to mean
"reasonable intent." The objectification of contracts was the touchstone
of twentieth century decision-making. The "reasonable person" was
constructed to solve most of the problems of construction and interpretation. 3 ' Satisfaction was thus transformed into reasonable satisfaction,

527. "The science of jurisprudence ... is concerned with positive laws ... as considered
without regard to their goodness or badness." THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 350 (Clarence
Morris ed., 1959) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted); see also AUSTIN, supra note 79
(describing the analytical or scientific nature of law and jurisprudence).

528. RONALD DwORK1N, LAW'S EMPIRE 33 (1986) (emphasis added) (accrediting Austin with
the statement).
529. Default rules generally refer to the rules of contract that are implied by the courts unless
the parties agreed to vary from them in the contract. See generally Richard Craswell, ContractLaw,
Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989) (noting preference
for the term "background rules"); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the InteractionsBetween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L.
REv. 261, 265-66 (1985) (explaining that the development of "standard formulations" is a reflection
of a party's desire to reduce risk).
530. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 149.
531. The reasonable person can be configured to fit any factual situation. She is a chameleon
who can change colors to provide a measure in determining if there has been a contractual breach.
For example, in cases of professional services, the reasonable person is one who possesses the "skill
and judgment which can be reasonably expected from similarly situated professionals." City of
Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978).
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complete performance to substantial performance, and an exclusive
agency contract was held to require a good faith duty of best efforts.
Intertwined with the notion of reasonableness are the norms of reliance,
fairness, and justice.
Justice Cardozo examined the interplay between the norm of
precedent and the dictates of justice in reviewing the doctrine of
substantial performance. "I have no doubt that the inspiration of the rule
' This "sentiment of justice" was the
is a mere sentiment of justice."532
driving force behind the doctrinal development to "protect builders who
'
in trifling details... have departed from their contracts."533
Those
concerned with the preservation of the generality and formality of legal
doctrine were concerned about such ad hoc incursions. Thus, the courts
"proceeded to surround [the doctrine of substantial performance] with the
'
halo of conformity to precedent."534
The same can be said of the
encasing of other fairness-based developments within "halos of precedent." The formalization into doctrine of such subjective case by case
inquiries as undertaken in connection with satisfaction clauses,535 the
implication of best efforts,53 6 and the interpretation of covenants not to
compete537 can be seen as formalism's "intellectual passion for
elegentia juris, for symmetry of form and substance."538 Nonetheless,
it is clearly a triumph of the fairness-justice norms over those of certainty
and predictability. 39
Closely associated with the enhanced place of the fairness-justice
norms in contract is the use of the reliance norm to extend the reach of
contractual liability. Professor Fuller forewarned that protection of the
reliance interest may become "the exclusive raison d'etre of judicial
intervention.""54 ' He noted that one of the major concerns of such an
expansive exercise of contractual recovery is that it "would unduly
broaden the field of legal intervention.""' The reliance norm's place
within contracts would ultimately be determined by "an inquiry into the
532. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 44 (emphasis added).
533. Id.

534. Id. at 44-45.
535. See supra part I11I.A.
536. See supra part 111.F.
537. See supra part 11I.E.
538. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 34.
539. Professor Atiyah notes that by 1954 "classical theory was already giving way to a different
approach, which laid less stress on promissory liability, and more on paternalistic devices." ATIYAH,
supra note 18, at 173.
540. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 94, at 393.
541. Id. at 420.
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reasons which underlie ... the enforcement of promises generally."542
The notion of "bargained for exchange," in traditional contract doctrine,
limited the basis for judicial intervention upon the rationales of
convenience and certainty of contract. 43 The injustice of uncompensated reliance upon another's promise soon became a formidable counterweight. It was to the rectification of such injustice that Fuller likely
directed the bold statement that "the fundamental purpose of the law is
the prevention of unjust enrichment.""
Professor Summers notes that "authority reasons," such as adherence
to precedent, need not be inconsistent with the other norms of contract
law. It is only in the formalistic application of precedent and rules that
a judge loses her normative grounding. "[P]recedents are not self-defining
and self-applying. To apply a precedent rationally, judges must advert to
the substantive reasons behind it. 5' 45 It is to these underlying reasons
or norms to which we now turn for a fuller exposition. It will then be
determined whether one may venture some insights on how the norms
interrelate in the course of judicial decision-making.
A.

The Norms of Traditional Contract Doctrine

1. Certainty and Evidentiary Norms
The systemic rationale of traditional contract doctrine held that
certainty of contract provided for the efficiency which the free market
system mandated. The formal application of the classical checklist of
contractual formalities allowed for parties to transact business in an open,
fair, and efficient manner. A party to a business transaction was assured
that if the proper formalities were followed she would have predetermined the legal outcome of a subsequent dispute. For example, one
would be able to limit one's legal exposure by not conforming to the
known requirements for contractual liability. Alternatively, one could
obtain contractual rights by following the required formalities. By
choosing an accepted legal device, one may channel a transaction into the
protective area of contract. Also, the selection of a formalized model of
542. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 6, at 53. The normative nature of this inquiry is evident: "In

actuality the loss which the plaintiff suffers... is not a datum of nature but the reflection of a
normative order." Id.
543. "[T]he law of contract was designed to provide for the enforcement of the private arrangements .... In general the law was not concerned either with the fairness or justice of the
outcome .... " ATIYAH, supra note 18, at 9.
544. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 6, at 67.
545. Summers, supra note 263, at 783 (footnote omitted).
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contract enables a party to reach the evidentiary threshold needed to
pursue and win a breach of contract cause of action. This enhanced
predictability allows for ease of judicial administration and efficient
contracting. Professor Dworkin refers to this conception of law as
"conventionalism." The reason for judicial intervention "is exhausted by
the predictability and procedural fairness" that such intervention supplies. 46
Karl Llewellyn believed that the notions of certainty and predictability in the law are based upon a false conception of precedent. He
explained that "The basic false conception is that a precedent or the
precedents will in fact (and in 'a precedent-system' ought to) simply
dictate the decision in the current case . . . .""' It is a fallacy premised
upon the ideology that doctrine will provide the one single right
answer. 4 8 The belief is that the law of contracts provides a set of
categorical imperatives in which all rational judges glean the same
decision from the body of preceding cases. The realist believes that,
except for cases of precise precedential application, certainty of outcome
is a tenuous hope. Llewellyn sees the judicial decision-making process
as merely involving the "lessening [of the] uncertainty of outcome. ' 49
2. Predictability Norm
Predictability may be viewed as a lesser degree of certainty. It is a
belief that contract rules and doctrine do allow business parties and their
lawyers to predict the likely outcome of a contractual dispute. According
to Holmes's theory, "valid law consists of a rule or other precept that in
the generality of cases is likely to prevail."55 The most notable
dissertation of this idea is Justice Holmes's "prediction theory" of the
law.55 ' "The best that [a judge] usually can do is make a more or less
informed ... prediction of how the matter in issue will be resolved
through the judicial process."552 In The Problems of Jurisprudence,
546, DWORKIN, supra note 528, at 95.
547. LLEWELLYN, supra note 19, at 62 (emphasis added).
548. See id. at 24.
549. Id. at 17. Llewellyn was writing in the specific context of appellate review.
550. Summers, supra note 20, at 905.
551. See M.H. Fisch, Justice Holmes, the Prediction Theory of Law, and Pragmatism, 39 J.
PHIL. 85, 92-93 (1942); Moskowitz, supra note 152, at 430-31 (arguing that judicial decision-making
should result from a balancing text which reflects the weighing of "correctness, justice, and wisdom"

with the decision's consistency to the existing precedents while noting, however, that justice should
not be sacrificed for the sake of rigidly following precedent).
552. Mark D. Howe, Introduction to HOLMES, supra note 3, at xviii. "The prophecies of what
the courts will do in fact ... are what I mean by the law." Holmes, supra note 152, at 461. See
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Judge Posner resurrects the prediction theory as an able enough answer

to the question of "what is law?" 553 For Posner, law is an activity
subject to examination. "The law is not a thing [that judges] discover; it
is the name of their activity. They do not act in accordance with
something called 'law'---they just act as best they can."S 4 The absolute
nature of the certainty norm envisions that there is only one right answer
to an issue in dispute. In comparison, the prediction theory holds that a
judge has a choice among a number of reasonable alternatives. "[T]he

judge's proper aim in difficult cases is a reasonable result rather than a
demonstrably right one ...." 555
3. Contract as Promise or Moral Convention
Professor Fried has strenuously made the case for the morality of
enforcing contracts. In short, one has a moral obligation to keep one's
promise when using the "convention" of promising:
There exists a convention that defines the practice of promising and its
entailments. This convention provides a way that a person may create
expectations in others. By virtue of the basic Kantian principles of trust
and respect, it is wrong to invoke
that convention in order to make a
556
promise, and then to break it.
This is the deontological argument for the enforcement of contracts.
Contracts should be enforced because everyone has a duty to fulfill one's
promises. The influence of the "morality of promise" can be seen at work
in Cardozo's famous opinion in Allegheny College.557 During the
period of this decision, circa 1927, charitable gifts were generally viewed

generally Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 793 (1989)
(arguing that the apparent contradiction between Holmes's theoretical approach to the law and his
view that the law is a tool for pragmatic prediction "are consistent with his pragmatist account of
law as experience"); Note, Holmes, Peirce, and Legal Pragmatism, 84 YALE L.J. 1123 (1975).
553. POSNER, supra note 29, at 220-44. Judge Posner incorporates the prediction theory into a
"broader activity theory of law." Id. at 225.
554. Id. (emphasis added) (foomote omitted). In our multi-layered court system, it is thus a
function of a lower-court judge to predict how an appellate court would decide an issue on appeal.
"The prediction theory, when viewed normatively, implies that the function of the lower-court judge
is to predict how the higher court would decide his case." Id. at 227.
555. Id. at 26. This view of the law is clearly consequentialist in nature. See id. at 26, 223.
556. FRIED,supra note 20, at 17. But see Wallace K. Lightsey, A Critiqueof the PromiseModel
of Contract, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 45 (1984) (arguing that the exchange-relationship model is
better for society than Fried's promise model of contracts, which involves a provincial and
antagonistic relationship between the individual and the community, because the individual and the
community support and complement each other).
557. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
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as unenforceable due to a lack of consideration. Justice Cardozo
superficially satisfies the requirement of consideration by finding that the
promise to "perpetuate the name" of the intended donor was adequate
consideration."5 A better explanation for the decision is that the
"supplementary gloss," referred to by Cardozo,559 would have made it
"immoral" for the promisor not to fulfill her promise.
4. Efficiency, Autonomy, and Free Will Norms
Before its more recent appearance in law and economics literature,
efficiency and economics had long been recognized as the basis for
contract enforcement. In his 1933 article, The Basis of Contract,
Professor Cohen explained the "economic
argument for
contractualism."5 6 The economic basis is premised upon the belief that
"a regime in which contracts are freely made and generally enforced
gives greater scope to individual initiative and thus promotes the greatest
wealth of a nation. '5 6' This regime's focus is upon the enforcement of
contract for the purpose of the efficient use of resources or the maximization of wealth. Implicit in this approach is a non-moral, or at least a
"rational," view of breach. If the benefits of a breach outweigh the costs,
then breaching one's contract is an appropriate course of action. "If a
party finds that another deal can provide more benefit even if damages
are paid, then that party is free to break the contract."'5 62
A number of reasons provide the basis for the norms of efficiency
and free will. Contracts should be enforced because they "foster[]
individual autonomy, promot[e] fair allocation of social benefits, and
minimiz[e] the costs of transacting. 5 63 The efficiency and autonomy
norms often argue for strict enforcement of contract and a minimal
amount ofjudicial intervention. However, one commentator notes that in
the case of a contractual ambiguity, or "gap," the most efficient term
may not be one intended in the parties' "hypothetical bargain." Therefore, for the efficiency norm to be advanced, the court should interpret

558. See id at 176. Although disagreeing with the opinion of the court, Justice Frank noted, "I
can see no ground for the suggestion that the ancient rule which makes consideration necessary ... is in danger of effacement .... To me that is a cause for gratulation rather than regret."
Id. at 178 (Frank, J., dissenting).
559. Id. at 174.

560. Cohen, supra note 10, at 562.
561.
562.
563.
89 MicH.

Id at 562-63.
Michael D. Bayles, Legally Enforceable Commitments, 4 L. & PffIL. 3 11, 322 (1985).
David Chamy, HypotheticalBargains: R7e Normative Structureof ContractInterpretation,
L. REv. 1815, 1817-18 (1991).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

93

Hofstra
Law Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1995], Art.
8 24:349
HOFSTRA
LAW REVIEW
[VCol.

the contract "in a way that the court believes to be socially desirable.564
B.

"New Spirit" of ContractNorms: Good Faith and
FairDealing

The "new spirit" of contract implies a duty of cooperation, good
faith, fair dealing, and, conceivably, a duty to modify or adjust. It has
most often been applied to long-term, relational contracts. However, the
potential breadth of this "new spirit" is unlimited in scope. The notions
of good faith and fair dealing have been incorporated into the Uniform
Commercial Code565 and the Second Restatement."6 The most "liberal" version of this "new spirit" implies a duty to modify or adjust the
terms of a contract in order to preserve the longevity of the contractual
relationship. This entails the use of norms not generally associated with
contracts. Professor Macneil identifies two such norms:
[There are] two norms particularly applicable to contractual relations:
(1) harmonizing conflict within the internal matrix of the relation,
including... discrete and presentiated behavior with nondiscrete and
nonpresentiated behavior; and (2) preservation of the relation. These
norms affect change in contractual relations ....
...[This

is especially true] with situations
where the desire is to
567
it.
terminate
to
not
relation,
the
continue
The norms of the new spirit provide the normative and doctrinal
flexibility needed to adjust and preserve long-term, relational contracts.
This notion of a duty to adjust has profound implications on the remedial
end of the spectrum. In the event a party "strictly" enforces the terms of
a relational contract, she may be surprised to find the contract retroactively reformed by a court. These "new" norms place a party on notice

564. Id. at 1878.
565. "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995).
566. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). See
generally Summers, supra note 207, at 835 (noting that with the adoption of Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 205, there will be an increase and "growth of general contract law on good faith").
567. Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment ofLong-Term Economic Relations UnderClassical,
Neoclassical,and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 895-96 (1978) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
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that refusing a reasonable request for a modification may not be done
without some peril.
C. The Reliance Norm
The dialectic between the traditional contract norms and the reliance
norm has been "codified" in sections 75 and 90 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. The formality "of the bargain" in traditional
contract law serves the channeling, cautionary, and evidentiary functions
that it was designed to safeguard. 5' 6 However, the limiting of contractual remedies by the requirements of formality often resulted in uncompensated harm. The need for greater flexibility in providing relief for injury
caused by "informal" promise was soon recognized.169 Fuller and
Corbin persuasively made their case for the recognition of the reliance
interest in order to provide a remedy for such promissory injury.
Professor Boyle described Fuller's "acceptance" of the shortcomings of
the "formalistic criteria [required] for enforceability"'57 of contract:
Where the classicists stressed form... as theoretical a prioris, Fuller
subjected those ideas to functional scrutiny, decried the undervaluation
of the reliance principle, and found reasons for enforceability in relative
and contingent community norms. Fuller accepts that Section
90.. . may require the judge to step in post hoc and create enforceable
bargains where necessary.. . ; he portrays the formal requirements of
contract as being in dialectical, productive tension with their functional
goals .... 571
Reliance or promissory estoppel became the "equitable" means to
redress such injury. In Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,572 Justice Cardozo eloquently restated the tension between the consistency of rules and
the "wavering and blurred 5 73 lines that equitable considerations often
produce. Justice Cardozo stated, "Something, doubtless, may be said on
the score of consistency and certainty in favor of ...stricter standard[s].
The courts have balanced such considerations against those of equity and

568. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 72 cmt. c, 75 cmt. a (1979).
569. The Second Restatement indicates a reliance antecedent in the days of common law writ.
"It is fairly arguable that the enforcement of informal contractsin the action of assumpsit rested
historically on justifiable reliance on a promise." Id. § 90 cmt. a (emphasis added).
570. Boyle, supra note 19, at 372.
571. Id. (footnote omitted).
572. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).

573. Id. at 891.
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fairness, and found the latter to be the weightier."" 4
D.

The Norms of Equity: Fairnessand Justice

The use of equitable doctrines has been a formal part of contract
law since the merger of law and equity. Cardozo states that equitable
doctrines "are merely the remedial devices by which a result conceived
of as right and just is made to square ...with the symmetry of the legal
system." 57 The doctrine of substantial performance and the
objectification of satisfaction clauses are examples of where the courts
have imposed doctrinal changes in order to meet the demands of
society's sense of fairness.576 Such doctrinal changes are vastly outnumbered by the use of fictional devices in an attempt by the courts to
mask the "equitable reformation" of contracts. This covert operation is
due to the courts' attempt to serve two masters at the same time. In both
instances, the courts are fearful of the consequences of their decisions.
This teleological duality creates inherent normative tension in the
rendering of the decision. It is the pitting of the norms of classical
contract against the norms of substantive fairness long found in equity.
It is the concern for the substantive consequences to the immediate
parties, on one hand, and the fear of such a decision upon the security of
future transactions. Professor Sherwin explains the dilemma as follows:
[T]hree of the values that influence contract law point toward the legal
model of enforcement: the social utility of a market economy, efficient
resource allocation, and respect for personal autonomy....
...[It
is] a preference for the formal medium of rules [which]
preempt[s]further normative evaluation....
...[T]he equitable model of enforcement... grants relief from
contract obligations on the basis of unfairness in the process and
substantive content of a bargain, exercis[ing] compassion at the expense
of utility and stability. ... "
Professor Atiyah has stressed the importance of "fair exchange" in the

574. Id.
575. See CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 42-43.
576. "It is the function of our courts to keep the doctrines up to date with the mores [of the
community] by continual restatement .... A.L.C., The Offer ofan Act for a Promise, 29 YALE L.J.
767, 771 (1920), quoted in CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 135.
577. Sherwin, supra note 506, at 272, 276. The different goals or perspectives of fairness and
classical contract are explained as follows: "[Fairness's] object is not to regulate future conduct in
a range of similar cases, but to undo an unjust result between parties." Id. at 275.
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judicial mind. "[M]any of the norms and ideas which permeate contract
law will often be utilized-for instance, [a judicial decision] may be
influenced by ideas of 'fairexchange."'57 s One commentator analyzed
the use of "fairness norms" as they pertain to the issue of the cessation
of contractual relations. It is clear that "fairness norms ... supplement
'
freedom of contract."579
Courts often weigh the fairness consequences
when deciding the issue of cessation. Fairness and justice concerns
pervade the entire spectrum of contract, from formation to cessation.
V.

"INTO THE CALDRON: ALL OF THESE INGREDIENTS ENTER IN
' 580
VARYING PROPORTIONS

Contract research has unduly centered upon the legitimation of the
law through a unified perspective."' The history of contract has
evidenced a cyclical approach of search and destroy. Analysis after
analysis has been forwarded to extract excalibur from its lodging within
the edifice of contract. Each attempt at exerting the "one" true unified
bond that holds all of contract together has failed to receive universal
acceptance. Each of these attempts, from Blackstone to Fried, has
received its fair share of criticism. Unfortunately, the framing of the
research goal as the discovery of some mystical unifying web into which
all that is contract can be weaved has doomed many an effort to the
jurisprudential dust bin. The harmful effects have been the
underutilization of valuable research simply because of its failure to
"reach that unreachable" goal. 8 2 Instead, we should recognize that
most of the major schools of thought offer essentially correct information
that can provide guidance to both practitioner and scholar.
Most of the old and new theories of contract have served to enrich
and expand our jurisprudence. Professor Hillman asserts that "contract
law is a complex set of rules and principles. 5 3 As such, the theoretical

578. ATIYAH, supra note 18, at 4 (emphasis added).
579. Hillman, supra note 441, at 620. "[C]ourts typically weigh potential gains and losses from
cessation and evaluate the reasonableness of the parties' conduct to ensure a fair result." Id. at 658.
580. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 10.
581. Professor Bayles recognizes this focus of most contract theories. He states, "Most theories
of contract law adopt a single aim: the enforcement of agreements or promises, maximizing
economic value, or fulfilling reasonable expectations. An advantage of this approach is that it
provides a unity to the field." Bayles, supra note 562, at 319.
582. See MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, THE ADVENruREs OF DON QUIXOTE DE LA MANCHA (Tobias
Smollett trans., 1986).

583. Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Conrract Theory, 67 TEx. L. REV. 103, 103
(1988). He explains, "Although based in part on the principle of freedom of contract, modem
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underpinnings, by necessity, must reflect that complexity. One may argue
that the complexity of contract law has grown over the years. The

sophistication and complexity of modem commercial transactions have
tested the rudiments of classical contract law. The long-term and
increasingly relational nature of modem transactions have induced the

modification of doctrine and the institutionalization of new conceptions
of contract law."s The diversity of norms, that have been served by the
different theories, should all be looked upon in providing an adequate
conceptual framework. The recognition and acceptance of a normative
composite that incorporates the different norms and theories is in order.
Instead of the exclusivity fostered by "contract as promise,"5 85 the
"efficient breach of contract," 5 6 and "death of contract" theories, 587
a recognition of the diversity of contract and the inability to quantify a
unified theory would be more productive. 88
A.

Departmentalization:A Beneficial Side Effect of a
Non- Unified Approach

The use of fictional devices to place different contracts within the
pigeonholes of existing doctrine should be discarded.5 89 An acceptance
of the "diversity of contract" allows for the utilization of a wide range
of existing descriptive and normative theories. 590 An approach that
contract law is also tempered both within and without its formal structure by principles, such as
reliance and unjust enrichment, that focus on fairness and the interdependence of parties rather than
on parties' actual agreements." Id. at 104 (footnote omitted).
584. The increased prominence of promissory estoppel and § 90 of the Restatement is but one
example. For the long-term nature of many of today's contractual relations, see generally Gillette,
supranote 441; Hillman, supranote 440; Macneil, supranote 169. The increasingly relational nature
of today's transactions is reflected by the fact that over 50% of our gross national product is
attributable to the service sector. See infra note 594.
585. See FRIED, supra note 20, at 8.
586. For discussion of law and economics theorists, see supra part II.D.
587. See GILMORE, supra note 5.
588. "A highly abstract core theory simply cannot exercise dominion over the entire field [of
contract]." Hillman, supra note 583, at 123.
589. Courts have often utilized fictional or "doctrine stretching" devices to overcome the
harshness of classical contracts' "all-or-nothing" approach. See Robert W. Reeder III, Court-Imposed
Modifications: Supplementing the All-or-Nothing Approach to Discharge Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J.
1079 (1983). Reeder notes, "[C]ourts have developed an array of doctrines ....[T]hese doctrines
assist courts in defining 'a shifting line of compromise between the impulse to uphold the sanctity
of business agreements and the desire to avoid imposing obligations that are... unduly
burdensome."' Id. at 1080 (quoting Fuller & Perdue, supra note 94, at 379).
590. Karl Llewellyn recognized this diversity: "[I]n
our legal system we have large numbers of
mutually inconsistent major premises available for choice: 'competing' rules, 'competing' principles,
'competing' analogies ...." LLEWELLYN, supra note 19, at 12.
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recognizes the "diversity of contract" will allow a fuller use of existing
norms and theories. Contract law should be departmentalized into classes
of contract. 9 ' The most applicable theories, and their normative
foundations, could then be applied in varying degrees to the "types" of
contracts that they can best serve. One attempt at categorization of
contract was promoted by Karl Llewellyn. His unadopted version of the
Uniform Commercial Code would have provided separate rules for
merchants and nonmerchants. One commentator noted, "[Llewellyn]
advocated that the [sales] law conform to a normative vision of merchant
reality .. "592 It may be argued that contract law has always involved
the categorization of contracts. Two prominent scholars noted that
contractual intent only results in liability "where that intention runs in
terms which coincide roughly with the categories of the law.i 59 3 The
remainder of this Article will analyze two interrelated propositions. First,
the need for a recognition of "categories" of contract. Second, the
acknowledgement that there is no unified theory of contract, but only a
variety of non-unified theories that may all be useful in varying degrees
when applied to the different categories of contract. A brief analysis of
recent categorizations in the law of contracts may help illustrate how a
non-unified approach may better reflect contractual reality.
1. Transactional/Relational Dichotomy
An example of categorization is the bifurcation between transactional and relational contracts. Approximately fifty-three percent of our Gross
National Product involves the sales of services.594 A number of commentators have argued that the courts need to focus upon the "contextual
realities"'5 95 of relational contracts beyond that which is dictated by

591. This has long been the case at a more general level. "[M]ost contracts fall into certain
well-recognized classes, such as a sale of goods, hire-purchase, agency, employment, partnership,

[and] insurance ....

Each of these contracts has its own "law'just as much as the general law of

contract .. " AT1YAH, supra note 18, at 214 (emphasis added).
592. Wiseman, supranote 369, at 493. Llewellyn believed that the existing unitary set of rules
for all of sales law was "removed from the actual facts of commercial transactions." Id. at 492.
593.

LoN L. FULLER & ROBERT BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 67 (Erwin N. Griswold ed.,

1964) (emphasis added), quoted in Richard E. Speidel, Contract Law: Some Reflections upon
Commercial Context and the Judicial Process, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 822, 831 n.34.
594.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

UNITED STATES 1992, at 430 (1992) (compiling Gross National Product information from the years
1970 to 1991). The sales of services has been an expanding segment of our economy. The 53%
registered in 1991 compares to 40% attributable to the sales of services in 1970. Id.
595. Hillman, supra note 583, at 126; cf John Kidwell, A Caveat, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 615

(noting that "contract-as-transaction" is still predominant, in the law of contract, over

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

99

Hofstra
Law Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1995], Art.
(Vol. 824:349
HOFSTRA
LAW REVIEW

discrete, transactional exchanges. Professor Hillman acknowledges the
different normative mind-sets which these two areas of contract demand:
"[R]elational norms such as cooperation and compromise, rather than
promises, largely govern these parties' associations. 59 Ithas been
argued that the "relational realities" are such that the parties have
implicitly agreed to a duty to adjust in order to save the relationship." 7
The complexity of relational transactions and the "anticipation of
cooperation" implied in such relations was recognized by Professor
Macneil. He noted that the "[p]ossibility of trouble [is] anticipated as [a]
normal part of relation[al contracts], to be dealt with by cooperation and
59 One may argue that there is a greater
other restorational techniques.""
"duty 9to adjust" in a relational contract than in a discrete, transactional
59

one.

2. Discrete/Long-Term Relationships
The duty to cooperate and to adjust contractual terms is also more
likely to be emphasized in long-term relationships. The force of fairness
and relational norms are likely to exert greater force in such contracts.
In contrast, the certainty norm is likely to exert greater force in more
discrete, transactional-types of contracts. One commentator has suggested
the use of the term "interaction" as being preferable to the term
"transaction": "'Transaction' suggests a discrete event, whereas
'interaction' can apply to a long-term relationship."6 "° The significance
of this change in terminology is that "[m]uch traditional contract law
focuses on brief interactions between strangers. Yet, in the contemporary
world, many contracts, such as employment, franchise, and installment
contracts, pertain to a course of dealing between parties."'6' The
6 2 by
Second Restatement accepts the reality of "on-going transactions""

"contract-as-relation").
596. Hillman, supra note 583, at 124.
597. See Hillman, supra note 440, at 3.
598. Macneil, supra note 169, at 740; see also Gidon Gottlieb, Relationalism:Legal Theoryfor
a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 (1983). Gottlieb states, "The dominant aspect of
juridical activities in relational societies is not of a litigious character. It centers instead on the
practices of actors and on their usages, customs, and interpretations that mediate between actors'
actual patterns of conduct and the formal juridical instruments that are deemed to govern them." Id.
at 568.
599. For a contrary opinion, see Gillette, supra note 441.
600. Bayles, supra note 562, at 318.
601. Id. (emphasis added). See generally MACNEIL, supra note 22.
602. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. a (1979).
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recognizing an exception to the pre-existing duty rule.603 Section 89
provides for modifications of executory contracts "if the modification is
fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the
parties." 6°4 Its scope becomes more expansive by making modifications
not binding when made but subsequently binding if there had been
reliance on the promised modification.0 5
Professor Lightsey formulates an "exchange-relationship model" of
contract based upon long-term contracts. Instead of focusing upon the
will of the parties or the promise itself, this model treats contract as a
"socio-legal relationship."' ' Its focus is upon external contractual
norms in determining the scope of the contractual obligation. The norms
stressed by this model are societal in nature. They include "general
67
societal norms of fairness and reciprocity,... and trade custom.,
This model recognizes the obvious differences between long-term
contractual relationships and short-term relational contracts or one-shot
transactional agreements.
3. "Equality" of Bargaining and Contracts of Adhesion
Contracts of adhesion have been treated differently by many courts.
The idea of mutual assent is clearly an illusion in most contracts
involving the use of a form provided by one of the parties. Nonetheless,
the courts have routinely upheld their validity. The difference in
treatment as compared to classical "bargained for" contracts can be seen
in how the courts have reviewed the clauses and terms within the forms.
The courts have undertaken full-scale fairness inquiries in limiting the
enforceability of "unfair terms." The Second Restatement adopts the
relative bargaining power of the parties as a factor in determining the
substantive fairness of a contract term. 0" The interplay of a one-sided
contract term and inequality of bargaining power has been a key in the

603. See generally Burton F. Brody, Performance of a Pre-Existing Contractual Duty as
Consideration: The Actual Criteria for the Efficacy of an Agreement Altering Contractual
Obligation, 52 DENVER LJ.433, 434-35 (1975) (examining the role of the pre-existing duty rule in
light of, and in conflict with, long term modem-day contracts where "there is a greater need for, and
frequency of, modification of original contracts").
604. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrS § 89(a) (1979). Note that despite its title, § 89
applies to more than just "wholly" executory contracts. It allows for modification of"contract[s] not
fully performed on either side." Id. § 89 (emphasis added).
605. See id. § 89(c).
606. Lightsey, supra note 556, at 67.

607. Id.
608. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979). See generallyLeff, supra note
206.
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finding of unconscionability. The use of a standard form provided by the
"stronger party" has resulted in a heightened level of scrutiny of its terms
by the courts.6' This reformation of unconscionable terms as an affront
to the freedom of contract norm was noted by a commentator on
Australian law: "Laissez-fairehas had to yield to pressures for protection
601
of the individual against another more powerful contracting party."
The Second Restatement makes it clear that contracts of adhesion are to
be viewed differently from other forms of contract. "[T]he more
standardized the agreement and the less a party may bargain meaningfully, the more susceptible the contract or a term will be to a claim of
' 61
unconscionability. '
4. Custom Drafted Contracts and Standard Form Contracts
Often associated with the term "contracts of adhesion" is the use of
standard form contracts. However, the term "adhesion contract" is often
viewed in a negative way. It is the illegitimate child of the more general,
"legitimate" use of form contracts. Form contracts have been recognized
as a necessary evil needed to facilitate the demands of a consumer
society.612 Unreasonable terms that reflect an inequality of bargaining
power have generally been stricken by the courts as being "unconscionable." More generally, the fact that a contract is a product of "dickering"
or is a standard form is likely to play a role in a court's enforcement
decision. A custom contract may evoke a strong presumption in favor of
the enforcement of a term in dispute. A non-dickered term in a standard
form contract lacks the "necessary" assent of the parties resulting in a
weakening of the presumption of enforceability.61 3 Thus, a differentia-

609. "[C]ourts dealing with form contracts or unconscionable contracts have been increasingly
willing to disregard terms of the contract found to be against public policy or otherwise contrary to
societal understandings of fairness." Lightsey, supra note 556, at 47.
610. VERMEESCH & LINDGREN, supra note 17, at 623.
611. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1979) (reporter's note). For an
international perspective, see Andrew Burgess, Consumer Adhesion Contracts and Unfair Terms:
A Critique of Current Theory and a Suggestion, 15 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 255, 274 (1986) ("[Ihe
correct standard by which to judge the fairness or unfairness of these contracts must be the public
interest.").
612. See generally Slawson, supra note 435. Slawson states that "under the conditions of
modem contracting buyers are usually not reasonably expected even to read the forms before they
become bound." Id. at 26. Section 211 of the Restatement also recognizes the "utility of
standardization": "Standardization of agreements serves many of the same functions as standardization of goods and services; both are essential to a system of mass production and distribution."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1979).
613. Karl Llewellyn was the first to recognize the problem of "lack of assent" in standard form
contracts. See Slawson, supra note 435, at 32-37.
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tion between "customized contracts" and standard form contracts may
provide guidance on how a court approaches a case.
B.

Contract Law as a Normative Composite

Professor Hillman, in The Crisis in Modern ContractTheory, argues
that the "debate" between freedom of contract and legislative-judicial
preemption of the contracting process has distorted much of contract
theory.614 His observations are equally applicable to the illusion of a
unified theory:
This debate contributes to the crisis in contract theory, because it
diverts our focus from the reality that freedom of contract and fairness
principles are all very important.... In short, conflicting and complex
theories, principles, rules, and policies dominate modem contract law
and together govern the relations of people in our society.
...We would have to concede the bankruptcy of attempts to
concoct a unified theory of the whole.15
The problem with unified theories and the rigid application of contract
rules based upon such theories is that they are exclusionary. For example,
"pure" bargained for exchange would preclude reliance liability upon an
unreciprocated promise. The notion of "efficient breach" would justify
nonperformance, whereby the morality implicit in "contract as promise'
would not condone such a breach. Classical contracts' focus on the
importance of the generality of law would preclude the implication of a
"duty to adjust" by the "new spirit" of contract.
The diversity of norms and theories of contract should all be
allowed to provide "information" for the decision-maker. "A rational
person uses logical reasoning and all relevant available information
in... deciding what to do, and [in] accepting legal principles."6 1 6 So
too, we should encourage our judges to use their logical reasoning to
utilize and decipher all of the information available in making their
decisions. A normative composite formulated with all relevant contractual
theories should be used by the courts in weighing the consequences of
a given decision.
These norms can be found in the existing rules of law. Contract
rules were initially formulated to forward certain goals or norms. By

614, See Hillman, supra note 583, at 133.
615. Id.
616. Bayles, supra note 562, at 313.
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returning to the genesis of the different rules of contract, we can
rediscover their normative origins. The courts should attempt to
"synthesize" as many of these norms and goals in reaching their
decisions. Professor Summers, in noting that the norms may be in
conflict and that it is the task of the court to structure a decision that best
minimizes the conflict, states, "[T]here usually will be no simple, single
goal for a legal precept. The goals of a given precept form a goal
'constellation' or 'synthesis' that usually reflects some effort to
accommodate conflicts in an optimal way."617 What is being suggested
may be no more than what Llewellyn referred to as the need to return to
the "Grand Style 618 of decision-making or to Cardozo's notion of
"balancing" the conflicting demands of the norms of contract. Cardozo
explains that "[t]he social interest served by symmetry or certainty must
then be balanced against the social interest served by equity and
fairness.,

619

A non-unified approach to the enforceability and interpretation of
contract would be premised upon two exercises. First, there would be an
analysis of the norms underlying the doctrines and theories of contract.
Second, there would be the recognition that the norms represented by
classical contract theory and those that are behind the "new spirit" of
contract do, and should, coexist. The diversity of this normative base
should be recognized and used by courts in dealing with the "diversity
of contract." This diversity of contract precludes the notion of a
"hierarchy" of norms. In a given type of contract, the norm of certainty
may be the predominate influence. In another, the norms of fairness or
justice may tip the balance in another direction. The fact is that this
interplay of the norms of contract has always been at the heart of judicial
decision-making. What is posed here is a fuller recognition of the

617. Summers, supra note 20, at 885 (emphasis added).
618. LLEWELLYN, supra note 19, at 36. The Grand Style refers to a manner of

decision-making--'a functioning harmonization of vision with tradition, of continuity with growth,
of machinery with purpose, of measure with need." Id. at 37.
619. CARDOzO, supranote 2, at 113. Cardozo believes that the "judicial methods" available to
judges in balancing these "social interests" are sufficient for the task. He notes, "[T]he whole subject
matter of jurisprudence is more plastic, more malleable ...than most of us ...have been
accustomed to believe." Id. at 161.
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diversity of contract and of contractual norms that the notion of a unified
theory has precluded.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Behind the facade of the notion of a unified theory of contract,
many of the inner rumblings of the normative foundations of contracts
have gone unnoticed. In fact, the normative ground-swell that laid the
basis for many of the doctrines and rules of contract has been prevented
from further nourishing our jurisprudence. One may argue that there has
been an ongoing process of detachment between norm and rule.
Oftentimes, the normative basis of certain rules of contract have been
ignored in the promotion of a unified theory. A review of the different
unified theories and the search for the norms of contract leaves one
humbled by the complexity of the contractual landscape. Roscoe Pound
may have had this in mind when he proclaimed that "[n]owhere ...has
the deductive method broken down so completely as in the attempt to
deduce principles upon which contracts are to be enforced." 620
An analysis of the law of satisfaction illustrates the battle between
the norms of certainty and freedom of contract with the fairness norm.
Like the shifting of two geometric plates, the fairness of the exchange
has further encroached upon the domain of freedom of contract. The
classical preference for the determinacy of contract has given way to the
flexibility available by the fairness inquiry. The result is that subjective
satisfaction is redefined through the eyes of objectivity. Instead of
preserving the rule of freedom of contract, the courts should simply make
clear that unreasonable satisfaction clauses will not survive the strict
scrutiny of the fairness norm. The courts should return to the jural
rudiments and normative base of contract. The full panoply of norms
provided in our jurisprudence should be openly applied. Rule fixation
should give way to the use of a normative composite. The job of judge
and scholar should be to base decisions on and find solutions which best
balance the competing norms.
A recognition of the "diversity of contracts" and of the norms of
contracts will allow the law to achieve the benefits of both
backward-looking and forward-looking mind-sets. 2' Moreover, it
would allow the use of both deontological and teleological philosophy in
order to structure a system that promotes justice, certainty, and efficien-

620.

ROscoE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 149 (rev. ed. 1954).

621.

See POSNER, supra note 29, at 223-27.
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cy. Judge Posner defines wise adjudication as "finding the right balance
between predictability and flexibility."6" The advantage of the flexibility of a normative composite approach to decision-making is its adaptability to contractual situations that continue to grow in variety and
complexity. Judges should no longer feel unduly constrained by the
dictates of contractual dogma. The decisions of the past should be a
source of guidance, not the source of preordination.

622. Id. at 147.
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